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Abstract
Malfunctioning software systems can cause severe loss of money, sensitive data, or
even human life. The ambition is therefore to verify these systems not only statically,
but also monitor their behaviour at runtime. For the latter case, the temporal logic
LTL—a de facto standard specification formalism in runtime verification—is widely
used and well-understood. However, propositional variables are usually not a nat-
ural nor sufficient model to represent the behaviour of complex, interactive systems
that can process arbitrary input values. Consequently, there is a demand for more
expressive formalisms that are defined wrt. what we call traces with data, i.e., traces
that contain propositions enriched with values from a (possibly) infinite domain.
This thesis studies the runtime monitoring with data for a natural extension of
LTL that includes first-order quantification, called LTLFO. The logic’s quantifiers
range over values that appear in a trace. Under assumptions laid out of what
should arguably be considered a “proper” runtime monitor, this thesis first identifies
and analyses the underlying decision problems of monitoring properties in LTL and
LTLFO. Moreover, it proposes a monitoring procedure for the latter. A result is that
LTLFO is undecidable, and the prefix problem too, which an online monitor has to
preferably solve to coincide with monotonicity. Hence, the obtained monitor cannot
be complete for LTLFO; however, this thesis proves the soundness of its construction
and gives experimental results from an implementation, in order to justify its useful-
ness and efficiency in practice. The monitor is based on a new type of automaton,
called spawning automaton; it helps to efficiently decide what parts of a possibly
infinite state space need to be memorised at runtime. Furthermore, the problem
occurs that not every property can be monitored trace-length independently, which
is possible in LTL. For that reason, a hierarchy of effectively monitorable properties
is proposed. It distinguishes properties for which a monitor requires only constant
memory from ones for which a monitor inevitably has to grow ad infinitum, inde-
pendently of how the future of a trace evolves.
Last but not least, a proof of concept validates the monitoring means developed
in this thesis on a widely established system with intensive data use: Malicious be-
haviour is checked on Android devices based on the most comprehensive malware
set presently available. The overall detection and false positive rates are 93.9% and
28%, respectively. As a means of conducting the experiments and as a contribution in
itself, an application-agnostic logging-layer for the Android system has been devel-
oped and its technical insights are explained. It aims at leveraging runtime verifica-
tion techniques on Android, like other domain-specific instrumentation approaches
did, such as AspectJ for Java.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In today’s society, software systems grow inevitably in scale and functionality while
at the same time performing increasingly critical work. For example, in cars, which
evolve towards self-driving [Halleck, 2015], a growing range of complex control tasks
is handled by software whose malfunction can cause severe injury or even death to
human beings [cf. Knight, 2002]. Not long ago, many consumer devices, such as
mobile phones, involved almost no software. Nowadays, they are powerful comput-
ing devices, connect to the internet, and contain several built-in sensors dedicated to
tracking a user’s location, taking photos or scanning fingerprints. These innovations
in hardware open up the door to many useful software applications, such as mobile
payments, or location based services. However, unauthorised access to sensitive data
(e.g., through exploits of a phone’s operating system [cf. Davi et al., 2010]) can cause
the loss of valuable assets, including real money or users’ identity [cf. Dagon et al.,
2004]. The literature usually distinguishes systems as being safety- or security crit-
ical; safety refers to the inability of the system to have an undesirable effect on its
environment, and security, vice versa, to the inability of the environment to have an
undesirable effect on the system [Line et al., 2006].
Due to the increased complexity and growing interrelation of security and safety,
it is a main goal in software and systems engineering to improve on verification tech-
niques for such critical systems; verification, according to IEEE [2005a], comprises all
techniques suitable for showing that a system satisfies its specification. Ideally ver-
ification is achieved statically, i.e., without executing a program (e.g., based on its
source code alone). Traditional static verification techniques include model checking
[cf. Clarke et al., 2001; Baier and Katoen, 2008], theorem proving [cf. Bertot and
Castéran, 2004], and testing [cf. Myers et al., 2012].1 Despite their great advantages
to program correctness, these techniques have shortcomings: Model checking faces
the state explosion problem [cf. Clarke, 2009], so that for very large systems the com-
putational power or memory needed is beyond what is practically feasible today. On
the other hand, theorem proving does not scale well as it typically requires manual
effort [Kaufmann and Moore, 2004]. Moreover, there is no hope to statically verify
programs or systems comprehensively, as this is in general an undecidable problem
1Testing can be dynamic and static. In the latter case, it includes program inspections or code
walkthroughs [Myers et al., 2012, §3], which are usually not computer-based.
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[Turing, 1936]. Even if all errors could be eliminated prior to execution, the under-
lying hardware might behave in an unexpected manner, or assumptions made about
the execution environment prove themselves inadequate or incomplete in practice.
Hence, the non-occurrence of problems at runtime cannot be guaranteed, so that
the combination of static and dynamic analysis has become the norm and often even
mandatory for critical systems [cf. Bowen and Stavridou, 1993]. Generally speak-
ing, dynamic analysis approaches check single execution paths; thus, they are by
definition incomplete, as not all errors can be detected (false negatives). However,
their advantage is the access to “real” execution data. This can drastically limit false
positives and, therefore, complement static analysis techniques, as false positives of-
ten occur due to working with an abstraction of the system [cf. Chen et al., 2004].
Another advantage is that dynamic analysis can be applied to “black boxes” (i.e.,
without having access to the source code). In this case static verification becomes
impossible.
Dynamic techniques can be used both for testing before deployment of the soft-
ware, in which case test case runs are checked to uncover a bug [Artho et al., 2003],
and after—to continuously monitor a running system in production. This thesis deals
with studying challenges and formal approaches to the latter.
1.1 An overview of the runtime verification process
This section provides a brief overview of the research discipline and the major steps
involved in the process to formally and continuously monitor a system.
Leucker and Schallhart [2009] define runtime verification as the discipline of com-
puter science that deals with the study, development, and application of those ver-
ification techniques that allow checking whether an execution of a system under
scrutiny satisfies or violates a given correctness property. Thus, the inputs to a run-
time verification framework are: (1) a system to be checked, and (2) a set of cor-
rectness properties that is checked against the execution of the system. Runtime
verification is nowadays commonly associated with only the detection of a property’s
satisfaction or violation (i.e., only passively observes a running system), unlike run-
time enforcement [cf. Falcone et al., 2012b; Schneider, 2000], which additionally studies
the “repairing” (i.e., delaying, stopping or changing) of executions. Runtime enforce-
ment is out of scope of this thesis. The runtime verification process typically involves
four aspects, whose relation is depicted in Fig. 1.1, and which are introduced in
the following [cf. Bauer, 2007; Falcone et al., 2013]. The first two aspects are con-
cerned with checking system traces, i.e., designing adequate specification languages
to formulate properties, and building algorithms to check those (from top left to the
middle). The last two aspects (from bottom to top right) are concerned with the
practical side of generating the traces and running the analysis, i.e., extracting the
necessary observations from a system, and finally, forwarding them to monitors as
well as interpreting their results.
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Figure 1.1: An overview of the runtime verification process.
Property specification. A set of correctness properties is usually expressed in a for-
mal specification language (e.g., a logic-based formalism with mathematically defined
syntax and semantics) that suits for unambiguous description and reasoning, so that
the latter can be performed by a computing device. As writing specifications is even
a difficult and error prone task for experts, one aims at the same time for conciseness
and intuitive understanding of the specification language. For this purpose, there ex-
ists work on extensions, which do not make a language more powerful but improve
its usability [cf. Bauer and Leucker, 2011; IEEE, 2005b].
Depending on what needs to be checked, the requirements for the specification
formalism vary. However, their diversity shows that, not surprisingly, there exists
no “silver bullet” formalism and associated monitoring technique yet [cf. Falcone
et al., 2013]. Formalisms adequate for runtime verification usually support reason-
ing about sequences of temporally separated program states (and not just assertions
about a single program state). This means they include some kind of temporal quan-
tification, e.g., in form of temporal operators. These can refer to points in time, so
that properties such as “whenever a user logs into a system, she eventually logs out”
can be expressed. Some formalisms are called untimed, i.e., only allow referring to
time in terms of a state ordering relationships [cf. Pnueli, 1977], while others go
further and allow stating relative or absolute time values [cf. Raskin, 1999]. An often
additionally required language feature is called data quantification. It allows binding
and referral (forward or backward in time) to values across states [Havelund and
Goldberg, 2005].
This thesis deals in particular with a natural extension of LTL that allows data
quantification, called LTLFO (see §3.1).
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Monitor generation. From each property a so-called monitor is generated, i.e., a
decision procedure for the property. It takes representations of system executions
as inputs. The monitor’s task then is to yield a verdict that tells if the property has
been satisfied (or violated) by the observed system behaviour. The monitor usually
informs the user after each received event, while taking into account the history of all
events received so far. Monitor generation is usually automated, i.e., no user interac-
tion is necessary. It is a challenging trade off between designing the expressiveness
of a language and constructing effective as well as efficient monitors that can check
every property specifiable in it.
System instrumentation. The purpose of this stage is to generate from native oc-
curring system events—to give some examples, these can be performed operations,
function calls, acquired locks, or assignments to variables—so-called actions2 that can
be understood and processed by a monitor for analysis. As it has to be assured that
all observations necessary for checking a property can be technically retrieved, this
stage depends on the ones above. In other words, the stream of captured events is
the sole representation of a system’s execution on which the analysis is based; hence,
it is crucial to gather all relevant actions, as the consequence of missed observations
likely result in incorrect outcome of monitor verdicts. On the other hand, capturing
irrelevant observations causes unnecessary performance overhead to the system en-
vironment. This stage can also influence the stages above if one has to deal with a
given, fixed set of possible observations, and one needs to find under this assumption
an adequate formalism for reasoning.
Execution analysis. Finally, the system is executed and generates events that are
consumed by the monitor(s) whose outcome is interpreted and from which according
actions are to be derived. Overhead is induced by the system instrumentation, as
well as the monitors. The latter might run internally (i.e., on the same execution
environment as the system), where they influence its efficiency, or externally, where
performance is probably less crucial. In synchronous monitoring, whenever a relevant
observation is produced by the system, further execution is stopped until the checker
confirms that no violation has occurred. However, synchronous monitoring is only
necessary if reconfiguration, repairing or giving feedback to the system based on the
monitor’s results is desired and time-critical.
1.2 Detailed problem statement
Runtime verification for propositional temporal specification formalisms, such as
LTL, has been widely studied since the early 2000s and is nowadays well-understood.
2In the literature, the term action and event are often used interchangeably. In this thesis we will
use the term system event, to make clear whenever we mean a native event, action for their formal
representation, and simply event to denote a set of actions, which represents all necessary information
about a system state at a time, for example.
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A key result of monitoring LTL properties is that the prefix problem (see Def. 3.2.3)
can be solved by a decision procedure in form of a Moore machine [Bauer et al.,
2011] that is optimal wrt. space complexity (i.e., is the unique solution with the
fewest states).
However, while LTL is sufficient to monitor embedded systems, there is a growing
demand to monitor interactive and structural more complex, high-level systems that
process arbitrary input values. A use case is to check the latter, for instance, against
compliance and security regulations [cf. Basin et al., 2014]. Consequently, research
has shifted towards formalisms with an adequate expressiveness. These are defined
over what we call in the following traces with data, i.e., traces containing actions
enriched with values from a (possibly) infinite domain. In this context, dealing with
decidable monitoring problems, building finite state-space algorithms, or finding an
optimal monitor is generally not—or only under tight restrictions—possible.
1.2.1 Monitoring beyond propositional expressiveness
When using propositional runtime verification, one assumes that information about a
system’s state is representable in form of propositional variables; or more precisely
conjunctions of propositional literals. There exist various practically useful proper-
ties that are expressible in this kind of formalism. Consider, for example, the dining
philosopher problem introduced by Dijkstra [1971], which illustrates synchronisation
issues of concurrent systems: having n philosophers and n chopsticks, each philoso-
pher can be in a state of waiting for up to two chopsticks (represented by proposition
waiti), eating (if occupying two chopsticks), or releasing both chopsticks after finish-
ing eating. An occupied chopstick is represented by occupiedi. The property
G¬( ∧
0≤i<n
waiti ∧
∧
0≤i<n
occupiedi),
written here in LTL (see § 2.4 for its formal syntax and semantics), describes deadlock
freedom, i.e., it should be never the case that all philosophers are waiting while all
chopsticks are occupied (as this means exactly one chopstick is occupied by each
philosopher, so that no one can proceed).
However, if a system’s internal state structure is complex, or it processes a priori
unknown input values, propositional logic might not be an adequate formalism for
verification. In the best case, properties are just very long and inefficient to write
and monitor. Imagine in the example above having thousands of philosophers (or
processes, as an equivalent in a software system). In this case the property would
be still expressible as long as the number of philosophers is known at the time of
specification. However, in other cases, arbitrary values from an infinite domain can
occur (such as the integers or strings), which cannot be stated as a propositional
property of finite length. Consider for example a web server, for which we do not
know the number of expected users logged in at any given time. The property
G∀x : login. X(¬login(x)Ulogout(x))
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overcomes this problem, as it is able to reason over traces with data. A trace contains
instead of propositions login and logout, which are true (i.e., appear in the trace) if a
login happens, ground atoms such as login(d) and logout(d′), where d, d′ ∈N0 repre-
sent user IDs. The quantifier in the formula above then binds the values from ground
atoms of each event to the variable x for which the formula X(¬login(x)Ulogout(x))
must hold, respectively. This means a user identified by the natural number 3, for
example, should not log in twice, unless she logs out (i.e., logout(3) appears in the
trace) in between. For the formal syntax and semantics of this property, specified
here in LTLFO, see §3.1.
There exist a wide range of different approaches that are capable of monitoring
traces with data, but these vary in expressiveness and efficiency. Some allow explicit,
but often only implicit or restricted quantification, can only monitor a syntactical
safety fragment, or do not allow for arbitrary computable predicates or functions
as we shall see when discussing related work in §4.5. One of the most efficient
approaches is JavaMOP, which can solve the login-logout-problem above via so-called
trace slicing [Chen and Rosu, 2009]. However, we will see that many other properties
cannot be monitored by it. Furthermore, some works do not agree with the properties
an online monitor should arguably have, and which are described in detail in the next
section.
1.2.2 Desired properties of a monitor
As there exist many ways in which a system can be monitored in the abstract sense
described in §1.1, we are going to put forth six specific assumptions concerning the
properties and inner workings of what is considered a “proper” monitor.
Property 1 (Online monitoring): When monitoring reactive systems, such as oper-
ating systems, web servers or mobile phones, the assumption is that those ideally do
not terminate. In this case, we need to monitor online, i.e., process executions from
a system while it is still evolving—knowing that there is always eventually a next
event. In other words, a monitor can not wait until the system has finished executing
to process observations, and therefore incrementally consumes events in a step-by-
step manner—whenever a next, new observation occurs. It is common practice that
the monitor yields a verdict after every observation; that is, to inform the user as
early as possible about the satisfaction (resp. violation) of the property.
On the other hand, when monitoring offline, one usually records events from a
system under scrutiny for some fixed amount of time or until it terminates (e.g., in
the case of a non-reactive system or algorithm, such as a sorting function), stores
them, for example, in a log file, and applies a monitor to analyse the sequence of
executions post hoc—as a whole. In this case, we say the sequence of observed
events is complete, i.e., no further events of the system are expected, and no further
knowledge about the system executing can be gained. In offline monitoring, it is
sufficient for a monitor to yield a verdict at the end of the trace instead of providing
intermediate results.
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In this thesis, we require a monitor of being capable to perform at least online
monitoring, which we will see is the much harder problem to solve.
Property 2 (Trace-length independence): Our second property states that an online
monitor should not try to store an ever growing trace, or otherwise the monitor’s
efficiency will inevitable decline with an increasing number of observations. In other
words, ideally, the amount of information that needs to be stored by a monitor as its
inner state should depend only upon the property to be monitored and not upon the
number of already processed events. While many monitors in propositional runtime
verification fulfil this property, we shall see that this is generally not possible when
monitoring traces with data. More precisely, trace-length independence becomes
a property both of formulae and monitors, where the later should be trace-length
independent if likewise the formulae being monitored allow it.
In a taxonomy of monitoring properties introduced by Rosu and Havelund [2005]
a monitor violating this property was named trace storing, or non-storing if being
trace-length independent.
Property 3 (Monotonicity): The property called monotonicity of entailment in a logi-
cal system such as classical first-order logic, means that if a sentence ϕ can be inferred
from a set of premises Γ, then it can also be inferred from any set ∆ of premises con-
taining Γ as a subset. In other words, additional knowledge should never change the
truth value of already inferred results. Kleene [1952] introduced monotonicity (back
then called regularity) in the context of dealing with undefined (i.e., unknown) truth
values, when extending Boolean logic to a 3-valued logic with truth value “incon-
clusive”. He stated that the value of any formula should never change from true to
false or from false to true, though a change from “inconclusive” to one of false or true
is allowed—complying this way with the meaning of true and false in the 2-valued
Boolean logic.
Similarly, since observed behaviour at runtime can only ever be a finite prefix of
an ideally infinite behaviour, a consequence from online monitoring is that knowl-
edge (i.e., a trace) is always incomplete albeit extended with each new observation.
Hence, with the desire in runtime verification to avoid misunderstanding wrt. the
meaning of true and false in classical logics, we require that these truth-value’s se-
mantics ultimately should be preserved; that is, the satisfaction (in the case of a
monitor returning true) or violation (in the case of a monitor returning false) of a
property independent of more knowledge gained—implying also that a monitoring
device can stop observing in those cases. In other words, we demand a monitor in
this thesis to be monotonic wrt. reporting verdicts for a specification, meaning that
once the monitor returns “SAT” to the user, additional observations do not lead to it
returning “UNSAT” (and vice versa).
Property 4 (Impartiality): Refining the idea of monotonicity, Bauer et al. [2007] and
Dong et al. [2008] have stated the principle of impartiality, which requires that a finite
trace is not evaluated to true or false if there still exists an (infinite) continuation
leading to another verdict. Obviously, this principle implies online monitoring, as
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there are no continuations when working with complete traces. This principle was
stated having a concrete semantics for runtime verification in mind, namely LTL3,
which we will investigate further in §2.5.
Property 5 (Anticipation): Generally speaking, this principle desires a monitor to
return a conclusive verdict as early as possible, so that the user can react timely on
a system fault, for example. However, the principle of anticipation was articulated
having the detection of good and bad prefixes in mind, thus requires that once every
(infinite) continuation of a finite trace leads to the same verdict, then the finite trace
evaluates to this verdict [Dong et al., 2008]. Note that requesting the principle of
impartiality alone would allow for a trivial monitor; that is, one that always yields the
verdict “unknown”. But this monitor would not be anticipatory, so both principles
are required together.
Note as well that historically, in a taxonomy of monitor properties proposed by
Rosu and Havelund [2005], this property was called synchronous monitoring. However,
it did not distinguish between an offline monitor, which generally cannot detect a
violation in a timely manner, and an online monitor, which detects violations several
but finitely many steps later than those occurred.
Property 6 (Minimal or low runtime overhead): We understand monitoring or run-
time overhead as the time (or number of computation steps) that it takes the monitor to
yield a verdict, starting from reading the current event as input until being ready to
process the next event. However, the verdict should not depend on the current event
alone, but must obviously take into account the history of all events received so far
(for which purpose the monitor keeps an inner state). For the case of LTL properties,
Bauer et al. [2006, 2011] have proposed a monitor with constant runtime overhead,
but whose construction is double-exponential. However, a common assumption in
runtime verification is to neglect the cost of monitor generation ahead of time (un-
less, of course, the monitor for very long properties cannot practically be built), as
it is comparably low in relation to the runtime overhead that occurs over and over
again for each new event.
Note that this property is somewhat stricter than demanding a monitor to be
only trace-length independent, since minimal (or low) overhead implicitly claims
that a monitor is not allowed to process the whole trace after each new event.
1.2.3 System instrumentation as a domain-specific task
As we have pointed out in §1.1, runtime verification with data requires collecting
detailed information about a system executing. Therefore, developing techniques to
automatically instrument systems—with probes for event extraction—is a practical
and important problem the runtime verification community is concerned with; espe-
cially, since not every system comes with a built-in logging mechanism, or what is
logged cannot be configured flexibly after a program is compiled.
However, in contrast to work pursued on monitoring algorithms and specification
languages, instrumentation is a highly domain specific task that cannot be solved
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without knowing what data is available to be intercepted, nor understanding how
information flows between components of a system, so that events are not missed.
Furthermore, it is necessary to take the characteristics of the targeted programming
language or paradigm into account, which also becomes apparent when consider-
ing the various tools available: For Java, there exists for example AspectJ [Kiczales
et al., 2001], and the AspectJ compiler, called ajc,3 which is used by many runtime
verification frameworks to “weave” log statements into the source code or even byte-
code of a program. For programs written in C++, there are approaches such as As-
pectC++4 [Spinczyk and Lohmann, 2007], for C the tool Movec5 [Chen et al., 2016b],
or Arachne6 [Douence et al., 2006], which is a dynamic “weaver” for binary code of
C applications.
Challenges of instrumenting the Android system. The Android operating system
(OS) is the fastest growing mobile operating system in the world (Fig. B.1), which
has been under development since 2003. With 86% global market share (Fig. B.1),
and in use not just on mobile phones or tablets, but also on televisions, or in cars,
it is nowadays established world-wide; hence, there is arguably a need to have an
instrumentation mechanisms for it, in order to undertake debugging,7 profiling [cf.
Yoon et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2012] or security hardening [cf. Enck et al., 2010], to
name just some applications. Note that in this thesis we use the term Android system
when we mean the Android OS and the software applications (called apps) running
on top of it. In other words, the term Android system denotes here the complete
software stack that runs on a mobile device.
Although apps are written mainly in Java, instrumenting them cannot be simply
solved by applying AspectJ to them. First of all, apps running on the Android OS are
usually developed by third-party vendors, so that their source code is not directly
accessible and often heavily obfuscated [cf. Moser et al., 2007]. Even though placing
probes in bytecode is possible, modifying apps would break the licence agreement
and also their signature. Furthermore, one has to be concerned with dynamic loading
of executable code via reflection [Forman and Forman, 2004], which is not present
at instrumentation time, or C libraries that an app can make use of via the Java
Native Interface (JNI). Consequently, it might be preferred to consider apps as “black
boxes” and capture events outside the apps—as part of the Android OS. Depending
on the range of events to capture one might need to tie into the platform at a low
level (e.g., the Linux kernel), where one is concerned with data formats that are not
human-readable anymore; that is, the unknown semantics of bytestreams has to be
decoded in some way. Although the Android platform stack is freely available,8 and
arbitrary modifications to the Android OS are possible, users usually run a so-called
3http://www.eclipse.org/aspectj/doc/released/devguide/ajc-ref.html
4http://www.aspectc.org/
5http://svlab.nuaa.edu.cn/zchen/projects/movec/
6http://web.emn.fr/x-info/arachne/index.html
7https://developer.android.com/studio/debug/index.html
8https://source.android.com/
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stock ROM (i.e., the initial firmware on a device provided by the manufacturer or
mobile carrier), and do not want to be concerned with deploying their own version.
Therefore, statically weaving and recompiling the Android Open Source Project (AOSP)
is not a choice as it restricts usability.
Consequently, having an instrumentation approach for Android—a data-intensive
and security-critical platform—is challenging but is expected to be of interest to the
runtime verification community.
1.2.4 The benefit of runtime verification on mobile platforms
The dominance of the Android OS, and especially its security relevance due to
managing a wide range of sensitive data—such as location information or two-
step authentication tokens to access financial services—have made it a target of a
steadily growing range of attacks, such as so-called spyware or banking trojans. In
its Q1/2011 malware report,9 security firm Kaspersky remarks that “since 2007, the
number of new antivirus database records for mobile malware has virtually doubled
every year.”, and in August 2015 McAfee still recognised a growth of 17% quarterly
(see Fig. B.2)—having captured over 8 million mobile malwares in total. Further-
more, in case of the Android platform, security firm McAfee asserts in its Q2/2011
threats report that, in fact, “Android OS-based malware became the most popular
target for mobile malware developers.”10
Besides traditional virus scanners tackling this problem, static analysis techniques
have been increasingly employed, such as model checking and theorem proving, in
order to perform malware detection on a semantic-based level [cf. Kinder et al.,
2005; Preda et al., 2008]. While it has been shown that these systems are effective
in identifying current malware, code obfuscation schemes [cf. Moser et al., 2007]
and the fundamental limits in what can be decided statically, render static analysis
techniques alone insufficient to detect malicious code. For this reason, automated
dynamic analysis systems have been explored that can deal with the large amounts
of malware and its diversity. However, those techniques on the other hand, which are
often used as a form of testing (i.e, run on an emulator or other kind of artificial test
environment for a short period of time), face difficulties with malware samples that
employ recent emulator-detection techniques [Vidas and Christin, 2014]. Therefore,
it is expected that online monitoring is a complementing option lending itself well
for mobile security and helping to secure mobile systems running directly on end-
users’ phones. The latter scenario had not been comprehensively explored before,
i.e., no vast amount of real malware behaviour has been exhaustively monitored to
support this hypothesis. Furthermore, questions arise whether it scales to effectively
discover malicious behaviour by specifications and if detection and false positive
rates are promising. Also, while runtime verification has been evaluated for the use
of monitoring safety [cf. Brat et al., 2004; Pike et al., 2011] as well as security policies
[cf. Basin et al., 2014], it is of interest to study what language features are suitable
9http://me.kaspersky.com/en/images/kaspersky_lab_q1_malware_2011_report.pdf
10http://www.mcafee.com/au/about/news/2011/q3/20110823-01.aspx
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for mobile platforms, for example, to facilitate reasoning over the various appearing
forms of data to a great extent.
1.3 Contributions of this thesis
This thesis contributes both in a theoretical and practical way to the research field of
runtime verification. Under the assumption of modelling system behaviour in form
of traces with data, it investigates the computational complexity of online monitoring
and provides an efficient runtime monitor for this setting that complies with prop-
erties stated in §1.2.2. Furthermore, it provides a useful instrumentation approach
for a widely used platform with data—the Android system—and evaluates the ap-
plication of runtime verification to Android in terms of effectiveness and efficiency
for mobile security.
Contributions to the foundations of runtime verification. After first summarising
some well-known computational complexity results for decision problems around
monitoring LTL properties—such as the satisfiability, word, model checking and pre-
fix problem—we look at this decision problems again, in comparison, for LTLFO. In
this new setting we will see that what we understand by solving the online moni-
toring problem, based on the desired properties of a monitor laid out in §1.2.2, is
undecidable. Furthermore, additional problems arise that have been irrelevant or
non-existent in the propositional case, such as determining whether a property is
trace-length (in)dependent; that is, if the amount of information a monitor has to
keep about the trace during monitoring has an upper bound. Note that in the propo-
sitional case only constant amount of data depending on trace needs to be stored
[Bauer et al., 2011]. For this purpose, we propose formal definitions of a monitor-
ing hierarchy. It distinguishes property classes for which a monitor exists that has
constant size, from properties for which it is unavoidable for any monitor to store
a strictly monotonic growing amount of data (independent of how the trace evolves
and which properties therefore have the inherent problem of being practically infea-
sible to monitor).
Contributions to monitor synthesis. The decision procedure developed in this the-
sis for LTLFO is neither restricted to implicit quantification (i.e., both universal and
existential quantifiers can be arbitrarily nested) nor syntactical fragments (instead
every formula definable in the language can in principle be monitored), allows us-
ing arbitrary computable predicates and functions, and furthermore agrees with
the postulated, desired properties of a monitor by tackling the prefix problem (see
Def. 3.2.3)—which we will see is computationally more involved than solving the
easier and decidable word problem (see Def. 3.2.1). The monitor construction is
based on a novel type of automaton, called a spawning automaton (SA), which is an
acceptor for LTLFO; that is, it only has an accepting run if the according trace is a
model of LTLFO. The automaton construction as well as the monitor construction is
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proven to be sound albeit the latter being incomplete, as the prefix problem of LTLFO
is undecidable. However, experiments show that this is more of a theoretical prob-
lem, as in practice a wide range of relevant properties can be efficiently monitored.
The construction resembles a similar idea as in Bauer et al. [2011], but since an SA
has an infinite state space, the approach for LTLFO is more complex. We can merely
create its structure ahead of time serving as a pattern, for which at runtime necessary
assignments are efficiently “book-kept” and “garbage collected”.
Contributions to system instrumentation. Chen et al. [2016b] argue that runtime
verification for Java became popular especially due to the success and availability of
the AspectJ compiler. Thus, inspired by AspectJ, they ported it for the C language,
hoping that their instrumentation leverages runtime verification applications for this
language, too. With a similar hypothesis in mind, this thesis proposes an application-
agnostic logging library for the Android platform that overcomes certain problems
in this field: It is modular in the sense that no Android system modifications are
required, and portable, i.e., works for a wide range of different Android versions
running on various hardware. This way it addresses the Android fragmentation
problem [cf. Zhou et al., 2014]. It has been successfully tested on devices of the
Google Nexus family (Nexus S, 7 and 5) and for early as well as recent Android
versions (2.3.6, 4.3 and 5.0.1).
Compared to other approaches, which are usually either app- or platform-centric
(see discussion in §6.5), the major advantage is that it, conceptually, combines the
strengths of both of these “worlds”: While it is similarly easy to install on a user’s
“off-the-shelf” device as app-centric approaches [cf. Backes et al., 2013; Xu et al.,
2012], which recompile apps under scrutiny but not the Android OS, it is also as
powerful as platform-centric approaches that have access to a wide range of system
events, but therefore need to modify the system [cf. Enck et al., 2010; Bugiel et al.,
2012]. However, the approach in this thesis neither modifies the Android OS nor
the apps running on it but it requires devices to be rooted to load a Linux kernel
module. This may seem restrictive, but one should keep in mind that it has become
common practice by now. The kernel module can be loaded even into a currently
running Android system, yet is able to trace app (even pre-installed Google apps
that cannot be rewritten or hidden spyware that the user is unaware of) and other
Android system interactions all the way down to the OS kernel level.
Feasibility and limitations. As a proof of concept, we validate runtime verifica-
tion for security purposes on mobile platforms: In the most comprehensive study on
Android attacks so far (undertaken by the Android Malware Genome Project (AMGP)),
the behaviour of more than 1, 200 malwares was analysed and categorised into com-
mon, recurring groups of attacks. Based on this work (and the corresponding actual
malware files), we specify and identify these (and similar) attacks using runtime
verification. For conducting the experiments, Küster and Bauer [2015] developed a
standalone monitoring app, which combines the monitor construction and the An-
droid system instrumentation approach mentioned above. Even though there have
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been many monitoring accomplishments to mobile security based on formal specifi-
cations, and especially Android, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis is
the first undertaking a broad study of comprehensively monitoring a vast set of real
malware collected by the AMGP on a real Android stock device.
1.3.1 Publications
The majority of research results presented throughout this monograph have been
published in proceedings of international conferences and journals: The detailed
theoretical foundations of LTLFO and complexity results in §3, the introduction of an
SA, the efficient and sound monitor approach for LTLFO, as well as the comparison
with a somewhat naive approach in §4, can be found in Bauer, Küster, and Vegliach
[2013]. The journal article by Bauer, Küster, and Vegliach [2015] extends the confer-
ence paper by proposing an optimised monitor construction for LTLFO, also contained
in §4, as well as refining ideas on trace-length independence, which led towards a
hierarchy of effectively monitorable languages in §5.
The modular, portable, and application-agnostic logging library for the Android
platform as well as the malware study in §6, for which the monitoring app was de-
veloped, has been published as a technical report (see [Küster and Bauer, 2014]) and
in Küster and Bauer [2015]. The first idea and study of applying runtime verification
to Android security was published in Bauer, Küster, and Vegliach [2012]—at that
time having implemented a somewhat naive monitoring approach based on formula
rewriting for LTLFO and having only a non-modular instrumentation prototype for
the Android system with limited access to a selection of system events.
1.3.2 Practical realisations
For undertaking the research of this thesis, three different tools have been developed.
They are available to use free of charge. Furthermore, Ltlfo2mon and DroidTracer
are free software, i.e., published under the GNU General Public License (GPL).
Ltlfo2mon (https://github.com/jckuester/ltlfo2mon). The decision procedure intro-
duced in this thesis, for solving the prefix problem of properties specified in LTLFO,
is implemented in Scala and available as the project Ltlfo2mon on github. Ltlfo2mon
allows to programmatically define arbitrary computable functions and predicates,
contains further an optimised version of the algorithm, which is also presented in
this thesis, and for comparison, allows switching to a procedure based on formula
rewriting. Ltlfo2mon can be used as a standalone tool without installing Scala. It is
ready-to-use via the command line in form of a Java Archive (JAR) file.
DroidTracer (https://github.com/jckuester/droidtracer-module). The application-
agnostic logging library for intercepting system events on the Android system is
also freely available on github. The project is wrapped into an Android Studio mod-
ule that can be imported in someone’s own app development process if its func-
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tionality is needed. DroidTracer has an API, which Javadoc can be found under
http://jckuester.github.io/droidtracer-module/. It allows other developers of third-
party apps to integrate DroidTracer and build their own analyses on top. More
precisely, the API allows a developer to register a callback method (which is called
whenever a new event occurs), start and stop tracing certain apps or all apps, and
add specific events to a white or black list (which always or never should be captured,
respectively, independent of what apps are currently intercepted).
MonitorMe (https://github.com/jckuester/monitorme-app). The monitoring app is
called MonitorMe. Technically, it uses DroidTracer as a library and combines it with
Ltlfo2mon, to run on an Android phone or tablet device. MonitorMe is able to run in
two (not mutually exclusive) modes: (1) monitor LTLFO specifications online, and (2)
persist events in an SQLite database for offline analysis, repeatability of experiments,
or to share traces with other researchers. MonitorMe is still under active develop-
ment. A range of already compiled kernel modules working for various devices is
available as well.
1.4 Results of this thesis
In summary, the particular results developed in this thesis are:
• The formal foundations of a custom first-order temporal logic, called LTLFO,
which is a natural extension of propositional future LTL with quantification—
to allow reasoning over traces carrying data.
• A summary of known complexity results for decision problems around moni-
toring in the propositional case (LTL) and proofs of their pendents’ complexity,
when “lifting” the setting to first-order (LTLFO).
• A translation from LTLFO to a novel type of automaton, called SA, which is
proven to be an acceptor for LTLFO; that is, it recognises exactly the language
(i.e., all models) of the LTLFO formula it is constructed for.
• A monitor construction based on an SA, which is proven to be sound albeit
inherently incomplete (due to the undecidablility of LTLFO). However, it is
efficient since it is able to precompute the state space structure required at
runtime.
• Formal definitions towards a general categorisation of so-called effectively mon-
itorable languages, which is closely related to this notion of “growth-inducing”
(i.e., trace-length dependent) formulae. It relates to the well-known safety-
progress hierarchy [Manna and Pnueli, 1990], yet is orthogonal to it.
• Instrumentation means of a native logging layer for the Android platform,
which is modular, portable to many versions and devices, and efficient. It is
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application-agnostic, so that one can build whatever analysis on top, and has a
functional-rich API to receive events without polling as well as to control what
apps and event types should be intercepted.
• A proof of concept showing that the first-order runtime verification approach
with data is effective to solve a “real world problem” in an efficient way. The
study provides detection and false positive rates by using the AMGP as a
benchmark. It strengthens the idea that runtime verification lends itself well
for mobile security.
• Tool-support in the form of Ltlfo2mon, DroidTracer, and MonitorMe.
1.5 Structure of this thesis
This section briefly summarises the remaining chapters in this thesis.
Chapter 2—Preliminaries. This chapter outlines the formal foundations and termi-
nology used in this thesis. It introduces notions and notations from the theory of
formal language, which are needed to mathematically precisely model both propo-
sitional and data-carrying traces. Furthermore, this chapter recalls the concept of
automata as acceptors for finite and infinite words, as the monitoring procedure for
LTLFO is based on these. It follows the formal syntax and semantics of LTL, and an
overview on different semantics suitable and arguably non-suitable for online mon-
itoring. They have an impact on the decision problem that a monitor is required to
solve in this thesis.
Chapter 3—Logic and complexity. This chapter first formally introduces LTLFO.
Second, it studies the complexity of decision problems revolving around runtime
verification, namely the satisfiability, model checking, word, and prefix problem—
first in the propositional case, for LTL, and then for its first-order extension, LTLFO.
Chapter 4—Monitoring algorithm. First, this chapter introduces definitions of the
new SA, and provides a translation for LTLFO formulae to an SA, which is proven cor-
rect. Second, it introduces the monitoring algorithm for LTLFO formulae based on an
SA, as well as optimisations for its implementation, and provides a soundness proof
for both. Furthermore, experimental results from an implementation are discussed.
Last but not least, a comprehensive study of monitoring approaches in the literature
that are also able to handle data in a broader sense is provided.
Chapter 5—Towards a hierarchy of effectively monitorable languages. This chap-
ter sketches a categorisation of so-called effectively monitorable languages, which is
closely related to this notion of “growth-inducing” (that is, trace-length dependent)
formulae. Furthermore, it discusses example formulae for each of the categories.
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Chapter 6—Proof of concept: Android malware detection. This chapter first de-
tails on the Android architecture and its built-in security mechanism, to then in-
troduce conceptual and technical details of the proposed Android logging-library
as well as the monitoring app. Furthermore, this chapter presents a specification
manual that explains how to best specify malware characteristics and behaviour in
LTLFO, as well as discusses formulae that describe malware behaviour derived from
the AMGP. It follows experimental results in form of detection rates for monitored
malware samples from the AMGP, a discussion about false positives, as well as the
examination of performance and portability. Finally, related Android instrumenta-
tion approaches in the literature are discussed.
Chapter 7—Conclusions. Conclusions are drawn from the work provided in this
monograph, as well as further research directions and open problems are discussed
in the last chapter of this thesis.
Appendix A—Detailed proofs. The undecidability, complexity, and soundness
proofs, whose ideas are only outlined in §3 and §4, are given in this appendix in
their full length.
Appendix B—Proof of concept: Additional experiment data. Comprehensive ex-
perimental results from the malware analysis on the Android platform are contained
in this appendix.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
The aim of this chapter is to recall formal foundations and define some terminology
used in the remainder of this thesis.
Section §2.1 introduces the notions and notations of finite and infinite words from
the theory of formal language, and §2.2 details on their use as an underlying model of
system executions. Furthermore, §2.4 formally describes the syntax and semantics of
LTL—originally defined in terms of infinite words—that is used to formulate system
properties for static as well as dynamic verification. Section §2.4 further explains the
meaning of some LTL formulae based on examples from the well-known specification
patterns. Since many monitoring approaches for LTL, similar to the one in this thesis,
are based on executable automata, §2.3 presents how words are recognised by means
of automata theory. It focuses on regular and ω-regular languages, as languages
defined in terms of LTL are a strict subset of the latter. Finally, §2.5 gives an overview
of different LTL semantics over finite words—some arguably suitable and others non-
suitable for online monitoring—as these determine what decision problem a monitor
should solve; hence, the semantics ultimately influences the monitor construction
provided in §4.
2.1 Words over alphabets
An alphabet Σ is a finite non-empty set of symbols. A finite word (or string) over
Σ is a sequence of symbols drawn from Σ, i.e., finite words are of the form u =
u0 . . . ui . . . un, where n, i ∈ N0, 0 ≤ i ≤ n and ui ∈ Σ. Depending on the context,
we give the symbols a concrete name, e.g., we speak of events when we use words to
represent system executions. Also, if we refer to a word not just in its abstract sense
of a language, but mean the representation of some concrete system behaviour or
executions, we might use the term trace instead.
The length of a finite word u = u0u1 . . . un, usually written |u|, is n + 1 (i.e., the
number of all symbols occurring in u). The empty word, denoted e, is the word of
length 0. Given an alphabet Σ, we write Σn to denote all words with length n that
can be constructed from Σ. The set of all finite words is indicated using the Kleene
star operator, Σ∗ :=
⋃
i∈N0 Σ
i. Furthermore, the Greek letter ω (omega) is used to
denote “infinity”, i.e., represents the smallest infinite ordinal ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, so
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that we write Σω to denote the set of all infinite words over the alphabet Σ. We call
an infinite word w = w0w1w2 . . . ∈ Σω also an ω-word.1 As a convention, we use
u, u′, v, . . . to denote finite words, by σ the word of length 1, and w for infinite ones
or where the distinction is of no relevance. Furthermore, we define Σ∞ := Σ∗ ∪ Σω
to be the union of the sets of all infinite and finite words, and Σ+ := Σ∗ \ {e} the set
of all non-empty finite words, over Σ respectively.
A prefix of an infinite word w = w0w1w2 . . . is a word v of the form v = w0w1 . . . wi,
where i ∈ N0, or in the case of a finite word w = w0w1 . . . wn, if 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Note
that e is a prefix of any finite or infinite word. For two words u and v, where u is
finite, we write uv when we mean their concatenation, which itself is another word;
more precisely an ω-word if v is an ω-word, but finite if v is finite. For a word
w = w0w1 . . ., the word wi is defined as wiwi+1 . . ..
A language is any set of words over some fixed alphabet Σ, denoted by L, and
L ⊆ Σ∗ therefore is a language of finite and L ⊆ Σω of infinite words. Based
on concatenation of single words, we define the concatenation of finite languages,
LL′ := {uv ∈ Σ∗ | u ∈ L and v ∈ L′}, and the Kleene-closure or star of a language
inductively as L∗ := ⋃i∈N0 Li, where L0 := {e}, L1 := L, and Li = L · · · L (the
concatenation of i copies of L). The union and intersection of two languages L and L′,
denoted as L ∪ L′ and L ∩ L′ respectively, is defined as for usual sets; thus L ∪ L′
contains all words in either L or L′, or both, whereas L ∩ L′ contains all words that
are only in both languages.
2.2 Representation of system behaviour
This section details on some common, propositionally-based representations of sys-
tem executions in static and dynamic verification methods, such as model checking
or runtime verification. These representations are based on the notions of finite and
infinite words in §2.1.
A Kripke structure is a transition system, or digraph. It is used in model checking
to represent all possible, infinite system executions of a reactive system. States of the
structure correspond to system states, and executions correspond to paths through
the structure. Clarke et al. [2001] define a Kripke structure as follows.
Definition 2.2.1 (Kripke structure). Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. A Kripke
structure over AP is a tuple K = (S, s0,λ,→), where
• S is a finite set of states,
• s0 ∈ S a distinguished initial state,
• λ : S −→ 2AP a labelling function assigning propositions to states (where 2AP is the
power set of AP), and
• →⊆ S× S a left-total transition relation, (i.e., ∀s ∈ S. ∃s′ ∈ S. (s, s′) ∈→).
1Words can be also defined as a function, i.e., u : {0, 1, . . . , n} −→ Σ for finite ones or w : N0 −→ Σ
for infinite ones, which leads to the notion u = u(0)u(1)u(2) . . . u(n) and w = w(0)w(1)w(2) . . .
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There exist a transition from state s ∈ S to state s′ ∈ S if and only if (s, s′) ∈→.
A run ρ through the structure K is a sequence of states ρ = s0s1s2 . . . such that
for i ∈ N0 it holds that (si, si+1) ∈→, and s0 is the initial state. The infinite trace
w = λ(s0)λ(s1)λ(s2) . . . over a run ρ is then an ω-word over the alphabet 2AP.
Recall that we call the sets of atomic propositions events. The occurrence of some
native system event is then modelled by a single atomic proposition if it is contained
in such set. Since→ is left-total, there is always an infinite run through the structure.
In other words, the language defined by a Kripke structure is an ω-language. A
deadlock state s can be modeled by having for s only a single outgoing and self-
looping transition, which is of the form (s, s) ∈→.
We say that K is a linear Kripke structure, if each state of K has at most one
successor and the transition relation is loop-free. In this case K defines a single, finite
run and it models a sequence of observed system executions in runtime verification,
for example.
2.3 Automata as acceptors of finite or infinite words
Compared to Turing machines [Turing, 1936]—a useful mathematical model to study
what can and what cannot be computed in terms of real computers—automata are
a simpler form of abstract “machines”. Conceptually, a finite automaton might rep-
resent a computer program. It is at all times in one of a finite number of states,
whose purpose is to “remember” relevant parts of the program’s history. Since the
complete history of reactive systems cannot be remembered with finite resources, the
states are a helpful concept to design a program in such a way that it has to “forget”
what is not important. In this regard an automaton is a useful concept in runtime
verification; that is, to build monitoring procedures, and also study the amount of
information these keep at most at any time in order to yield a result.
Note that wrt. generating a monitor, an automaton can serve as a so called ac-
ceptor, i.e., indicate whether or not a received input is accepted (for this purpose
states are either marked as non-accepting or accepting). Formally, an automaton can
also be considered as the representation of a language, which contains every word it
accepts but none of the rejected ones.
Automata over finite words. Let us first recall automata over finite words, which
accept what are called the regular languages.
Definition 2.3.1 (Non-deterministic finite automaton). A non-deterministic finite au-
tomaton (NFA) is a tuple A = (Σ, Q, Q0, δ, F), where
• Σ is a finite alphabet,
• Q a finite set of states,
• Q0 ⊆ Q a set of distinguished initial states,
• δ : Q× Σ −→ 2Q a transition function, and
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• F ⊆ Q a distinguished set of final (or accept) states, also called acceptance set.
Definition 2.3.2 (Complete NFA). An NFA, A, is called complete, if for all q ∈ Q and
σ ∈ Σ, there exists a state q′ ∈ Q with q′ ∈ δ(q, σ).
Note that for every non-complete NFA, A, there exists a complete NFA, A′, such
that L(A) = L(A′) [cf. Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979].
Definition 2.3.3 (Finite run). Given a finite word u = u0u1 . . . un ∈ Σ∗, a finite run2 of
A over u is defined as a mapping ρ : {0, . . . n} −→ Q, such that
• ρ(0) ∈ Q0, and
• ρ(i + 1) ∈ δ(ρ(i), ui), where i, n ∈N0 and i < n.
Definition 2.3.4 (Accepting run). A run ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . ρ(n) is called accepting if
ρ(n) ∈ F, i.e., ρ ends in an accepting state.
As said above, automata can be seen as acceptors of words of a language, where
the accepted language of A is defined as
L(A) := {u ∈ Σ∗ | there exists an accepting run of A over u}.
The size of A, denoted |A|, is defined as the numbers of states and transitions of A,
i.e.,
|A| = |Q|+ ∑
q∈Q
∑
σ∈Σ
|δ(q, σ)|.
A is called a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) , if |Q0| ≤ 1 and |δ(q, σ)| ≤ 1 for all
q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ. It is well-known that deterministic and non-deterministic finite
automata are equally expressive; that is, a language can be recognised by an NFA
iff it can be recognised by a DFA; this can be proven via the well-known powerset
construction by Rabin and Scott [1959]. Therefore, we speak only of finite automata,
and omit their characterisation of being (non-)deterministic, if it is irrelevant or clear
from the context.
Another language-defining notation to describe regular languages are regular
expressions [Kleene, 1956]; these are outlined here briefly for completeness, since
LTL is a strict subset of their extension to the ω-regular languages, but which are
otherwise of no specific relevance in the rest of this thesis.
Definition 2.3.5 (Regular expressions). The set of regular expressions over an alphabet
Σ, denoted by RE(Σ), is inductively defined as follows:
e,∅ ∈ RE(Σ), where e and ∅ are constant symbols,
if σ ∈ Σ, then σ ∈ RE(Σ),
if E, E′ ∈ RE(Σ), then E + E′, EE′, E∗ ∈ RE(Σ).
2Alternatively, a finite run can be defined as a finite word (or sequence of states) q0q1 . . . qn ∈ Q∗,
such that q0 ∈ Q0 and qi+1 ∈ δ(qi, ui) for i, n ∈N0 and i < n.
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The language defined by a regular expression is defined inductively by the following
rules: L(∅) := ∅, L(e) := {e}, L(σ) := {σ}, L(E + E′) := L(E) ∪ L(E′),L(EF) :=
L(E)L(F),L(E∗) := (L(E))∗.
The equivalence of finite automata and regular expressions is known by Kleene’s
famous theorem:
Theorem 2.3.1 (Kleene theorem [Kleene, 1956]). A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is regular iff there
is a regular expression E ∈ RE(Σ) such that L = L(E).
Another concept we refer to in this thesis is a deterministic Moore machine
[Moore, 1956]. It is a finite state transducer, which—in contrast to a finite automaton—
has an output alphabet and tape; thus, it can print out some word, which is for a
Moore machine solely determined by its visited states. A Moore machine is used by
the monitor of Bauer et al. [2011] to print a verdict after processing each event.
Definition 2.3.6 (Moore machine). A Moore machine is a 6-tupleM = (Σ, Q, Q0, δ,Λ,λ),
where the first four symbols are defined as for the finite automaton above, and
• Λ is an output alphabet, and
• λ : Q −→ Λ a labelling function.
Automata over infinite words. Automata that serve as acceptors for ω-words are
called ω-automata. There exist various classes of ω-automata, such as the ones pro-
posed by [Büchi, 1962], [Rabin, 1969], [Streett, 1982], or [Muller, 1963]—each in a
deterministic or non-deterministic form. They are structurally identical to finite au-
tomata (i.e., are defined by the same five-tuple), but in order to accept infinite words,
they differ in the accepting condition. Furthermore, they all have the same expres-
siveness (i.e., are able to accept what is called the ω-regular languages), except the
deterministic Büchi automaton, which is strictly less expressive. However, we con-
sider only the non-deterministic Büchi automaton (NBA) [Büchi, 1962] any further, as
this is the standard acceptors for LTL-definable languages (i.e, the star-free regular
languages [cf. Lichtenstein et al., 1985], which are a strict subset of the ω-regular
languages), and also an underlying concept of the monitor construction in this the-
sis. We omit the reference “non-deterministic”, thus speak of a BA, whenever we
mean an NBA.
Definition 2.3.7 (Infinite run). Given an ω-word w = w0w1w2 . . . ∈ Σω, an infinite run
of ω-automaton A over w is defined as a mapping ρ : N0 −→ Q, such that
• ρ(0) ∈ Q0, and
• ρ(i + 1) ∈ δ(ρ(i), wi), where i ∈N0.
For a run ρ and ω-automaton A, the set of states visited infinitely often is denoted
by
Inf (ρ) := {q ∈ Q | ρ(i) = q for infinitely many i ∈N0}.
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Definition 2.3.8 (Non-deterministic Büchi automaton). An NBA is an an ω-automaton
A, of which a run ρ is accepting if ρ(i) ∈ F holds for infinitely many indices i ∈N0, i.e.,
Inf (ρ) ∩ F 6= ∅ (Büchi acceptance).
A further concept we need is that of a generalised (non-deterministic) Büchi automa-
ton (GBA). It is used for the standard translation of LTL to ω-automata [Gerth et al.,
1995], as it often results in smaller size than directly constructed NBAs [Gastin and
Oddoux, 2001]. A simple translation of a GBA into an NBA exists in form of the
well-known counting construction [cf. Gerth et al., 1995; Gastin and Oddoux, 2001,
§5].
Definition 2.3.9 (Generalised BA). A GBA, is a tuple G = (Σ, Q, Q0, δ,F ), where Σ, Q,
Q0, and δ are defined as for an NBA, and F = {F1, . . . , Fn} is a set of acceptance sets. Its
acceptance condition requires a run ρ to visit each of the sets F1, . . . , Fn infinitely often:
∀Fi ∈ F : Inf (ρ) ∩ Fi 6= ∅ (generalised Büchi acceptance).
The (infinite) accepted language of an ω-automaton is defined as
L(A) := {w ∈ Σω | there exists an accepting run of A over w}.
Definition 2.3.10 (ω-regular languages). A language L ⊆ Σω is called an ω-regular
language, if L := ⋃1≤i≤n LiL′ωi , for some n ∈ N, where Li,L′i are regular languages, L′i is
non-empty and does not contain the empty word e, and L′ωi := {v0v1 . . . | vj ∈ L′i for all j ∈
N0}.
It is noteworthy that Kleene’s theorem carries over in straightforward manner to
the ω-regular languages:
Theorem 2.3.2 (Büchi [1962]). An ω-language L ⊆ Σω is recognised by a BA if and only
if L is ω-regular.
The ω-regular languages and BAs—like regular languages and finite automata—
are closed under negation, union, and intersection; that is, if L1,L2 ⊆ Σω are two
ω-regular languages, then Σω \ L1, L1 ∪ L2, and L1 ∩ L2 are regular ω-languages,
respectively [cf. Baier and Katoen, 2008].
2.4 Propositional linear-time temporal logic
Linear-time temporal logic (LTL) is often more intuitive than writing ω-regular expres-
sions or even notions of automata directly. It was first proposed by Pnueli [1977]
as a formalism to program verification of reactive and concurrent systems and adds
temporal operators to propositional logic. While propositional logic is limited to
specify conditions about a single state (or point in time), LTL extends this concept
to sequences of states (and therefore permits truth values of propositions to vary
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over time). Note that temporal in this context does not refer to a global external clock
that determines when exactly events occur, but merely their relative order. In this
setting time points can then be modelled by monotonically increasing natural num-
bers, which is sufficient to express for example the property “no second login should
happen until a logout”. Moreover, the underlying perspective on time is linear, so
that every moment has exactly a single successor moment—in contrast to branching
time, where multiple successors, in a tree-like manner, are allowed (see for example
computational tree logic (CTL) [cf. Baier and Katoen, 2008]). As the discipline of run-
time verification reasons over single paths of executions, linear time is the only and
sufficient time model considered here.
In this section we recall the formal syntax and semantics of LTL.3 We also explain
the meaning of some common examples of LTL properties.
Definition 2.4.1 (LTL syntax). Given a set AP = {p1, . . . , pn} of atomic propositions,
the set of well-formed LTL formulae over AP, denoted by LTL(AP), is defined by the follow-
ing induction:
if p ∈ AP, then p ∈ LTL(AP),
if ϕ,ψ ∈ LTL(AP), then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ,Xϕ, ϕUψ ∈ LTL(AP).
If a concrete set AP is irrelevant or clear from the context, we write simply LTL
instead of LTL(AP). LTL formulae are usually interpreted over infinite traces of sets
of atomic propositions, i.e., elements from the alphabet Σ = 2AP. Interpretations
over finite traces exist too, such as the one originally introduced by Kamp [1968]. To
reduce redundancy, we provide in the following a combining definition, since both
forms are referred to in this thesis.
Definition 2.4.2 (LTL semantics). Let ϕ ∈ LTL(AP), w = w0w1 . . . ∈ Σ∞, where Σ =
2AP, a non-empty trace, and i ∈ N0 a time point. Then the relation w, i |= ϕ is defined
inductively as follows:
w, i |= p iff p ∈ wi, where p ∈ AP,
w, i |= ¬ϕ iff w, i 6|= ϕ,
w, i |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff w, i |= ϕ and w, i |= ψ,
w, i |= Xϕ iff |w| > i and w, i + 1 |= ϕ,
w, i |= ϕUψ iff there is a k s.t. i ≤ k < |w|, w, k |= ψ,
and for all i ≤ j < k, w, j |= ϕ.
If w, 0 |= ϕ holds, we usually write w |= ϕ instead, and we say w is a model of
(or satisfies) ϕ. Symmetrically, if w 6|= ϕ, we say w violates ϕ, in which case w is not
a model of ϕ. The set L(ϕ) := {w ∈ Σ∞ | w |= ϕ} is called the language of ϕ. If
L(ϕ) = ∅, then ϕ is called unsatisfiable, or otherwise, if ϕ has a model, satisfiable.
Note that LTL is a decidable logic; in fact, the satisfiability problem for LTL is known
to be PSpace-complete [Sistla and Clarke, 1985].
3In the literature, many variants of LTL exist, for example with past operators [cf. Laroussinie et al.,
2002], but which are not further discussed in this thesis.
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Although this semantics, which was also proposed by Markey and Schnoebelen
[2003], gives rise to mixed languages, i.e., languages consisting of finite and infinite
words, we shall only ever be concerning ourselves with either finite-trace or infinite-
trace languages, but not mixed ones. It is easy to see that over infinite traces this
semantics matches the definition of standard LTL. If necessary we use a subscript
and write |=F or |=ω, to distinguish whether we mean the finite or infinite semantics,
respectively.
When using LTL in proofs or other formal contexts, we restrict the Boolean op-
erators to ∧, and ¬, as those are sufficient to make the logic functionally complete
in terms of Boolean operators. However, in other parts throughout this thesis, for
readability, we may make use of the following derived operators:
false := p ∧ ¬p, ϕ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ⇔ ψ := (ϕ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ⇒ ϕ),
true := ¬false, ϕ⇒ ψ := ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ⊕ ψ := (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ).
Some further and commonly seen LTL operators are the following derivations, which
add “syntactic sugar” to the standard syntax. They do not add expressiveness to
LTL—as defined in terms of the standard operators—but are practical useful to write
shorter, often more concise and intuitive formulae:
Fϕ := trueUϕ (eventually),
Gϕ := ¬F¬ϕ (or ϕWfalse) (globally),
ϕWψ := (ϕUψ) ∨Gϕ (weak until),
ϕRψ := ¬(¬ϕU¬ψ) (release).
Note that the G-operator is dual to the F-operator, the U-operator dual to the R- and
W-operator, respectively, and the X-operator is dual to itself:4
¬Gϕ = F¬ϕ,
¬Fϕ = G¬ϕ,
¬(¬ϕU¬ψ) = ϕRψ,
¬(¬ϕR¬ψ) = ϕUψ,
¬(ϕUψ) = (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)W(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ),
¬(ϕWψ) = (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)U(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ),
¬Xϕ = X¬ϕ.
Examples of common LTL specifications. Let us consider some examples of widely-
used LTL formulae. They are chosen from the well-known specification patterns pro-
posed by Dwyer et al. [1999], who collected these by surveying over 500 properties
for finite-state verification tools. Each pattern has a scope, which is the extent of a
program execution over which the pattern must hold. There are five basic scopes,
4Note that the X-operator is only dual to itself in the infinite trace semantics.
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Figure 2.1: Scopes over which patterns must hold.
highlighted in Fig. 2.1 in grey: global (the entire program execution), before (the ex-
ecution up to a given event), after (the execution after a given event), between (any
part of an execution from one given event to another), and after until (like between
but the designated part of the execution continues even if the second event does not
occur). The start and ending of a scope is defined by so-called state formulae; that is,
if those evaluate to true over a given event. State formulae are denoted here by cap-
ital letters (e.g., P, Q, R, or S) and represent Boolean combinations of propositions.
However, they can sometimes also contain temporal operators without changing the
semantics of the pattern (see for example Bauer and Leucker [2011] and the defi-
nition of the stop operator for this purpose). Here, the scope begins with the start
event, whereas the end event lies outside the scope. However, it is possible to define
open-left and closed-right scopes as well [cf. Bauer and Leucker, 2011].
The patterns themselves are organised into two groups, of which the first seman-
tically deals with the occurrence of events, i.e., require a state formula to evaluate
to true or not over an event: absence (a given event does not occur within a scope),
existence (a given event must occur within a scope, which is dual to the absence pat-
tern), bounded existence (a given event must occur at most k times within a scope),
and universality (a given event occurs all throughout a scope). The second group
of patterns deals with the ordering of events, i.e., events must appear in a defined
order: precedence (a given event for which P holds must always be preceded by one
for which a given Q holds within a scope), response (a given event for which P holds
must always be followed by one for which a given Q holds within a scope, which is
converse to the precedence pattern), as well as chain precedence and chain response
(a generalisation of the precedence and response pattern, i.e., a sequence of events
for which P1, . . . , Pn holds must always be preceded or followed by one for which
Q1, . . . , Qn holds, respectively).
Table 2.1 lists the LTL formulae for a selection of the discussed patterns over
different scopes. A common use case for the absence pattern is mutual exclusion,
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Table 2.1: Example LTL formulae from the specification patterns.
Pattern Scope LTL formula
Absence
(P is false) Globally G(¬P)
Existence
(P becomes true) After Q until R G(Q ∧ ¬R⇒ (¬RU(P ∧ ¬R)))
Bounded existence
(P occurs max. twice) After Q until R
G(Q⇒ ((¬P ∧ ¬R)U(R ∨ ((P ∧
¬R)U(R ∨ ((¬P ∧ ¬R)U(R ∨ ((P ∧
¬R)U(R ∨ (¬PWR) ∨GP)))))))))
Universality
(P is true) Between Q and R G((Q ∧ ¬R ∧ FR)⇒ (PUR))
Precedence
(S precedes P) After Q until R G(Q ∧ ¬R⇒ (¬PW(S ∨ R)))
Response
(S responds to P) After Q G(Q⇒ G(P⇒ FS))
Precedence chain
(P precedes S, T) Before R
FR⇒ ((¬(S ∧ (¬R) ∧X(¬RU(T ∧
¬R))))U(R ∨ P))
Response chain
(P responds to S, T) After Q
G(Q⇒ G(S ∧XFT ⇒
X(¬TU(T ∧ FP))))
where P describes for example that orthogonal traffic lights at a crossing show a
green light at the same time. The precedence pattern can be used to express that a
resource (e.g., a lock) is only granted in response to a request, whereas the response
pattern to describe that a resource must be granted after it is requested. Bounded
existence is useful to describe that a process A can enter its critical section at most
twice while B is waiting, in which case a between scope is used and delimited by B
entering and exiting its waiting region.
2.5 LTL semantics for runtime verification
After having introduced in the previous section the specification language LTL, a
model checker and monitor’s task can be described to decide for a given property
of that language whether it is satisfied (or violated) by all traces of some given set
of traces, or a given single trace, respectively. However, while a model checker, in
terms of reactive systems, can evaluate traces according to the standard semantics of
LTL5—since both are defined over infinite traces—a monitor must use a finite LTL
semantics, as observations are merely prefixes of infinite traces.
5For bounded model checking, obviously, also finite trace semantics are used [Biere et al., 2003].
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Runtime verification is usually performed to complement model checking, and
therefore the finite LTL semantics should preferably coincide with the infinite one;
that is, a monitor should only return true denoted by > (or false denoted by ⊥) if the
property is satisfied (or violated, respectively) for all continuations. Recall that this is
exactly the definition of impartiality, described by Property 4 in §1.2.2. Note that this
property is easy to comply with for an offline monitor, as there are no continuations,
and verdicts are returned only once at the end of a trace. In other words, a trace
represents complete knowledge—as no further observations of a system are to be
expected—so that under this assumption monotonicity is not an issue. An offline
monitor, therefore, can for example implement the finite LTL semantics introduced
in Def. 2.4.2: Intuitively ϕUψ is interpreted as false if ψ never evaluates to true on a
finite trace, and Xϕ is interpreted as false at the end of the trace if no further event
exists—called the strong semantics of the X-operator. This idea is extended by Manna
and Pnueli [1995], who add a weak view of the X-operator (being dual to the strong
one, and which we denote here with X!) that is interpreted as “if a next event exists
then for this event ϕ must hold”.
In contrast, during online monitoring, traces always resemble only incomplete
albeit expanding knowledge (and are therefore also called truncated). In this section
we will see that the finite LTL semantics from above and similar variations based on
a 2-valued semantics (i.e., with only true and false as truth values) are inadequate for
that purpose since these are inherently not able to comply with monotonicity.
Weak, strong, and neutral finite path semantics. While the syntax and semantics
of LTL for checking complete traces is well accepted in the literature, there is no con-
sensus on defining LTL over truncated traces. Eisner et al. [2003] define for example
LTLtrunc, which is an LTL semantics defined wrt. finite or infinite traces, and an in-
dicator for the strength of the interpretation; it can be either weak, strong or neutral
in relation to the standard finite semantics by Kamp [1968] in Def. 2.4.2 (denoted by
[w |= ϕ]−, [w |= ϕ]+, and [w |= ϕ]F, respectively). We call the resulting logics LTL−,
LTL+, and FLTL, respectively. Intuitively, in the weak view U acts like W, X like X!;
and in the strong view (which is dual to the weak one) W acts like U, and X! like X;
whereas the neutral one leaves the operators unchanged. In other words, the weak
view has a preference for false positives, the strong view for false negatives, and the
neutral view desires to see as much evidence as can reasonably be expected from a
finite trace.
Table 2.2 exemplifies how these three semantics behave differently for a trace
consisting of a single event. An interesting corollary shows that if w is infinite then
[w |= ϕ]F iff [w |= ϕ]− iff [w |= ϕ]+; that is, the strength indicators behave identical
over an infinite trace [Eisner et al., 2003, Corollary 5]. However, the inherent problem
with all three proposed finite semantics for truncated paths is that those must eval-
uate to true or false prematurely since these cannot reflect the “not yet known”-case
properly to avoid either false positives or negatives.
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Table 2.2: The evaluations of a trace wrt. the weak, strong and natural view.
neutral strong weak
{a} 6|= aUb {a} 6|= aUb {a} |= aUb
{a} 6|= Fb {a} 6|= Fb {a} |= Fb
{a} |= Ga {a} 6|= Ga {a} |= Ga
{a} 6|= Xb {a} 6|= Xb {a} |= Xb.
LTL3 semantics. Therefore, Bauer et al. [2011] have introduced a 3-valued prefix
semantics (i.e., it cannot be defined inductively as in Def. 2.4.2), defined as follows.
Definition 2.5.1 (LTL3 semantics).
[u |= ϕ]3 =

> if ∀w ∈ Σω : uw |= ϕ
⊥ if ∀w ∈ Σω : uw 6|= ϕ
? otherwise.
It agrees with the property of impartiality and anticipation stated in §1.2.2. Note
that the truth domain here is a set B3 = {>,⊥, ?}, where ? denotes the inconclusive
case. A monitor following this semantics must return ? for a prefix as long as there
exist continuations of which some satisfy and some violate the property ϕ. However,
as soon as there are only continuations of one sort, it must return a conclusive verdict.
RV-LTL semantics. Bauer et al. [2010] further introduced a 4-valued prefix seman-
tics, called RV-LTL. It refines the inconclusive case of LTL3 by “presumably true” (>P)
and “presumably false” (⊥P); that is, helps with so-called ugly prefixes (i.e., prefixes
whose expansions all lead to a monitor returning ? but never a conclusive verdict) by
providing at least some information to which degree a formula is considered satisfied
or not.
Definition 2.5.2 (RV-LTL semantics).
[u |= ϕ]RV =

> if [u |= ϕ]3 = >
⊥ if [u |= ϕ]3 = ⊥
>P if [u |= ϕ]3 =? and [u |= ϕ]F = >
⊥P if [u |= ϕ]3 =? and [u |= ϕ]F = ⊥
Note that RV-LTL complies with a property that is not further considered in this
thesis: complementation by negation, i.e., a formula ¬ϕ of a logic should yield a com-
plementary and different truth value than ϕ when evaluated over the same trace.
This is not the case for traces leading to ? wrt. the LTL3 semantics, as ? is comple-
mentary to itself, in contrast to >, ⊥ or >P, ⊥P being complementary to each other,
respectively.
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Table 2.3 summarises the different semantics and their most relevant properties
to runtime monitoring [Bauer et al., 2010]. A conclusion drawn from the discussion
Table 2.3: Overview of monitoring properties for finite LTL semantics.
LTL FLTL LTL−/+ LTL3 RV-LTL
Domain Σω Σ+ Σ∗ Σ∗ Σ+
Monotonicity
(Property 3) 7 7 3 3
Impartiality
(Property 4) 7 7 3 3
Anticipation
(Property 5) 7 7 3 3
Complementation
by negation 3 7 7 3
in this section is that we prefer an online monitor to check traces—and similarly
traces with data when LTL is lifted to LTLFO in the following chapters—at least wrt.
a 3-valued semantics such as LTL3.
2.6 Summary
This chapter briefly outlines formal foundations and terminology used in this thesis.
It details on notions and notations from theory of formal language, which provides
the basic framework to define propositional as well traces with data; in fact we will
see a precise definition of the latter in the next chapter. It recalls the standard syntax
and semantics of LTL over finite and infinite traces, since the next chapter researches
on its extension to first-order quantification. Furthermore, it discusses finite LTL
semantics used in runtime verification—namely, the neutral, strong and weak finite
LTL semantics, as well as the prefix semantics LTL3 and RV-LTL. While the first three
all cannot comply with monotonicity, the latter fulfil this property; thus, we consider
the prefix problem as the central decision problem to solve in online monitoring.
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Chapter 3
Logic and complexity
This chapter explores and compares the complexity of decision problems around run-
time monitoring—namely the satisfiability, word, model checking, and prefix prob-
lem both for propositional LTL (see §3.2.1) as well as LTLFO (see §3.2.2). While the
former is the de facto standard specification language in runtime verification, the lat-
ter can be considered as natural extension with first-order quantifiers. In a nutshell,
the quantifiers bind domain values from parameterised actions appearing in a trace,
and not directly from some “external” (possibly infinite) domain. LTLFO is introduced
in §3.1. Based on the desired properties of a monitor in §1.2.2, and the different LTL
semantics laid out in §2.5, we will see that the prefix problem a runtime monitor
should arguably solve is undecidable in LTLFO. In contrast, the word problem, which
should be solved by offline monitors is decidable both in LTL and LTLFO (and in LTL
also computationally less involved). Furthermore, this chapter discusses that the ac-
tual problem wrt. online monitoring is difficult to state in terms of complexity theory
at all, but the prefix problem helps to find at least a lower bound.
3.1 LTLFO—Formal definitions and notation
Let us now introduce the first-order specification language LTLFO and related con-
cepts in more detail. The first concept we need is that of a (sorted first-order) signature,
given as Γ = (S, F, R), where S is a finite non-empty set of sorts, F a finite set of
function symbols and R = U∪ I a finite set of a priori uninterpreted and interpreted
predicate symbols, s.t. U ∩ I = ∅ and R ∩ F = ∅. The former set of predicate sym-
bols are referred to as U-operators and the latter as I-operators. As is common, 0-ary
function symbols are also referred to as constant symbols, and 0-ary predicate symbols
as propositions. We assume that all operators in Γ have a given arity that ranges over
the sorts given by S, respectively. We also assume infinite supplies of variables, one
for each sort, collectively referred to as a set V, where V ∩ (F ∪ R) = ∅. Let us refer
to the first-order language determined by Γ as L(Γ). The set of terms T (Γ) of L(Γ) is
inductively defined as follows: Any x ∈ V and any constant is a term, and if f ∈ F is
an n-ary function symbol, and t1, . . . , tn are terms of the proper sort, then f (t1, . . . , tn)
is a term.
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Definition 3.1.1 (Syntax). Formulae of L(Γ) are defined inductively as follows:
if p ∈ U and t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Γ), then p(t1, . . . , tn) is a L(Γ) formula,
if r ∈ I and t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Γ), then r(t1, . . . , tn) is a L(Γ) formula,
if ψ, ϕ are L(Γ) formulae, then
¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ,Xϕ, ϕUψ, ∀(x1, . . . , xn) : p. ϕ are L(Γ) formulae.
Note that the symbols in Γ (i.e., the non-logical symbols) are the only thing that
distinguishes one first-order language L(Γ) from another.
As variables are sorted, in the quantified formula ∀(x1, . . . , xn) : p. ϕ, the U-
operator p with arity τ1 × . . .× τn, implicitly defines the sorts of variables x1, . . . , xn
to be τ1, . . . , τn, with τi ∈ S, respectively. For terms t1, . . . , tn, we say that p(t1, . . . , tn)
is well-sorted if the sort of every ti is τi. This notion is inductively applicable to terms.
Moreover, we consider only well-sorted formulae and refer to the set of all well-sorted
L(Γ) formulae over a signature Γ in terms of LTLFOΓ . When a specific signature Γ is
either irrelevant or clear from the context, we will simply write LTLFO instead. When
convenient and a certain index is of no importance in the given context, we also
shorten notation of a vector (x1, . . . , xn) by a (bold) x.
A Γ-structure, or just (first-order) structure is a pair A = (|A|, I), where |A| =
|A|1 ∪ . . .∪ |A|n, is a non-empty set called domain, s.t. every sub-domain |A|i (one for
each sort, pairwise disjoint) is either a non-empty finite or countable set (e.g., set of
all integers or strings) and I an interpretation. The purpose of I is to assign to each
sort τi ∈ S a specific sub-domain τ Ii = |A|i, to each function symbol f ∈ F of arity
τ1 × . . .× τl −→ τm a function f I : |A|1 × . . .× |A|l −→ |A|m, and to every I-operator
r with arity τ1× . . .× τm a relation rI ⊆ |A|1× . . .× |A|m. We restrict ourselves, if not
explicitly stated, to computable structures [cf. Harizanov, 1998]; that is, there must be a
computable enumeration of |A| and relations and functions must be computable (i.e.,
f , r are computable if there is a procedure which effectively computes the result of f I ,
or answers whether t I ∈ rI or t I 6∈ rI in a finite number of steps, respectively). In that
regard, we can think of I as a mapping between I-operators (resp. function symbols)
and the corresponding algorithms which compute the desired return values, each
conforming to the symbols’ respective arities. Note that the interpretation of U-
operators is rather different from I-operators, as it is closely tied to what we call a
trace and therefore discussed after we introduce the necessary notions and notation.
We model observed system behaviour in terms of actions: Let p ∈ U with ar-
ity τ1 × . . . × τm and d ∈ Dp = |A|1 × . . . × |A|m, then we call (p, d) an action.
We refer to finite sets of actions as events. A system’s behaviour is therefore a fi-
nite trace of events, which we also denote as a sequence of sets of ground terms
{sms(1234)}{login(“user”)} . . . when we mean the sequence of tuples {(sms, 1234)}
{(login, “user”)} . . . Therefore the occurrence of some action sms(1234) in the trace
(which can be informally seen as a parameterised proposition) at position i ∈ N0,
written sms(1234) ∈ wi, indicates that, at time i, sms(1234) holds (or, from a prac-
tical point of view, a Short Message Service (SMS) message was sent to number 1234
on a mobile phone). We follow the assumption that only symbols from U appear
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in a trace, which therefore gives these symbols their respective interpretations. The
following formalises this notion.
A (first-order) temporal structure is a tuple (A, w), where A = (|A0|, I0)(|A1|, I1)
. . . is a (possibly infinite) sequence of first-order structures and w = w0w1 . . . a cor-
responding trace. We demand that for all Ai and Ai+1 from A, it is the case that
|Ai| = |Ai+1|, for all f ∈ F, f Ii+1 = f Ii , and for all τ ∈ S, τ Ii = τ Ii+1 . For any
two structures, A and A′, which satisfy these conditions, we write A ∼ A′. Moreover
given some A and A, if for all Ai from A, we have that Ai ∼ A, we also write A ∼ A. In
other words, the latter notation states that the same domain as well as interpretation
of functions and sorts, defined in A, is used throughout all first-order structures of
the sequence A. Finally, the interpretation of a U-operator p with arity τ1 × . . .× τm
is then defined wrt. a position i in w as pIi := {d | (p, d) ∈ wi}. Essentially this
means that, unlike function symbols, U- and I-operators do not have to be rigid.
Note also that from this point forward, we consider only the case where the
specification to be monitored is given as a closed formula (i.e., a sentence), which
means it contains no free variables. If a variable occurrence is not free we call it
bound. Furthermore, if x is the tuple of all the free variables of ϕ, we write ϕ(x). This
is closely related to our means of quantification: a quantifier in LTLFO is restricted to
those elements that appear in the trace, and not arbitrary elements from a (possibly
infinite) domain. While certain policies cannot be expressed with this restriction
(e.g., “for all phone numbers x that are not in the contact list, r(x) is true”), this
restriction bears the advantage that, when examining a given trace, functions and
relations are only ever evaluated over known objects. The advantages of this type of
quantification in monitoring first-order languages have also been pointed out in Hallé
and Villemaire [2008] and Bauer et al. [2009b]. In other words, had we allowed free
variables (i.e., quantification over arbitrary domains), a monitor might end up having
to “try out” all the different domain elements in order to evaluate such policies,
which runs counter to our design rationale of quantification.
Definition 3.1.2 (Semantics). Let us fix a particular signature Γ. The semantics of LTLFO
can now be defined wrt. a quadruple (A, w, v, i) as follows, where i ∈ N0, and v is an
(initially empty) set of valuations assigning domain values to variables:
(A, w, v, i) |= p(t1, . . . , tn) iff (tIi1 , . . . , tIin ) ∈ pIi ,
(A, w, v, i) |= r(t1, . . . , tn) iff (tIi1 , . . . , tIin ) ∈ rIi ,
(A, w, v, i) |= ¬ϕ iff (A, w, v, i) 6|= ϕ,
(A, w, v, i) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (A, w, v, i) |= ϕ and (A, w, v, i) |= ψ,
(A, w, v, i) |= Xϕ iff |w| > i and (A, w, v, i + 1) |= ϕ,
(A, w, v, i) |= ϕUψ iff there is a k s.t. i ≤ k < |w|, (A, w, v, k) |= ψ,
and (A, w, v, j) |= ϕ for all i ≤ j < k,
(A, w, v, i) |= ∀(x1, . . . , xn) : p. ϕ iff for all (p, d1, . . . , dn) ∈ wi,
(A, w, v ∪ {x1 7→ d1, . . . , xn 7→ dn}, i) |= ϕ,
where terms are evaluated inductively, and xI treated as v(x).
If (A, w, v, 0) |= ϕ, we write (A, w, v) |= ϕ, and if v is irrelevant or clear from
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the context, (A, w) |= ϕ. Later we will also make use of the (possibly countably
infinite) set of all actions (resp. events) wrt. A, given as (A)-Act =
⋃
p∈U{(p, d) | d ∈
Dp} (resp. (A)-Ev = 2Act) and take the liberty to omit the trailing (A) whenever a
particular A is either irrelevant or clear from the context. We can then describe the
generated language of ϕ, L(ϕ) (or simply the language of ϕ, i.e., the set of all logical
models of ϕ) compactly as
L(ϕ) := {(A, w) | wi ∈ Ev and (A, w) |= ϕ},
although, as before, we shall only ever concern ourselves with either infinite- or
finite-trace languages, but not mixed ones (and like for the finite and infinite LTL
semantics, we distinguish those if necessary also for LTLFO with a subscript, i.e., write
|=F for the former and |=ω for the latter, respectively). Finally, we will use common
syntactic “sugar”, which was mentioned already in §2.4 for LTL, and additionally
∃(x1, . . . , xn) : p. ϕ := ¬(∀(x1, . . . , xn) : p. ¬ϕ).
Example 3.1.1. See Bauer, Küster, and Vegliach [2012], Küster and Bauer [2015] and §6.3
for various example policies formalised in LTLFO. However, to give in this section already
an intuition, let us pick up the idea of monitoring Android apps again, and specify that
these must not send SMS messages to numbers not in a user’s contact database. Assuming
there exists a U-operator sms, which is true (i.e, appears in the trace), whenever an app
sends an SMS message to phone number x, we could formalise said policy in terms of G∀x :
sms. contact(x). Note how in this formula the meaning of x is given implicitly by the arity
of sms and must match the definition of the I-operator contact in each event, i.e., x is not just
any domain element, but a numerical value, which sms uses to capture the phone number
associated with an incoming SMS. Also note how sms itself is interpreted indirectly via its
occurrence in the trace, whereas contact never appears in the trace, even if true. The I-
operator contact can be thought of as interpreted via a program that queries a user’s contact
database, whose contents may change over time.
3.2 Complexity of monitoring
This section discusses and compares the complexity of monitoring in the proposi-
tional and first-order case, based on LTL and LTLFO, respectively.
3.2.1 Propositional case
As there are no commonly accepted rules for what qualifies as a monitor (not even in
the runtime verification community), we have explicitly argued in §1.2.2 what prop-
erties a runtime monitor should fulfil. However, as a consequence, there exist in the
literature a myriad of different approaches to checking that an observed behaviour
satisfies (resp. violates) a formal specification. Some of these [cf. Havelund and Rosu,
2004; Bauer et al., 2009b] consist in solving the word problem (see Definition 3.2.1). A
monitor following this idea can either be an offline monitor, i.e., first record the entire
system behaviour in form of a finite trace u ∈ Σ+, or an online monitor, i.e., process
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the events incrementally as they are emitted by the system under scrutiny (recall
§1.2.2, Property 1). Both approaches are documented in the literature [cf. Havelund
and Rosu, 2004; Genon et al., 2006; Hallé and Villemaire, 2008; Bauer et al., 2009b;
Basin et al., 2014; Maler and Nickovic, 2004; D’Angelo et al., 2005], but only the sec-
ond one is suitable to properly monitor reactive systems running in production and
detect property violations (resp. satisfaction) right when they occur.
Definition 3.2.1 (Word problem). The word problem for LTL is defined as follows.
Input: A formula ϕ ∈ LTL(AP) and some trace u ∈ (2AP)+.
Question: Does [u |= ϕ]F hold?
Markey and Schnoebelen [2003] presented a bilinear algorithm for this problem
(an even more efficient solution was given by Kuhtz and Finkbeiner [2012]). Hence,
the first sort of monitor (offline monitor), which is really more of a test oracle than
a monitor, solves a classical decision problem [cf. Garey and Johnson, 1979]. A test
oracle is a mechanism known from testing [Richardson et al., 1992]. It checks whether
the output for all test-case executions of a system (i.e., a finite set of finite input
sequences) is correct. Therefore, in terms of runtime verification the oracle works
like an offline monitor.
The second sort of monitor (online monitor), in which we are ultimately interested
in this thesis, however, solves an entirely different kind of problem; it cannot be stated
in complexity-theoretical terms at all (also pointed out by Baader and Lippmann
[2014]): Its input is an LTL formula and a finite albeit unbounded trace which grows
incrementally. This means that this monitor solves the word problem for each and
every new event that is added to the trace at runtime over and over again. It solves a
sequence of decision problems
(e, ϕ), (σ0, ϕ), (σ0σ1, ϕ), (σ0σ1σ2, ϕ) . . . ,
where (σ0 . . . σn, ϕ), is the input to the word problem. We can therefore say that the
word problem acts as a lower bound on the complexity of the monitoring problem
that such a monitor solves; or, in other words, the problem that the online monitor
solves is at least as hard as the problem that the offline monitor solves. As one clearly
wants not answer the sequence of decision problems indicated above independently
from each other, there are approaches to build efficient (i.e., trace-length indepen-
dent) monitors that repeatedly answer the word problem [cf. Havelund and Rosu,
2004], and which comply with Property 2 in §1.2.2.
However, such online approaches violate Property 3 in §1.2.2, in that they are nec-
essarily non-monotonic. Recall that monotonicity is not a concern when monitoring
finite, complete traces, so that solving the word problem is actually what is desired in
offline monitoring. To see this, consider ϕ = aUb and some trace u = {a}{a} . . . {a}
of length n. Using the finite-trace interpretation in Def. 2.4.2 (or the strong interpre-
tation in §2.5), [u 6|= ϕ]F. However, if we add un+1 = {b}, we get [u |= ϕ]F.1 For
1Note that this effect is not particular to the choice of finite-trace interpretation, but lies rather in the
nature of monitoring truncated traces and using 2-valued logics to monitor them. Had we used, e.g.,
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the users, this essentially means that they cannot trust the verdict of the monitor as
it may flip in the future, unless of course it is obvious from the start that, e.g., only
safety properties are monitored and the monitor is built merely to detect violations,2
i.e., bad prefixes [cf. Basin et al., 2015b]. However, if we take other monitorable
languages into account as we do in this thesis, i.e., those that have either good or bad
prefixes (or both) (see Def. 3.2.2), we need to distinguish between satisfaction and
violation of a property (and want the monitor to report either occurrence truthfully).
Definition 3.2.2 (Good and bad prefixes [Kupferman and Vardi, 2001]). Given a lan-
guage L ⊆ Σω of infinite words over Σ, a finite word u ∈ Σ∗ is called
• a good prefix of L, if for all w ∈ Σω it holds that uw ∈ L,
• a bad prefix of L, if for all w ∈ Σω it holds that uw 6∈ L.
We shall use good(L) ⊆ Σ∗ (resp. bad(L)) to denote the set of good (resp. bad)
prefixes of L. For readability, we also write good(ϕ) instead of good(L(ϕ)), and do
the same for bad(L(ϕ)). A good (resp. bad) prefix u is minimal if every prefix v of u
that is strictly shorter (i.e., |v| < |u|) is not a good (resp. bad) prefix anymore. Note
that every finite continuation of uv is a good (resp. bad) prefix as well.
A monitor that detects good (resp. bad) prefixes has been termed impartial (recall
§1.2.2, Property 4) as it not only states something about the past, but also about the
future: once a good (resp. bad) prefix has been detected, no matter how the sys-
tem would evolve in an indefinite future, the property would remain satisfied (resp.
violated). In that sense, impartial monitors are monotonic by definition. A further
monitor characteristic is anticipation (§1.2.2, Property 5), which demands detection
of minimal good or bad prefixes. In other words, an impartial but not anticipatory
monitor is allowed to return ? even though a (resp. bad) prefix has been observed.
While Bauer et al. [2011] give a construction that yields a trace-length independent
(even optimal) impartial and anticipatory monitor for an LTL formula as well as a
timed extension called TLTL, we shall see in §3.2.2 that obtaining anticipatory mon-
itors for first-order temporal specifications is generally impossible. The obtained
monitor for LTL specifications basically returns > to the user if u ∈ good(ϕ) holds,
⊥ if u ∈ bad(ϕ) holds, and ? otherwise; and as such agrees with the LTL3 semantics
[u |= ϕ]3 stated in Def. 2.5.1. Not surprisingly though, the monitoring problem such
a monitor solves is computationally more involved than the word problem. It solves
what we call the prefix problem (of LTL), which can easily be shown PSpace-complete
by way of LTL satisfiability.
Definition 3.2.3 (Prefix problem). The prefix problem for LTL is defined as follows.
Input: A formula ϕ ∈ LTL(AP) and some trace u ∈ (2AP)∗.
Question: Does u ∈ good(ϕ) (resp. bad(ϕ)) hold?
what is known as the weak finite-trace semantics, discussed in §2.5, we would first have had [u |= ϕ]F
and if un+1 = ∅, subsequently [u 6|= ϕ]F.
2Safety properties are those of which all counterexamples exhibit a bad prefix [cf. Alpern and Schnei-
der, 1985]. This is an important characteristic exploited in runtime verification, since all violations of
safety properties can be detected by finite prefixes.
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Theorem 3.2.1. The prefix problem for LTL is PSpace-complete.
Proof. Let us first focus on bad prefixes. It is easy to see that u = u0 . . . un ∈ bad(ϕ)
iff L(u0 ∧Xu1 ∧XXu2 ∧ . . .Xnun ∧ ϕ) = ∅, where Xn means the next operator written
down n times. Constructing this conjunction takes polynomial time and the corre-
sponding emptiness check can be performed in PSpace [Sistla and Clarke, 1985]. For
hardness, we proceed with a reduction of LTL satisfiability. Again, it is easy to see
that L(ϕ) 6= ∅ iff σ 6∈ bad(Xϕ) for any σ ∈ 2AP. This reduction is linear, and as
PSpace = co-PSpace [cf. Papadimitriou, 1994], the statement follows.
The proof is symmetric for good prefixes, i.e., u = u0 . . . un ∈ good(ϕ) iff L(u0 ∧
Xu1 ∧ XXu2 ∧ . . .Xnun ∧ ¬ϕ) = ∅, and L(ϕ) 6= ∅ iff σ 6∈ good(X¬ϕ) for any σ ∈
2AP.
Note that the automaton-based LTL3 monitor of Bauer et al. [2011] even processes
every incoming event in constant time, and therefore has a minimal runtime overhead
(§1.2.2, Property 6). Other LTL monitors, based on rewriting of formulae (see for
example the first five basic rewriting rules in Bacchus and Kabanza [1998, Table 1],
which can be used for LTL if the interval is [0,∞]), are trace-length independent, and
can also achieve anticipation by using a validity checker [cf. Havelund and Rosu,
2004]. The checker must be called on the rewritten formula after each processed event
[Rosu and Havelund, 2005]. However, this means solving a PSpace-complete problem
each time, which disagrees with our minimal runtime overhead requirement. Even
without the validity check, the runtime overhead of rewriting based approaches is in
the worst case exponential with respect to size of the formula [Rosu and Havelund,
2005]. Bauer et al. [2011] cannot avoid an exponential overhead either (since we know
the prefix problem is PSpace-complete), but for them it occurs while generating the
monitor—ahead of monitoring. In general, in runtime verification we prefer the
overhead during generation, as it is not recurring. On the other hand the rewriting
rules have the major advantage that their generation effort is constant. This becomes
a real disadvantage for automaton-based approaches if monitors are intractable to
create from large formulae.
Finally, we would like to point out the possibility of building an impartial and
anticipatory though trace-length dependent LTL monitor using an “off the shelf”
model checker, which accepts a propositional Kripke structure (see Def. 2.2.1) and an
LTL formula as input.
Definition 3.2.4. The model checking problem for LTL is defined as follows.
Input: A formula ϕ ∈ LTL(AP) and a Kripke structure K over 2AP.
Question: Does L(K) ⊆ L(ϕ) hold?
As in LTL the model checking and the satisfiability problems are both PSpace-
complete [Sistla and Clarke, 1985], we can use a model checking tool as monitor:
given that it is straightforward to construct K, s.t. L(K) = {uw | w ∈ (2AP)ω}, in
no more than polynomial time; that is, by adding to the last state of a linear Kripke
structure wrt. u, self-looping transitions for every subset of 2AP. Then we return
> to the user if L(K) ⊆ L(ϕ) holds, ⊥ if L(K) ⊆ L(¬ϕ) holds, and ? if neither
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holds. One could therefore be tempted to think of monitoring merely in terms of a
model checking problem, but we shall see that as soon as the logic in question has an
undecidable satisfiability problem this reduction fails. Besides, it can be questioned
whether monitoring as model checking leads to a desirable monitor with its obvious
trace-length dependence and having to repeatedly solve a PSpace-complete problem
for each new event. See also Schnoebelen [2002] for a survey of complexity results
for model checking other temporal logics than LTL.
3.2.2 First-order case
First and foremost, LTLFO as defined in §3.1 is undecidable as can be shown by way
of the following lemma. It basically helps us reduce finite satisfiability of standard
first-order logic to LTLFO.
Definition 3.2.5 (Finite structure). A structure A is called finite if its domain |A| is a finite
set [cf. Libkin, 2004, Definition 2.1].
Lemma 3.2.1. Let ϕ be a sentence in first-order logic, then we can construct a corresponding
ψ ∈ LTLFO s.t. ϕ has a finite model iff ψ is satisfiable.
Proof idea (full proof on page 124). By constructing a ψ in LTLFO (which is essentially
a formula of first-order logic, i.e., without temporal operators) in such a way that a
model (A′, σ) of ψ contains a (d, e) ∈ σ for every domain value e involved in satisfying
ψ (and where d is a freshly introduced U-operator). The finitely many e’s then make
up the domain satisfying ϕ.
Theorem 3.2.2. LTLFO is undecidable.
Proof. Assume it is decidable whether ψ ∈ LTLFO is satisfiable. Let ϕ be a sentence in
first-order logic, then by Lemma 3.2.1, we can construct some ψ ∈ LTLFO, s.t. ϕ has
a finite model iff ψ is satisfiable, so that we can test whether ϕ has a finite model.
However, by Trakhtenbrot’s Theorem, testing if ϕ has a finite model is generally
undecidable [cf. Libkin, 2004, §9]. Contradiction.
Alternatively, undecidability can be shown by reducing the halting problem of
a deterministic Turing machine to the satisfiability problem of LTLFO, as shown by
Lemma A.1.1 in the appendix (full proof on page 125).
Let us now define what is meant by Kripke structures in our new setting and
the generated language of them. As in Def. 2.2.1, Kripke structures we consider
either give rise to infinite-trace languages (i.e., have a left-total transition relation),
or represent finite traces (i.e, each state has at most one successor and the transition
relation is loop-free). We restrict to the more general definition of the former. Note
that we will also skip detailed redefinitions of the decision problems discussed in
§3.2.1, since the concepts transfer in a straightforward manner.
Definition 3.2.6 (First-order Kripke structure). Given some A, a (A)-Kripke structure,
or just first-order Kripke structure, is a tuple KFO = (S, s0,λ,→), defined as in Def. 2.2.1,
but with λ : S −→ Â× Ev, where Â = {A′ | A′ ∼ A}.
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Definition 3.2.7 (First-order Kripke language). For a (A)-Kripke structure KFO with
states s0, . . . , sn, its generated language is L(KFO) = {(A, w) | (A0, w0) = λ(s0) and
for all i ∈ N there is some j, k ∈ {0, . . . , n} s.t. (Ai, wi) = λ(sj), (Ai−1, wi−1) = λ(sk)
and (sk, sj) ∈→}.
The inputs to the LTLFO word problem are therefore an LTLFO formula and a linear
first-order Kripke structure, representing a finite input trace. Unlike in standard LTL,
Theorem 3.2.3. The word problem for LTLFO is PSpace-complete.
Proof idea (full proof on page 127). Membership by a depth-first search according to the
inductive definition of LTLFO. Hardness by reducing the Quantified Boolean Formula
Problem [cf. Garey and Johnson, 1979; Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979, §11.3.2-11.3.4] to
the word problem of LTLFO.
The inputs to the LTLFO model checking problem, in turn, are a left-total first-
order Kripke structure, which gives rise to an infinite-trace language, and an LTLFO
formula.
Theorem 3.2.4. The model checking problem for LTLFO is in ExpSpace.
Proof idea (full proof on page 127). For a given ϕ ∈ LTLFO and (A)-Kripke structure
KFO defined as usual, where A = (|A|, I), we construct a propositional Kripke struc-
ture K′ and ϕ′ ∈ LTL, s.t. L(KFO) ⊆ L(ϕ) iff L(K′) ⊆ L(ϕ′) holds.
The reason for this result is that we can devise a reduction of that problem to LTL
model checking in exponential space. While the PSpace-lower bound is easy, e.g.,
via reduction of the LTLFO word problem, we currently do not know how tight these
bounds are and, therefore, leave this as an open problem. Note also that the results of
both Theorem 3.2.3 and Theorem 3.2.4 are obtained even without taking into account
the complexities of the interpretations of function symbols and I-operators; that is,
for these results to hold, we assume that interpretations do not exceed polynomial,
resp. exponential space.
We have seen in §3.2.1 that the prefix problem lies at the heart of an impartial
monitor. While in LTL it was possible to build an impartial and anticipatory monitor
using a model checker (albeit a very inefficient one), the following shows that this is
no longer possible.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let A be a (first-order) computable structure and ϕ ∈ LTLFO, then L(ϕ)A =
{(A, w) | A ∼ A, w ∈ Evω, and (A, w) |= ϕ}. Testing if L(ϕ)A 6= ∅ is generally
undecidable.
Proof idea (full proof on page 129). By a reduction from Post’s Correspondence Prob-
lem [cf Post, 1946; Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979, §9.4].
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Theorem 3.2.5 (Prefix problem). The prefix problem for LTLFO is undecidable.
Proof idea (full proof on page 129). By way of a similar reduction as in Theorem 3.2.1,
but here based on Lemma 3.2.2, i.e., (A, σ) ∈ bad(Xϕ) iff L(ϕ)A = ∅ for any σ ∈
Ev.
There are essentially two ways trying to achieve a decidable prefix problem: Re-
stricting the structure (i.e, the interpretations of predicate symbols allowed) or syntax
of formulae that can be used for monitoring. However, from Corollary 3.2.1 can be
concluded that seeking decidable fragments under computational structures is an
impossible task. Already a single existential quantifier and unary predicate symbol
make the problem be undecidable.
Corollary 3.2.1. The prefix problem for LTLFO under computable structures with only a
single existential quantifier, and one unary interpreted predicate symbol, is undecidable.
Proof. Follows from constructed formula in the proof of Lemma 3.2.2.
If we do not allow any predefined predicates or functions, but do not restrict the
syntax, the prefix problem is also undecidable.
Corollary 3.2.2. LTLFOΓ , where Γ is a relational signature (i.e., Γ contains only U-operators
and constants), with at least one binary U-operator, is undecidable.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 3.2.1 and Trakhtenbrot’s Theorem, which holds
for relational signatures with at least one binary relation.
Note that the prefix problem for finite structures is decidable. To show this, a
model checker can be used as a monitor, similarly as for LTL in §3.2.1; that is, we
construct a linear first-order Kripke structure, with a self-loop in the last state for
every subset of {(p, d) | p ∈ U, and d ∈ |A|0 × . . . |A|n}.
3.3 Summary
The first part of this chapter formally defines LTLFO, a natural extension of LTL with
first-order quantification. Quantifiers are restricted to bind only data values from ac-
tions appearing in the trace (coming from an possible infinite and “external” source).
This trace-centred view of quantification makes LTLFO arguably a natural formalism
to use for the purpose of runtime verification. The second part of the chapter details
on complexity results revolving around monitoring in LTL as well as LTLFO. Table 3.1
summarises the results. While the word problem (which is the underlying decision
problem to be solved in offline monitoring) is shown to be PSpace-complete in LTLFO,
the prefix problem (to be solved by an online monitor), is undecidable. However, a
decision procedure for tackling the prefix problem is subject of the next chapter.
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Table 3.1: Overview of complexity results.
LTL LTLFO
Satisfiability PSpace-complete Undecidable
Word problem < Bilinear-time PSpace-complete
Model checking PSpace-complete
ExpSpace-membership,
PSpace-hard
Prefix problem PSpace-complete Undecidable
Experiments of the next chapter also show that a decidable prefix problem is
merely of theoretical interest, as one usually does not encode undecidable problems
into formulae to be answered at runtime.
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Monitoring algorithm
A corollary of Theorem 3.2.5 is that there cannot exist a complete monitor for LTLFO-
definable infinite trace languages. Yet the main contributions of this chapter is to
show that one can build a sound and efficient LTLFO monitor that tackles the pre-
fix problem, using a new kind of automaton. Before we go into the details of the
actual monitoring algorithm (§4.2), let us first consider the model of an SA (§4.1),
which potentially “spawn” a positive Boolean combination of “children SAs” (i.e.,
subautomata) in each such step. The entire number of subautomata is infinite wrt.
a trace, thus those cannot be precomputed, unlike a BA for LTL. However, the sym-
bolic structure of subautomata (i.e., their states and transitions containing variables,
but not assignments) can be generated prior to commencing monitoring. The struc-
ture helps to efficiently decide what needs to be stored from events at runtime (i.e.,
by spawning the right amount of SAs in each step and assigning values of ground
atoms to variables in states), and what can be “garbage collected” (i.e., by pruning
entire subautomata).
We then consider optimisations to reduce the state space of the monitor (§4.3) and
experimental results of its implementation (§4.4). Finally, a comprehensive survey of
related monitoring approaches in the literature (i.e, those that allow reasoning over
traces with data in a broader sense) is given (§4.5).
4.1 Spawning automaton
First, we provide the general definition of an SA, and then detail on the construction
for LTLFO formulae. For an intuitive understanding of the new automaton model, see
Example 4.1.1.
4.1.1 General definition
For the output of a spawning function in Def. 4.1.1, we need to introduce the concept
of a positive Boolean formula: Let B+(X) denote the set of all positive Boolean
formulae over the set X (i.e., Boolean formulae that are created from X and use only
∧ and ∨, but not ¬). We say that some set Y ⊆ X satisfies a formula β ∈ B+(X),
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written Y |= β, if the truth assignment that assigns true to all elements in Y and false
to all X−Y satisfies β.
Definition 4.1.1 (Spawning automaton). An SA is given byA = (Σ, l, Q, Q0, δ→, δ↓,F ),
where
• Σ is a countable set called alphabet,
• l ∈N0 the level of A,
• Q a finite set of states,
• Q0 ⊆ Q a set of distinguished initial states,
• δ→ a transition relation,
• δ↓ what is called a spawning function, and
• F = {F1, . . . , Fn | Fi ⊆ Q} an acceptance condition (to be defined later on).
We have δ→ : Q × Σ −→ 2Q and δ↓ : Q × Σ −→ B+(A<l), where A<l = {A′ |
A′ is an SA with level less than l}.
An SA can be seen as an extension of a GBA (see Def. 2.3.9), where the level and
the spawning function is added to the usual 5-tuple. The spawning function of an SA
with level l spawns only Boolean combinations of “children SAs” that have a strictly
lower level than l.
Definition 4.1.2 (Run of an SA). A run of an SA, A, over input w ∈ Σω is a mapping
ρ : N0 −→ Q, s.t. ρ(0) ∈ Q0 and ρ(i + 1) ∈ δ→(ρ(i), wi) for all i ∈N0. When clear from
the context, we just say "run".
Definition 4.1.3 (Locally acceptaning run). A run ρ of an SA, A, is locally accepting if
Inf (ρ) ∩ Fi 6= ∅ for all Fi ∈ F , where Inf (ρ) denotes the set of states visited infinitely often.
Definition 4.1.4 (Accepting run of an SA). A run ρ of A over input w ∈ Σω is called
accepting if l = 0 and it is locally accepting. If l > 0, ρ is called accepting if it is locally
accepting and for all i ∈ N0 there is a set Y ⊆ A<l , s.t. Y |= δ↓(ρ(i), wi) and all SAs
A′ ∈ Y have an accepting run, ρ′, over wi.
When clear from the context, we just say "accepting run". While not inherent
in the automaton model, notice that the above defined local acceptance basically
resembles a generalised Büchi acceptance. This means that the SAs with level 0 are
equally expressive as GBAs.
While the accepted language of an SA A, L(A), is defined as usual for automata
seen in §2.3 (i.e., it consists of all w ∈ Σω, for which A has at least one accepting
run), we additionally define the local language of A as
Llocal(A) := {w ∈ Σω | there exists a local accepting run of A over w}.
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4.1.2 A construction for LTLFO-formulae
Given some ϕ ∈ LTLFO, let us now examine in detail how to build the correspond-
ing SA, Aϕ = (Σ, l, Q, Q0, δ→, δ↓,F ) s.t. L(Aϕ) = L(ϕ) holds. To this end, we set
Σ = {(A, σ) | σ ∈ (A)- Ev}. If ϕ is not a sentence, we write Aϕ,v to denote the spawn-
ing automaton for ϕ in which free variables are mapped according to a finite set of
valuations v.1 To define the set of states for an SA, we make use of a restricted subfor-
mula function, sf|∀(ϕ), which is defined like a generic subformula function (Def. 4.1.5),
except if ϕ is of the form ∀ x : p. ψ, we have sf|∀(ϕ) = {ϕ}.
Definition 4.1.5 (Generic subformula function). The generic subformula function is a
mapping, sf : LTLFO −→ 2LTLFO , which is inductively defined as follows:
• sf(p(t)) = {p(t)},
• sf(r(t)) = {r(t)},
• sf(¬ϕ) = {¬ϕ} ∪ sf(ϕ),
• sf(ϕ ∧ ψ) = {ϕ ∧ ψ} ∪ sf(ϕ) ∪ sf(ψ),
• sf(Xϕ) = {Xϕ} ∪ sf(ϕ),
• sf(ϕUψ) = {ϕUψ} ∪ sf(ϕ) ∪ sf(ψ), and
• sf(∀x : p. ϕ) = {∀x : p. ϕ} ∪ sf(ϕ).
This essentially means that an SA for a formula ϕ on the topmost level looks
like the GBA for ϕ, where quantified subformulae have been interpreted as atomic
propositions.
For example, if ϕ = ψ ∧ ∀ x : p. ψ′, where ψ is a quantifier-free formula, then Aϕ,
at the topmost level n, is like the GBA for the LTL formula ψ∧ a, where a is an atomic
proposition; or in other words, Aϕ handles the subformula ∀ x : p. ψ′ separately in
terms of a subautomaton of level n− 1 (see also definition of δ↓ below).
Finally, we define the closure of ϕ wrt. sf|∀(ϕ) as
cl(ϕ) = {¬ψ | ψ ∈ sf|∀(ϕ)} ∪ sf|∀(ϕ),
i.e., the smallest set containing sf|∀(ϕ), which is closed under negation. The set of
states of Aϕ, Q, consists of all complete subsets of cl(ϕ); that is, a set q ⊆ cl(ϕ) is
complete iff
• for any ψ ∈ cl(ϕ) either ψ ∈ q or ¬ψ ∈ q, but not both; and
• for any ψ ∧ ψ′ ∈ cl(ϕ), we have that ψ ∧ ψ′ ∈ q iff ψ ∈ q and ψ′ ∈ q; and
1Considering free variables, even though the runtime policies can only ever be sentences, is neces-
sary, because an SA for a formula ϕ is inductively defined in terms of SAs for its subformulae (i.e.,
Aϕ’s subautomata), some of which may contain free variables.
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• for any ψUψ′ ∈ cl(ϕ), we have that if ψUψ′ ∈ q then ψ′ ∈ q or ψ ∈ q, and if
ψUψ′ 6∈ q, then ψ′ 6∈ q.
Let q ∈ Q and A = (|A|, I). The transition function δ→(q, (A, σ)) is defined iff
• for all p(t) ∈ q, we have t I ∈ pI and for all ¬p(t) ∈ q, we have t I 6∈ pI ,
• for all r(t) ∈ q, we have t I ∈ rI and for all ¬r(t) ∈ q, we have t I 6∈ rI .
In which case, for any q′ ∈ Q, we have that q′ ∈ δ→(q, (A, σ)) iff
• for all Xψ ∈ cl(ϕ), we have Xψ ∈ q iff ψ ∈ q′, and
• for all ψUψ′ ∈ cl(ϕ), we have ψUψ′ ∈ q iff ψ′ ∈ q or ψ ∈ q and ψUψ′ ∈ q′.
This is similar to the well known syntax directed construction of GBAs [cf. Baier
and Katoen, 2008, §5.2], except that we also need to cater for quantified subformulae.
For this purpose, an inductive spawning function is defined as follows. If l > 0, then
δ↓(q, (A, σ)) yields ∧
∀x:p.ψ∈q
 ∧
(p,d)∈σ
Aψ,v′
 ∧
 ∧
¬∀x:p.ψ∈q
 ∨
(p,d)∈σ
A¬ψ,v′′
 ,
where v′ = v ∪ {x 7→ d} and v′′ = v ∪ {x 7→ d} are sets of valuations, otherwise
δ↓(q, (A, σ)) yields >. Moreover, we set Q0 = {q ∈ Q | ϕ ∈ q}, F = {FψUψ′ | ψUψ′ ∈
cl(ϕ)} with FψUψ′ = {q ∈ Q | ψ′ ∈ q ∨ ¬(ψUψ′) ∈ q}, and l = depth(ϕ), where
depth(ϕ) is called the quantifier depth of ϕ.
Definition 4.1.6 (Quantifier depth). The quantifier depth is a mapping, depth : LTLFO −→
N0, which is inductively defined as follows:
• depth(ϕ) = 0 iff ϕ ∈ LTLFO is a quantifier free formula,
• depth(∀ x : p. ψ) = 1+ depth(ψ)
• depth(ϕ ∧ ψ) = depth(ϕUψ) = max(depth(ϕ), depth(ψ)), and
• depth(¬ϕ) = depth(Xϕ) = depth(ϕ) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ LTLFO.
Correctness. We now assert formally in Theorem 4.1.1 that for a given ϕ ∈ LTLFO,
the constructed SA, Aϕ, as outlined above is correct in the sense that for any sentence
ϕ ∈ LTLFO, we have that L(Aϕ) = L(ϕ). The following lemma is needed in order to
prove this statement.
Lemma 4.1.1. Let ϕ ∈ LTLFO (not necessarily a sentence) and v be a valuation. For each
accepting run ρ in Aϕ,v over input (A, w), ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), and i ≥ 0, we have that ψ ∈ ρ(i) iff
(A, w, v, i) |= ψ.
Proof idea (full proof on page 129). By nested induction on depth(ϕ) and the structure
of ψ ∈ cl(ϕ).
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Level 0
{u 7→ 1, ip 7→ 2.3.4.1, u
′ 7→ 3, ip′ 7→ 2.3.4.3}
¬(u = u′ )
(ip = ip
′ )
{u 7→ 1, ip 7→ 2.3.4.1, u
′ 7→ 1, ip′ 7→ 5.6.7.8}
¬(u = u′ )
(ip = ip
′ )
{u 7→ 2, ip 7→ 2.3.4.2, u
′ 7→ 3, ip′ 7→ 2.3.4.3}
¬(u = u′ )
(ip = ip
′ )
{u 7→ 2, ip 7→ 2.3.4.2, u
′ 7→ 1, ip′ 7→ 5.6.7.8}
¬(u = u′ )
(ip = ip
′ )
Level 1
{u 7→ 1, ip 7→ 2.3.4.1}
(∀(u′ , ip′ ) : send. (u =
u′ )⇒ (ip = ip
′ ))
logout(u, ip)
{u 7→ 2, ip 7→ 2.3.4.2}
(∀(u′ , ip′ ) : send. (u =
u′ )⇒ (ip = ip
′ ))
logout(u, ip)
Level 2
∀(u, ip) : login. ((∀(u
′ , ip′ ) : send. (u =
u′ )⇒ (ip = ip
′ ))Ulogout(u, ip)
)
Figure 4.1: Spawning on event {login(1, 2.3.4.1), login(2, 2.3.4.2),
send(3, 2.3.4.3), send(1, 5.6.7.8)}.
Theorem 4.1.1. The constructed SA is correct in the sense that for any sentence ϕ ∈ LTLFO,
we have that L(Aϕ) = L(ϕ).
Proof idea (full proof on page 132). ⊆ by Lemma 4.1.1. The other direction uses induc-
tion on depth(ϕ).
Example 4.1.1. Consider the graphical representation of an SA for ϕ = G(∀(u, ip) :
login. ((∀(u′, ip′) : send. (u = u′) ⇒ (ip = ip′))Ulogout(u, ip))) in Fig. 4.1. For
readability, note that we write the interpreted predicate for equality as infix notation. In a
nutshell, ϕ specifies that once user u has logged in to the system from Internet Protocol (IP)
address ip, she must not send anything from an IP address other than ip until logged out.
While ϕ is not meant to represent a realistic security policy, it does help highlight the fea-
tures of an SA: We first note that level l of Aϕ is given by depth(ϕ) = 2. As ϕ is of the
form G∀(u, ip) : login. ψ, Aϕ’s state space is de facto that of an ordinary GBA for an LTL
formula of the form Gp. Let us now assume that σ = {login(1, 2.3.4.1), login(2, 2.3.4.2),
send(3, 2.3.4.3), send(1, 5.6.7.8)} is an event, which we want Aϕ to process. Due to ϕ’s
outmost quantifier, the two login-actions will lead to the spawning of a conjunction of two
subautomata of respective levels l − 1 (downward dotted lines). The state space of these
subautomata is de facto that of an ordinary GBA for an LTL formula of the form aUb as
one can see in Fig. 4.1, level 1. These SAs also keep track of a quantified formula, hence
the two send-actions will also spawn a conjunction of subautomata, basically, to check if
(u = u′) ⇒ (ip = ip′) holds. The respective valuations are given below each SA, whereas
the respective current states are marked in grey.
Let us now consider the accepting run of this SA. First note that the SA on level 2
has a locally accepting run over any trace. This is because its state does not contain any
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predicates. However, spawned conjunctions based on the state must be satisfied for a run to
be also accepting. In this example, the spawned conjunction of the initial state is satisfied if
the SAs on level 1 both have an accepting run. Note that if ϕ’s outermost quantifier were an
existential quantifier, a disjunction would be spawned, so that only one of the SAs on level 1
would need to have an accepting run. Recursively, the spawned conjunctions of the SAs on
level 1 must be satisfied. However, for the second SA from the left on level 0, there cannot
exist any (locally) accepting run over σw for any w ∈ Σω. This is because the predicates
in both initial states do not evaluate to true for the according send-action. It follows that
the spawned conjunction of the left automaton on level 1 cannot be satisfied, and therefore, it
cannot have an accepting run. Consequently, the SA on level 2 cannot have an accepting run
over any trace starting with σ.
Size of an SA. Given an SA for ϕ ∈ LTLFO, the size of the top-most level as well
as each spawned SA is O(2|ϕ|) (i.e., essentially the size of a GBA). Each SA spawns
O(|ϕ| · |σ|) different subautomata, where σ is the current event and O(|ϕ|) the num-
ber of quantified subformulae. This means, in total the size of an SA at time 0 is
bounded by O((|ϕ| · |σ|)depth(ϕ) · 2|ϕ|). However, an SA is not a finite state space
automaton; thus, it grows ad infinitum over time. A consequence is that a moni-
tor cannot build naively based on this type of automaton but must prune spawned
subautomata that are not needed for evalutation anymore.
4.2 Monitor construction
Before we look at the actual monitor construction in particular, let us first introduce
some additional concepts and notation: For a finite run ρ of Aϕ over (A, u), we call
δ↓(ρ(j), (Aj, uj)) = oblj an obligation, where 0 ≤ j < |u|, in that oblj represents the
language to be satisfied after j inputs. That is, oblj refers to the language represented
by the positive Boolean combination of spawned SAs. We say oblj is met by the input,
if (Aj, uj) ∈ good(oblj) and violated if (Aj, uj) ∈ bad(oblj). Furthermore, ρ is called
potentially locally accepting, if it can be extended to a run ρ′ over (A, u) together with
some infinite suffix, such that ρ′ is locally accepting.
The monitor for a formula ϕ ∈ LTLFO can now be described in terms of two mu-
tually recursive algorithms: The main entry point is Algorithm M. It reads an event
and issues two calls to a separate Algorithm T: one for ϕ (under a possibly empty
valuation v) and one for ¬ϕ (under a possibly empty valuation v). The purpose of
Algorithm T is to detect bad prefixes wrt. the language of its argument formula, call
it ψ. It does so by keeping track of those finite runs in Aψ,v that are potentially locally
accepting and where its obligations have not been detected as violated by the input.
If at any time no such run exists, then a bad prefix has been encountered. Algo-
rithm T, in turn, uses Algorithm M to evaluate if obligations of its runs are met or
violated by the input observed so far (i.e., it inductively creates submonitors): after
the ith input, it instantiates Algorithm M with argument ψ′ (under corresponding
valuation v′) for each Aψ′,v′ that occurs in obli and forwards to it all observed events
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from time i on.
Algorithm M (Monitor). The algorithm takes a ϕ ∈ LTLFO (under a possibly empty
valuation v). Its intuitive behaviour is as follows: Let us assume an initially empty
first-order temporal structure (A, u). Algorithm M reads an event (A, σ), prints “>”
if (AA, uσ) ∈ good(ϕ) (resp. “⊥” for bad(ϕ)), and returns. Otherwise it prints “?”,
whereas we now assume that (A, u) = (AA, uσ) holds.2
M1.[Create instances of Algorithm T.] Create two instances of Algorithm T: one
with ϕ and one with ¬ϕ, and call them Tϕ,v and T¬ϕ,v, respectively.
M2.[Forward next event.] Wait for next event (A, σ) and forward it to Tϕ,v and T¬ϕ,v.
M3.[Communicate verdict.] If Tϕ,v sends “no runs”, print ⊥ and return. If T¬ϕ,v
sends “no runs”, print > and return. Otherwise, print “?” and go back to M2.
z
Algorithm T (Track runs). The algorithm takes a ϕ ∈ LTLFO (under a corresponding
valuation v), for which it creates an SA,Aϕ,v. It then reads an event (A, σ) and returns
if Aϕ,v, after processing (A, σ), does not have any potentially locally accepting runs,
for which obligations have not been detected as violated. Otherwise, it saves the new
state of Aϕ,v, waits for new input, and then checks again, and so forth.
T1. [Create SA.] Create an SA,3 Aϕ,v.
T2. [Wait for new event.] Let (A, σ) be the event that was read.
T3. [Update potentially locally accepting runs.] Let B and B′ be (initially empty)
buffers. If B = ∅, for each q ∈ Q0 and for each q′ ∈ δ→(q, (A, σ)): add
(q′, [δ↓(q, (A, σ))]) to B. Otherwise, set B′ = B, and subsequently B = ∅. Next,
for all (q, [obl1, . . . , obln]) ∈ B′ and for all q′ ∈ δ→(q, (A, σ)): add (q′, [oblnew, obl1,
. . . , obln]) to B, where oblnew = δ↓(q, (A, σ)).
T4. [Create submonitors.] For each (q, [oblnew, obl1 . . . , obln]) ∈ B: call Algorithm M
with argument ψ (under corresponding v′) for each Aψ,v′ that occurs in oblnew.
T5. [Iterate over candidate runs.] Assume B = {b0, . . . , bm}. Create a counter j = 0
and set (q, [obl0, . . . , obln]) = bj to be the jth element of B.
T6. [Send, receive, replace.] For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n: send (A, σ) to all submonitors
corresponding to SAs occurring in obli, and wait for the respective verdicts. For
every returned > (resp. ⊥) replace the corresponding SA in obli with > (resp.
⊥).
T7. [Corresponding run has violated obligations?] For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n: if obli = ⊥,
remove bj from B and go to T9.
T8. [Obligations met?] For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n: if obli = >, remove obli.
T9. [Next run in buffer.] If j ≤ m, set j to j + 1 and go to step T6.
T10. [Communicate verdict.] If B = ∅, send “no runs” to the calling Algorithm M
and return, otherwise send “some run(s)” and go back to T2. z
2Obviously, the monitor does not really keep (A, u) around, or it would be necessarily trace-length
dependent. (A, u) is merely used here to explain the inner workings of the monitor.
3Note that we build the SA in such a way that it contains only states from which exist a loop through
some final states; i.e., every run in the SA is potentially locally accepting.
50 Monitoring algorithm
Level 0
Mψ′=(u=u′ )⇒(ip=i
p′ ),v′′
Tψ′ ,v′′
T¬ψ′ ,v′′
Mψ′ ,v′′′
Tψ′ ,v′′′
T¬ψ′ ,v′′′
Mψ′ ,v∗
Tψ′ ,v∗
T¬ψ′ ,v∗
Mψ′ ,v∗∗
Tψ′ ,v∗∗
T¬ψ′ ,v∗∗
v′′ = {u 7→ 1, ip 7→ 2.
3.4.1,
u′ 7→ 3, ip′ 7→ 2.3.4.3}
v′′′ = {u 7→ 1, ip 7→ 2
.3.4.1,
u′ 7→ 1, ip′ 7→ 5.6.7.8}
v∗ = {u 7→ 2, ip 7→ 2.
3.4.2,
u′ 7→ 3, ip′ 7→ 2.3.4.3}
v∗∗ = {u 7→ 2, ip 7→ 2
.3.4.2,
u′ 7→ 1, ip′ 7→ 5.6.7.8}
Level 1
Mψ=∀(u′ ,ip′ ):send.ψ
′Ulogout(u,ip)
,v
Tψ,v
T¬ψ,v
Mψ,v′
Tψ,v′
T¬ψ,v′
v = {u 7→ 1, ip 7→ 2.3.4
.1}
v′ = {u 7→ 2, ip 7→ 2.3.
4.2}
Level 2
Mϕ=G∀(u,ip):login.ψ
Tϕ
T¬ϕ
Figure 4.2: Monitor processing the event {login(1, 2.3.4.1), login(2, 2.3.4.2),
send(3, 2.3.4.3), send(1, 5.6.7.8)}.
Note that the idea to use two instances of Algorithm T in step M1 is conceptually
similar to the idea put forward in Bauer et al. [2011]. They construct for a given
LTL formula ϕ, a BA for ϕ and ¬ϕ, respectively. Based on the BAs, two NFAs are
created. The NFA wrt. ϕ helps to detect bad prefixes. This means, it has essentially
the structure of the according BA for ϕ, where a state is marked as accepting iff there
exists an accepting run starting from that same state in the BA (i.e., the language is
not empty). If the NFA for ϕ does not accept a prefix, a bad prefix has been found.
Inversely, the NFA for ¬ϕ is built to detect good prefixes.
For a given ϕ ∈ LTLFO and (A, u), let us use Mϕ(A, u) to denote the successive
application of Algorithm M for formula ϕ, first on u0, then u1, and so forth. We then
get
Theorem 4.2.1 (Impartiality). Mϕ(A, u) = > ⇒ (A, u) ∈ good(ϕ) (resp. for ⊥ and
bad(ϕ)).
Proof idea (full proof on page 133). By nested induction over depth(ϕ) and the length
of (A, u).
Example 4.2.1. Let us recall the policy used in Example 4.1.1, which we are going to use
in the following to exemplify the algorithm’s behaviour. Given the previously used event
σ = {login(1, 2.3.4.1), login(2, 2.3.4.2), send(3, 2.3.4.3), send(1, 5.6.7.8)}, Mϕ creates two
instances Tϕ and T¬ϕ, respectively. Note that there is no explicit valuation passed as an
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argument as ϕ, being the original user-specification, can be assumed to be a sentence. We
have illustrated this in Fig. 4.2 (see level 2).
Both Tϕ and T¬ϕ then create their respective SAs, Aϕ and A¬ϕ. More precisely, in this
very step, they create only the topmost level of respective SAs which, in case of Aϕ, coincides
with level 2 of the SA depicted in Fig. 4.1. We omit details for the creation of A¬ϕ, as it
is done similarly. Instead of naively unfolding the respective SAs, Algorithm T has a local
buffer B, which keeps track of potentially locally accepting runs; that is, Tϕ initialises B with
(q0, [δ↓(q0, (A, σ)) = Aψ,v ∧Aψ,v′ ]), where q0 denotes the one and only state of Aϕ on level
2 and v, v′ are the valuations reflecting the contents of σ. In other words, instead of unfolding
Aϕ (resp. A¬ϕ) directly, we store δ↓(q0, (σ,A)) (resp. for A¬ϕ) in B and then let another
monitor deal with its results.
Therefore, as far as Tϕ (resp. T¬ϕ) is concerned, it treats the quantified part of ϕ (resp.
¬ϕ) as a proposition, say, p, whose truth value is determined by some oracle (i.e., other
monitor). This means, ϕ is of the form Gp, for which a corresponding GBA only has a
single looping state over proposition p. Hence, Tϕ (resp. T¬ϕ) needs to remember only one
potentially locally accepting run inside B—the one that loops over p. From this point of view,
the name “potentially locally accepting” seems quite fitting, in that a positive answer by the
oracle (i.e., submonitor) will, indeed, confirm that the run is a suitable prefix of a satisfying
run, if only it continued like that.
Consequently—in a mutually recursive manner—Tϕ then creates monitors, one for Aψ,v
and one for Aψ,v′ , which we refer to as Mψ,v and Mψ,v′ , respectively (see Fig. 4.2, level 1).
To stick with our analogy: these monitors serve as the oracles for the simple Gp automaton.
(The same process is happening for T¬ϕ, of course, which we disregard, as it is similar.) By
their recursive definition, these new monitors behave like Mϕ, except that they do not start
with an empty valuation. Moreover, the mutual recursion eventually ends, once there are no
further quantifiers to create new Ts and Ms for. It is therefore obvious that Algorithm M
terminates, but not necessarily that the respective buffers are not growing unboundedly with
increasing trace lengths (and therefore potentially unbounded number of potentially locally
accepting runs). The following discussion illustrates this point.
Let us consider the newly created Tψ,v on level 1, Fig. 4.2, whose buffer is initially as
follows: (q0, [δ↓(q0, (A, σ)) = Aψ′,v′′ ∧ Aψ′,v′′′ ]), where Aψ′,v′′ and Aψ′,v′′′ are a reference
to the two leftmost SAs on level 0 in Fig. 4.1. Again, if we interpret these as propositions,
we need two further monitors that yield their truth value, which are Mψ′,v′′ and Mψ′,v′′′ ,
respectively. These, in turn, yield four instances of Algorithm T, Tψ′,v′′ , T¬ψ′,v′′ , Tψ′,v′′′ , and
T¬ψ′,v′′′ , respectively (four leftmost instances on level 0, Fig. 4.2). But as we have reached the
end of our recursion and there are no further quantifiers left, the respective buffers of these
four instances will never grow and, in fact, both T¬ψ′,v′′ and T¬ψ′,v′′′ will have no locally
accepting runs. Therefore, δ↓(q0, (A, σ)) = >, and the buffer becomes (q0, []). Note that we
have, again, omitted some details for the negated policy. However, the point we would like
to make here is that potentially locally accepting runs, stored inside the respective buffers, do
not necessarily have to be memorised over the entire lifetime of a monitor and can be removed
in a process similar to “garbage collection” known from programming languages [cf. Jones
and Lins, 1996].
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4.3 Optimisations
After we have developed in Example 4.2.1 an intuitive understanding of how the
monitoring algorithm works, let us discuss some obvious potential for optimisa-
tions. We can exploit the idea that the individual levels of an SA are merely GBAs
of effectively propositional LTL formulae and are therefore able to use well-known
transformations on automata to reduce the overall state space of the monitor. Some
of those were presented in the context of runtime verification in Bauer et al. [2011].
We have seen, in particular, in Example 4.2.1 that monitoring a formula, such as
ϕ = G∀(u, ip) : login. ψ, corresponds to building a hierarchy of submonitors, one for
each quantified subformula (and observed action, naturally). On the highest level of
this hierarchy, the corresponding monitor will effectively use two GBAs, one for a
formula of the form Gp and one for a formula of the form ¬(Gp), where we use p
merely as a reference to the submonitors checking the ∀(u, ip) : login. ψ part of the
original formula, and so forth. In other words, on the topmost level, we have two
GBAs for propositional specifications, Gp and ¬(Gp), and on the next level down,
one for ψ and one for ¬ψ (as well as for each observed action), and so forth.
This opens up the door to the following automata optimisations, which are ex-
pected to help make the monitor more efficient. We first convert the individual GBAs
into BAs, using the well-known counting construction, which we mentioned already
in §2.3. Let A˜ϕ = (Σ, Q, Qo, δ, F) denote a complete BA (see Def. 2.3.2) obtained
this way for ϕ, where Σ corresponds to the propositional alphabet of the automaton
(thus, completely ignoring the fact that it is used within the context of an SA), Q is
its set of states, Q0 ⊆ Q a set of initial states, δ ⊆ Q× Σ× 2Q the transition relation
and F ⊆ Q the set of final states. Then we turn A˜ϕ into an NFA (see Def. 2.3.1),
Aˆϕ = (Σ, Q, Q0, δ, Fˆ), where Fˆ ⊇ F is the set of states for which there exists a path in
A˜ϕ, s.t. a strongly connected component can be reached, which contains at least one
state from F. Strongly connected components can be found, for example, by Tarjan’s
algorithm [Tarjan, 1972], which performs a depth-first search. In Bauer et al. [2011],
it was shown that L(Aˆϕ) = {u ∈ Σ∗ | there exists a w ∈ Σω s.t. uw ∈ L(A˜ϕ)}. In
other words, Aˆϕ accepts prefixes of elements in L(A˜ϕ); that is:
Proposition 4.3.1. Every u ∈ L(Aˆϕ), has a potentially locally accepting run in Aϕ.
Proof. Follows straight from the definitions.
Since Aˆϕ is an ordinary NFA, it can be made deterministic and minimal in a
language-preserving manner (see again §2.3). Moreover, we can build the same au-
tomaton for ¬ϕ, and instead of using two automata in parallel, one for ϕ and one for
¬ϕ, we can build the synchronous product of these two [cf. Hopcroft and Ullman,
1979; Bauer et al., 2011] and use only this one automaton per submonitor—which on
top of it all is minimal and deterministic. Let Pϕ = (Σ, Qϕ × Q¬ϕ, Qϕ0 × Q¬ϕ0 , δ′) be
the product automaton obtained this way and δ′ defined as expected. The following
proposition formally sums up and gives argument for soundness of the proposed
optimisation.
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Proposition 4.3.2. If a run reaches a state (p, q) ∈ Qϕ × Q¬ϕ, s.t. q 6∈ Fˆ¬ϕ, then it is
potentially locally accepting only in Aϕ; if p 6∈ Fˆϕ, then it is potentially locally accepting
only in A¬ϕ; and if p ∈ Fˆϕ and q ∈ Fˆ¬ϕ holds, it is potentially locally accepting in Aϕ and
A¬ϕ.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 4.3.1 and soundness of the product construction.
The concrete changes to the algorithms in §4.2, resulting from these optimisations,
are now relatively straightforward to describe. Algorithm M, instead of creating two
instances of Algorithm T, merely creates one and interprets its result accordingly
(see below). Since for a given ϕ, Algorithm M no longer calls Algorithm T for both
ϕ and ¬ϕ, Algorithm T does not build Aϕ in T1, but Pϕ. Moreover, it performs
subsequent operations on this product automaton instead of Aϕ. Finally, in T10 and
in accordance with Proposition 4.3.2, if all runs (q, [oblnew, obl1 . . . , obln]) ∈ B are s.t.
that they are only locally accepting in A¬ϕ, Algorithm T sends “no runs in Aϕ”; if
they are only locally accepting in Aϕ, it sends “no runs in A¬ϕ”; and if neither holds,
it sends “runs in Aϕ and Aϕ.” Algorithm M, in instruction M3, then prints ⊥, >, ?
in either event, respectively.
4.4 Experiments
In order to demonstrate feasibility of the monitor construction and to get an intu-
ition on its runtime performance (i.e., space consumption at runtime), the author
has implemented the algorithm above both as laid out in §4.2 as well as with the
in §4.3 explained optimisations.4 Let us refer to the former in the following as the
“unoptimised” version of the algorithm.
The only divergence from its description is that the GBAs according to the rules
laid out in §4.2 are not manually constructed. We have argued that the GBAs are
basically ordinary propositional automata, hence there is no reason why we cannot
employ an “off the shelf” GBA generator, such as lbt.5 Similarly, for the optimised
version, we used the LTL3-Tools to construct the product automata.6
It should be obvious that this does not change any of the results, but instead
makes the approach a lot easier to implement. Moreover, the proposed algorithm has
the advantage that it is possible to precompute all the SAs (resp. product automata)
that are required at runtime, i.e., we replaced step T1 in Algorithm T with a look-
up in a precomputed table of SAs (resp. product automata) and merely use a new
valuation each time.
In §4.4.1, we first compare the unoptimised implementation with the somewhat
naive formula progression and in §4.4.2 we analyse explicitly if the optimisation
leads to effectively smaller monitor sizes—and therefore more efficient monitors—at
runtime.
4Available as open source Scala project on https://github.com/jckuester/ltlfo2mon
5http://www.tcs.hut.ﬁ/Software/maria/tools/lbt/
6http://ltl3tools.sourceforge.net/
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Figure 4.3: Difference in space consumption at runtime: SA-based monitor vs. pro-
gression.
4.4.1 SA-based monitoring vs. formula progression
Let us compare the SA-based monitor implementation with the arguably easier to
construct approach of monitoring LTLFO formulae, which has been described by
Bauer, Küster, and Vegliach [2012]. In that work was used the well-known concept
of formula rewriting known for LTL, which we have mentioned already in §3.2.1.
It is sometimes also referred to as progression [cf. Bacchus and Kabanza, 1998, Ta-
ble 1]: a function, Progress : LTL×Σ −→ LTL, continuously “rewrites” a formula
ϕ ∈ LTL using an observed event, σ, s.t., σw |= ϕ ⇔ w |= Progress(ϕ, σ) holds. As-
sume ϕ′ ∈ Progress(ϕ, σ). If ϕ′ = >, then σ ∈ good(ϕ), if ϕ′ = ⊥ then σ ∈ bad(ϕ),
otherwise the thereby realised monitor waits for further events to apply its progres-
sion function to. Progress rewrites according to the well-known fixpoint characteri-
sations of LTL operators. For the temporal operators, the basic rules are therefore
Progress(Xϕ, σ) = ϕ, and Progress(ϕUψ, σ) = Progress(ψ, σ) ∨ (Progress(ϕ, σ) ∧ ϕUψ).
For LTLFO was added another rule that handles the quantifier as well as the pro-
gression function takes another input: a valuation v. The new rule rewrites the
quantifier into a conjunction according to the actions occurring in an event (A, σ):
Progress(∀x : p. ϕ, (A, σ), v) = ∧(p,d)∈σ Progress(ϕ, (A, σ), v ∪ {x 7→ d}).
As a benchmark for all of the tests were used several formulae derived from the
well-known specification patterns discussed in §2.4. Quantification was added to
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Figure 4.4: Size of precomputed look-up tables.
crucial positions in the formulae. Some results of the comparison between progres-
sion and the monitor in this thesis are visualised in Fig. 4.3. For each LTLFO formula
corresponding to a pattern, 20 traces of lengths 100, 1000, and 10000 have been ran-
domly generated, respectively, and were passed to both algorithms. The number of
actions per event is uniquely distributed between 0 and 5 and the domain values of
ground terms are log-normal distributed.7
The average space consumption of each algorithm (i.e., size of the monitor) was
measured at different trace lengths. The x-axis marks the difference between the
two approaches after reading a trace of a given length. A positive difference (i.e.,
if the small shape sits in the right part of the diagram) indicates that the SA-based
monitor is on average strictly smaller than progression after reading a trace of a
set length (and vice versa, negative values indicate that progression is on aver-
age smaller). The space consumption of progression is measured simply in terms
of the length of the formula at a given time, whereas for the SA-based monitor
Mϕ,v it is determined recursively as follows: Recall, Mϕ,v first creates two instances
of Algorithm T, Tϕ,v and T¬ϕ,v, each of which creates a buffer, call it Bϕ, resp.
B¬ϕ. Let B = Bϕ ∪ B¬ϕ, and (qi, [obli,0, . . . , obli,n]) be the i-th element of B, then
7All traces used in this chapter, the definitions of I-operators appearing in formulae, as well as the
experiments’ results in its full extent can be found on https://github.com/jckuester/ltlfo2mon/tree/
master/experiments.
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|Mϕ,v| = ∑|B|−1i=0 |(qi, [obli,0, . . . , obli,n])| = ∑|B|−1i=0 (1 + |o˜bli,0| + . . . + |o˜bli,n|), where
|o˜bli,j| = |obli,j|+∑Aψ,v∈obli,j |Mψ,v|, i.e., the sum of the top-level monitor’s constituents
as well as that of all of its submonitors. Finally, we also need to add the total
size of the precomputed GBA look-up table. This is measured as |Aϕ| + |A¬ϕ| +
∑∀x:p.ψ∈sf(ϕ)(|Aψ| + |A¬ψ|), where |Aψ′ | is the size of the obtained GBA when we
run lbt on input ψ′ with quantified subformulae interpreted as propositions; that is,
the sum of the number of its states and transitions as well as the number of literals
contained in states. The absolute size of the look-up table for each formula is repre-
sented as a black coloured bar in Fig. 4.4, respectively. We find the smallest look-up
table with size 17 for the shortest of all formulae, ϕ1, which contains GBAs of the
form Gp, ¬Gp, p and ¬p. On the other hand, the biggest look-up table is the one
for ϕ7 with size 1785, which is also the longest formula of the patterns used in the
experiments.
The end markers on the left of each horizontal bar show how much bigger in the
worst case an SA-based monitor is for a given formula compared to the correspond-
ing progression-based monitor (and vice versa for the right markers). The small
shapes in the middle denote the average size difference of the two monitors over the
whole length of a trace. This difference is most striking for ϕ2 on longer traces (e.g.,
∆ ≥ 10000 for traces of length 10000), where the average almost coincides with the
worst case. As such, this example brings to surface one of the potential pitfalls of
progression, namely that a lot of redundant information can accumulate over time:
If ∃x : w. q(x) ever becomes true, then Progress, which operates purely on a syn-
tactic level, will produce a new conjunct G∀y : w. ¬p(y) for each new event, even
though semantically it is not necessary (or, to use our analogy of before: progression
is not very good at “garbage collection”). Hence, the longer the trace, the greater the
average difference in size (similar in case of ϕ3 and ϕ4).
At first glance, it may seem a curious coincidence that the left markers of each bar
align perfectly, because this indicates that for all three traces that belong to a given
formula, the SA-based monitor is in the worst case by exactly the same constant k
bigger than the progression-based one, irrespective of the trace. However, it makes
sense if we consider when this worst case occurs: It is whenever the SA-based moni-
tor (and consequently also the rewriting-based one) does not have to memorise any
data at all, in which case the size of the SA-based monitor’s look-up table weighs the
most; that is, the size of the look-up table is almost equal to k. Usually this happens
when monitoring commences; hence, there is a perfect alignment on all traces. On
the other hand, the worst case for progression occurs whenever the amount of data
to be memorised by the monitor has reached its maximum. As this depends not
only on the formula, but also on the content of the randomly generated traces (and
in some of the examples also on their lengths, as seen in the previous example), we
generally do not observe alignment on the right.
For those examples that, on average, favour progression, note that the difference
in size is less dramatic—a fact, which may be slightly obfuscated by the pseudo-
logarithmic scale of the x-axis. Again, the differences in these examples (ϕ1, ϕ5,
ϕ6, and ϕ7) can be mostly explained by the fact that an SA-based monitor generally
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Figure 4.5: Difference in space consumption at runtime: optimised vs. unoptimised
SA-based monitor.
wastes more space for “book keeping”.
4.4.2 SA-based monitoring vs. optimisations
Let us now evaluate if the state space reduction, aimed for by the optimisations,
actually effects the size of the monitor in practice. Therefore, the optimised version
of the monitor has been executed on the same set of formulae and traces as discussed
in §4.4.1 to compare it against the unoptimised version.
Fig. 4.5 shows the results in the same type of diagram, which was used to compare
SA-based monitoring with a progression-based monitor. Again, as we measure the
difference between both monitor implementations at runtime, positive values on the
x-axis mean that the optimised monitor is smaller in size than the unoptimised one
(and vice versa for negative values). One can clearly see that the optimised monitor,
in the majority of cases, is on average much smaller than the unoptimised one. How-
ever, in the worst case (left markers) it tends to be often bigger than the unoptimised
one, as we can observe for formulae ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6 and ϕ8. The perfect alignment
of markers on the left, which we have seen before in Fig. 4.3, again indicate that the
worst case occurs independently of the trace-length; that is, the optimised monitor is
bigger by a constant k. In this case k correlates exactly with the difference in size of
the precomputed look-up table for the optimised and unoptimised monitor, which
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can be obtained from the numbers given in Fig. 4.4. Sizes for the GBA look-up tables
are shown as black coloured bars and have been discussed above, whereas the look-
up tables of product automata are presented in grey. In contrast to former, the latter
size is measured as following: |Pϕ| + ∑∀x:p.ψ∈sf(ϕ)(|Pψ|), where |Pψ′ | is the size of
the product automaton obtained from the LTL3-Tools on input ψ′. We establish |Pψ′ |
equal to |Aψ′ | with the only difference being that Pψ′ is a transition-based automa-
ton, and therefore we count the number of propositional literals labelling transitions
instead of states. On the other hand, for formulae ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ7, the difference in
size is positive, meaning that the optimised monitor is smaller at any point in time
during monitoring.
As in our previous comparison, we get the best results when traces are longer;
that is, the optimised monitor is considerably smaller on longer traces as the aver-
age size and the right markers almost coincide. This suggests that the unoptimised
monitor accumulates a lot of data over time, which the optimised one does not. This
is due to the fact that on the lowest level, the LTL3-Tools generate propositional and
therefore minimal finite state machines of which the optimised monitor only needs to
store a single state at runtime. This becomes even more apparent when looking at the
average number of runs per monitor on the lowest level for the different formulae:
for ϕ3 = 4, ϕ4 = 5.6, ϕ5 = 4, ϕ6 = 13.8 and ϕ7 = 52.7.
Finally, let us consider results for ϕ1 and ϕ2, for which average and worst cases
(left and right markers) are identical. We know for these formulae that no “book
keeping” is required, and the results show that, indeed, none of the proposed algo-
rithms in this thesis does. Recall, we have observed the same phenomena in Fig. 4.3
only for ϕ1, as progression accumulates redundant information for ϕ2.
4.5 Related monitoring approaches
This thesis is not the first work to discuss monitoring of traces with data nor to
deal in particular with temporal first-order specifications. This section discusses
monitoring approaches in the literature that all handle formalisms that are strictly
beyond propositional expressiveness: Some offer forms of data quantification that is
implicit [Stolz and Bodden, 2006; Chen and Rosu, 2009], explicit [Basin et al., 2015b;
Hallé and Villemaire, 2008; Stolz, 2010], or restricted to only universal quantification
[Chen and Rosu, 2009]. Some approaches are based on SMT solvers [Decker et al.,
2016] or use different types of automata than SAs [Barringer et al., 2012; Stolz and
Bodden, 2006; Havelund, 2014]. We focus on the major similarities and differences,
including an informal comparison of expressiveness or efficiency.
Past first-order temporal logic (Past FOTL). Even before the existence of runtime
verification as a scientific discipline,8 the monitoring problem for different types of
8Starting in 2001, the runtime verification community founded its own workshop, as a satellite event
of the conference Computer Aided Verification (CAV) [Berry et al., 2001]. The workshop subsequently
became an international conference [Barringer et al., 2010a]. A community website is available at
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first-order logic has been widely studied, e.g., in the database community. It was
motivated by checking temporal triggers and temporal constraints. In that context,
Chomicki [1995] presents a method to check for violations of temporal integrity con-
straints in databases, specified using (metric) past temporal operators. His logic
differs from LTLFO, in that it allows first-order quantification over a single countable
and constant domain, whereas quantified variables in LTLFO range over elements that
occur at the current position of the trace (see also Hallé and Villemaire [2008]; Bauer
et al. [2009b]). Presumably, to achieve the same effect, Chomicki [1995] demands
that policies are what is called “domain independent”, so that all statements refer
to known (i.e., finitely many) objects, which therefore can be stored in materialised
views. In other words, his proposed monitor construction for past FOTL extends
every database state with auxiliary relations that contain the historical information
necessary for checking constraints, and this way can be implemented by existing
database technology. Domain independence is a property of the policy and shown to
be undecidable [Paola, 1969]. In contrast, one could say that LTLFO has a similar no-
tion of domain independence already built-in, because of its quantifier. Like LTLFO,
the logic of Chomicki [1995] is also undecidable [Harel, 1985]; no function symbols
are allowed and relations are required to be finite. However, the logic is sometimes
extended with an operator for equality and strict order, which have the expected
infinite and rigid semantics.
Despite the fact that the prefix problem is not phrased as a decision problem,
its basic idea is already denoted by Chomicki in terms of the potential constraint
satisfaction problem. In particular, he shows that the set of prefixes of models for
a given formula is not recursively enumerable. On the other hand, the monitor
in Chomicki [1995] does not tackle this problem and instead solves what we have
introduced as the word problem, which, unlike the prefix problem, is decidable.
Chomicki implicitly defines already what can be thought of as trace-length in-
dependence under the term bounded history encoding, to distinguish his method from
naive methods that need to store the entire database (and therefore will theoretically
require arbitrary space, as database changes over time are considered an infinite se-
quence). The term bounded history encoding captures the intuition that the amount of
historical information stored does not depend on the length of the database history
but only on the active domain (i.e., the different domain values that have appeared in
the database history so far). However, in the worst case his method requires polyno-
mially more space than a naive method that stores all the states in the history. What
he did not take into account in his definition is that trace-length independence is not
merely a property of a monitor, but also of the formula being checked. For example,
he states a formula
¬(∃x, sal1, sal2)((F−1Earns(x, sal1)) ∧ Earns(x, sal2) ∧ sal2 < sal1),
which could be written in LTLFO as G∀(x, sal1) : earns. XG∀(y, sal2) : earns. (x = y⇒
sal1 ≤ sal2), and means “a person cannot earn less than at any time in the past”. We
http://www.runtime-veriﬁcation.org/.
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term this kind of formula trace-length dependent (see hierarchy in §5), as its monitor
has no other choice than to grow with the trace and store all the past earnings.
Chomicki and Niwinski [1995] also closely studied a specific fragment of FOTL,
namely the biquantified formulas. This only allows future temporal operators and
quantification is restricted; that is, quantifier can either only appear outside the scope
of temporal operators (and are in this case universal), or inside their scope cannot be
a temporal operator. In other words, the arbitrary nesting of temporal and quanti-
fiers is not allowed. They show that already allowing one (existential or universal)
quantifier, whose scope is free of temporal operators makes the fragment undecid-
able.
Metric first-order temporal logic (MFOTL). Basin et al. [2010] extend Chomicki’s
monitor towards bounded future operators using the same logic (i.e., past metric
first-order temporal logic). This is a reasonable choice, as it is unknown whether the
past fragment of MFOTL has the same expressiveness as MFOTL with both past and
future operators. Note that for propositional LTL it is well-known that this is the
case [Gabbay et al., 1980; Gabbay, 1987] (even though LTL with past-only is expo-
nentially more succinct than LTL [Laroussinie et al., 2002]). As MFOTL is like LTLFO
undecidable (see Basin et al. [2013, Lemma B.4] and Theorem 3.2.2, respectively), the
authors restrict its monitor to formulae of the form Gϕ, where ϕ is bounded; that
is, a safety fragment where temporal operators refer only finitely far into the future.
While every propositional LTL formula representing a safety property is equivalent
to the above form [Pnueli, 1986], this is shown to be not the case in first-order tempo-
ral logic. Chomicki and Niwinski [1995] provide an according biquantified formula
as a counter example. In other words, Basin et al. [2010] monitor a restricted safety
fragment, whereas monitoring of LTLFO is not restricted to safety formulae.
Basin et al. [2010] allow infinite relations as long as these are representable by au-
tomatic structures, i.e., finite-state automata models. In this way, they show that the
restriction on formulae to be domain independent is no longer necessary, i.e., the un-
restricted use of negation and quantification becomes possible. LTLFO, in comparison,
is more general, in that it allows computable relations and functions. On the other
hand, LTLFO lacks syntax to directly specify metric constraints, and only has future
operators (but therefore unbounded ones). Nonetheless, the metric constraints of
operators can be defined by the following equivalent LTLFO formulae (also shown by
Hallé and Villemaire [2008, §5.2.2]): We define a predicate I(x, a, b) := x ≤ b ∧ x ≥ a,
which checks if x ∈ [a, b] for x, a, b ∈N. We then can express metric future temporal
operators of MFOTL in LTLFO in the following way:
X[a,b]ϕ := ∃t1 : τ. X(ϕ ∧ ∃t2 : τ. (I(t2 − t1, a, b) ∧ t2 > t1)),
ϕU[a,b]ψ := ∃t1 : τ. ϕU(ψ ∧ ∃t2 : τ. (I(t2 − t1, a, b) ∧ t2 > t1)).
Note that in contrast to MFOTL, LTLFO requires ground atoms wrt. a U-operator τ in
the trace to simulate the time-trace τ0, τ1 . . ., which is defined in MFOTL as part of
the semantics.
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Several practical extensions to MFOTL have been proposed, including operators
for aggregation [Basin et al., 2015a]. These are useful when applying the logic and
associated monitoring tool MonPoly,9 to case studies such as Nokia’s Data-collection
Campaign [Basin et al., 2013].
Future (or past) temporal logic with an assignment quantifier. Sistla and Wolfson
[1995] also discuss a monitor for database triggers whose conditions are specified in
a logic (with past or future operators), which uses an assignment quantifier (written
as [x ← t] ϕ(x)) that binds a single value or a relation instance t (i.e., the result of
a database query in the current state) to a global, rigid variable x. The assignment
is similar to the freeze quantifier defined by Henzinger [1990]. Their monitor is
represented by a graph structure, which is extended by one level for each updated
database state, and as such is proportional in size to the number of updates.
Linear temporal logic with full first-order quantification (LTL-FO+). The work of
Hallé and Villemaire [2008] describes a monitoring algorithm for a logic with quan-
tification identical to LTLFO, but without function symbols or arbitrary computable
relations. The resulting monitors are generated “on the fly” by using syntax-directed
tableaux, which is inspired by Gerth et al. [1995] adapted to first-order. Soundness
and completeness proofs for the extension are not provided. Tool support is available
and called BeepBeep.10 In our approach, however, it is possible to precompute the
individual BAs for the respective subformulae of a policy (i.e., levels of the SA), and
thereby bound the complexity of that part of our monitor at runtime by a constant
factor.
Parametric LTL (pLTL). Stolz [2010] developed a monitoring approach for para-
metric LTL, i.e., LTL where propositions are enriched with variables, and where
quantification is semantically identical to LTLFO. Consider for example the formula
G∃x : p(x)→ ϕ(x),
which is equivalent to the LTLFO formula G∃x : p. ϕ(x). This means → is not the
usual implication operator from Boolean logic, but a binding operator, where p(x)
is called an existence predicate. It denotes that the values of the proposition p will
be bound from the current event. The remainder of the formula, ϕ(x), only “uses”
the variable x. Semantically, for a current event {p(1), p(2), q(3)}, in pLTL—and
similarly in LTLFO—we have to verify the formulae Gp(1) → ϕ(1), Gp(2) → ϕ(2)
starting from this event, and G∃x : p(x)→ ϕ(x) again from the next event.
However, in contrast to LTLFO, pLTL does not allow interpreted relations, and is
“next-free”. Another fundamental difference is that Stolz [2010] does not solve the
9http://sourceforge.net/projects/monpoly/. MonPoly-Reg and MonPoly-Fin, where the former is
for finite relations, and the latter for regular relations, without the need of restriction [Basin et al.,
2015b].
10http://beepbeep.sourceforge.net/
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prefix problem. His monitor construction is based on a parameterised automaton,
which essentially behaves like a normal alternating finite automaton [cf. Vardi, 1995;
Finkbeiner and Sipma, 2004].
It is noteworthy that his work is an extension of one of the first approaches han-
dling parameterised events, called Java Logical Observer (JLO)11 [Stolz and Bodden,
2006]. In JLO quantification is only implicit, depending on the “parent” temporal
operator “shadowing” a proposition. For example, propositions inside the scope
of a “finally”-operator are existentially quantified, and those inside the scope of a
“globally”-operator are always universal. From an implementation point of view,
parameterised LTL properties are specified over AspectJ pointcuts, which serve as
propositions. A pointcut can for example refer to a method and triggers (i.e., its
associated proposition becomes true) if the method gets called. As AspectJ works on
the bytecode level, JLO can also instrument third-party Java programs whose source
code is not accessible.
Parametric monitoring and trace slicing. There are works dealing with so-called
parametric monitoring which, although not based on first-order logic, offer support
for monitoring traces carrying data [cf. Allan et al., 2005; Chen and Rosu, 2009].
The approach followed by Chen and Rosu [2009] is to “slice” a trace according to
the parameters occurring in it and then to forward the n (effectively propositional)
subtraces to n monitor instances of the same specification; for example, one per
logged-in user for the property
Λu, ip. (login(u, ip) send(u, ip)∗ logout(u))∗.
This expresses that for any user u who logs in from IP address ip, login and logout
actions of that user should alternate, and data from that same ip must be sent only
in between. An equivalent formula in LTLFO was discussed in Example 4.1.1. The
property above is of the form ΛX. P, denoting that P is a so-called parametric property
(here expressed as a regular expression). ΛX further denotes an implicit universally
quantifier over the set X, where actions are parametric with variables from X. For a
trace w = login〈u 7→ u1, ip 7→ ip1〉 send〈u 7→ u1, ip 7→ ip1〉 send〈u 7→ u1, ip 7→ ip2〉
the according two slices are
〈u 7→ u1, ip 7→ ip1〉 : login send,
〈u 7→ u1, ip 7→ ip2〉 : send.
On the left-hand side we see a unique list of bindings (i.e., variables mapped to
parameters). These each refer to a subtrace on the right-hand side, which contains
actions for that binding only, with parameters chopped off. For efficiency in practice,
instead of storing the subtraces, a binding maps directly to a state of the propositional
monitor for that binding (i.e., the state the monitor will be in wrt. observing the
according subtrace). One major concern in trace slicing is indexing, i.e., to efficiently
11http://www-i2.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/JLO/
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locate all related monitor instances given the bindings for an incoming event. Note
that the parametric property in the example above is violated by the trace w. This
is because the second subtrace, which contains only the action “send”, violates the
propositional property (login send∗ logout)∗.
Besides the implicit universal quantification, there are further limitations to the
slicing approach. For example, one cannot express that a user should not login from
a different IP address at the same time, as this requires the same action name with
different variables in one property (e.g., login(u, ip) and login(u, ip′)). More precisely,
this does not allow creating a unique binding based on the action name [Chen and
Rosu, 2009, Def. 3 and 6]. See further limitations below when discussing quantified
event automata (QEAs).
A widely-used runtime verification system implementing the trace slicing idea is
the monitoring oriented programming (MOP) framework [Meredith et al., 2012], with
the instance JavaMOP for Java programs. It claims to be the most efficient state-of-
the art runtime verification tool. JavaMOP specifications are compiled into AspectJ
[Kiczales et al., 2001] aspects, which can be “weaved” into a program that a user
wishes to monitor, using any standard AspectJ compiler such as ajc. Since in the MOP
framework, the indexing is decoupled from the actual property checking, it supports
parameterisation for many propositional logic formalisms—provided as a plugin—
such as those based on finite state machines, extended regular expressions (ERE), context
free grammars [Meredith et al., 2010], and LTL with past and future operators.
What is more, JavaMOP supports fine-tuning of the monitor semantics: Events
can be marked “creating” (i.e., for those only is created a new monitor instance), and
different binding modes can be used, such as “full-binding” (which indicates that all
variables must be instantiated, otherwise a monitor will not report a verdict). For the
example above, in full-binding mode, a monitor that only observes a logout event
would not report any violation.
It is worth noting that the MOP framework solves also the prefix problem for
LTL; however, it uses a satisfiability checker applied to each derived formula.
Another slicing-based approach is Tracematches [Allan et al., 2005], which applies
a similar technique as JavaMOP to match regular expressions with a program trace. It
adds a history-based language feature to the AspectJ language; that is, the possibility
to specify regular patterns (with free variables) over executions of a Java program.
When the pattern matches, some code will be executed. After JavaMOP it is the
second-most efficient Java monitoring system [Meredith et al., 2012]. Free variables
in Tracematches are evaluated over all possible instantiations, i.e., there is assumed
to be an implicit universal quantifier like in JavaMOP. Tracematch statements can
be specified by JavaMOP through the ERE plugin [Meredith et al., 2012]. Note that
JavaMOP can also capture the capabilities of JLO.
In summary, none of the slicing approaches above support arbitrary nesting of
quantifiers and temporal operators, use of negation, or function symbols to name just
some important restrictions. However, on the plus side, one is able to use optimised
monitoring techniques, developed in the propositional domain, and apply them—
with these restrictions in mind—to traces carrying data.
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Rule-based runtime verification. Rule-based monitoring approaches, such as Ea-
gle [Barringer et al., 2004] and RuleR [Barringer et al., 2010b], have been proposed
as expressive general-purpose formalisms in which various temporal logics can be
defined. In Eagle, new temporal operators are introduced as recursive equations
(with a minimal/maximal fixpoint semantics), formed from propositional logic and
three primitive temporal operators (“next”, “previously”, and “concatenation”). For
example, the “globally”-operator in LTL can be defined as
max Always(Form F) = F ∧©Always(F),
where © is the “next”-operator, and the keyword max specifies that ©Always(F)
is interpreted as true at the end of a trace. The fixpoint semantics is necessary as
Eagle, and also RuleR, use a finite trace semantics, i.e., their monitors solve the word
problem. What is more, rules can be parameterised with data, for example as seen
by
min R(int k) = Eventually(y = k) mon M = Always(x > 0→ R(x)),
where the rule R is parameterised with an integer k, which is bound whenever x > 0
holds in property M. The keyword mon indicates that property M is to be monitored.
A similar statement would be expressed in LTLFO as G∀x′ : x. (x′ > 0) ⇒ F∃y′ :
y. (y′ = x′). However, since we solve the prefix problem, we will see in §5 that this
property is not monitorable in LTLFO (see Def. 5.1.1). Regarding expressiveness, it
was shown by examples that Eagle can define future and past time LTL properties,
interval logic (e.g., metric temporal logic), ERE (using the concatenation operator),
or even limited forms of quantification over possibly infinite data sets (as seen in
property M above). The Eagle logic is like LTLFO, undecidable, and its word problem
decidable.
Hawk [d’Amorim and Havelund, 2005] introduces a programming-oriented ex-
tension to Eagle, dedicated to Java programs. As Hawk specifications are translated
into Eagle logic, Hawk adds no expressiveness, and therefore is merely a practical
and convenient way of specifying properties for Java programs. Like in JLO, specifi-
cations can directly refer to parameterised system events based on programs, which
for this purpose are instrumented by AspectJ.
RuleR [Barringer et al., 2010b] was designed based on experiences gained from
Eagle, and provides a similarly powerful but simpler “core” logic, which can be
monitored more efficiently. A specification in RuleR is a set of rules of the form
r : condition1, ..., conditionn → action1, ...|...|..., actionm,
where r is a rule’s name, and conditioni as well as actioni either some (possibly
negated) occurrence of a rule or observation name. A condition holds if the according
rule is active, or an according observation appears in the current state, respectively. If
all conditions on the left-hand side hold, the rule triggers. In this case, an observation
on the right hand side must hold in the next state, or a rule appearing on the right
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side is made active (i.e., can trigger after the next observation if their conditions hold).
Note that the right side is a disjunction of conjunctions. For example, G(a ∨ b) could
be expressed by the rule r :→ a, r|b, r. As there is no condition on the left (which is
equivalent to true), r always triggers, and next must hold r again, and a or b. Like in
Eagle, rules can be parameterised with data values, as shown in the following rule
r(k : N) : clock(?t1 : N) −→clock(?t2 : N), p, t2 − t1 ≤ k |
clock(?t2 : N),¬p, t2 − t1 ≤ k, r(k− t2 + t1).
While ?t1 indicates that parameter t1 binds the value of an action clock in the current
observation, ?t2 indicates that in the next state the value of an observation clock will
be bound to t2. Assume that there is an initially active rule r(5). Then, the above rule
could be written in MFOTL as formula F[0,5]p, assuming there is another rule that
demands a ground atom clock(t) with a strictly monotonic time value t in each state.
Another rule-based system is LogFire [Havelund, 2015], which is implemented
as a domain-specific language (DSL) in Scala. It is founded on an adaption of the Rete
algorithm [Forgy, 1982], which is know from rule systems in the artificial intelligence
community.
Quantified event automata (QEA). When exploring the spectrum between Java-
MOP and more expressive systems, such as Eagle and RuleR, [Barringer et al., 2012]
developed a monitoring approach that generalises parametric trace slicing. It is based
on an extension of an event automaton (EA), which is essentially an NFA, where the al-
phabet is a set of parametric actions, and transitions can be labelled with guards and
assignments. As an example, consider the following transition between two states
〈2, [max 7→ 1]〉 bid(
′hat′,5)−−−−−→ 〈3, [max 7→ 5, new 7→ 5]〉,
for which the following fraction defines a guard (top part) and an assignment (bottom
part)
new > max
max := new
.
In state 2 (with the value 1 bound to variable max), the transition above triggers on
a new event bid(′hat′, 5), with the consequence that the EA ends up in state 3 (with
bindings max 7→ 5, new 7→ 5), since the guard new > max holds and the “max” value
is set to the “new” value.
A QEA extends an EA with quantification over variables appearing in parametric
actions. For example, in the case of universal quantification, an accepting state must
be reached for all bindings.
The approach from [Barringer et al., 2012] overcomes the following concrete limi-
tations of trace slicing in JavaMOP: (1) events can be associated with multiple variable
lists, (2) free variables can be rebound along the trace, and (3) nesting of universal and
existential quantification is possible (recall that JavaMOP assumes universal quantifi-
cation on all parameters). More precisely, the following properties, specified here in
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LTLFO for comparison, can be represented as QEAs, but not in JavaMOP:
G∀x : login. (∀y : login. (x = y))Ulogout(x),
means there should not be a login of another user y before user x logs out,
G∀(item, amount) : bid. XG∀(item′, amount′) : bid.
(item = item′)⇒ (amount′ > amount),
means that during an auction another bid on the same item must be have a higher
amount (i.e., rebinding for the same event must happen), and
G∀(v, p) : member. G∀(c, p′) : candidate.
(p = p′)⇒ F∃(v′, c′, r) : rank. (v = v′) ∧ (c = c′),
means that all members of a party must rank all candidates of the same party (i.e.,
nested quantification is required).
The MarQ tool12 was developed to monitor properties expressed as QEAs [Reger
et al., 2015], and took part in the 1st13 and 2nd [Falcone et al., 2015] international
runtime verification competition.
Reger and Rydeheard [2015] recently studied the common aspects of first-order
and trace slicing specifications, aiming towards unifying monitoring languages. They
identified a fragment of first-order LTL that can be monitored with the QEA ap-
proach.
Havelund [2014] introduced another expressive monitoring formalism, called data
automata, where states can be parameterised with data.
Temporal data logic (TDL). Decker et al. [2014] introduce an algorithm that sup-
ports monitoring of a propositional temporal logic in combination with a data logic,
which together can express the timely behaviour of a system with respect to the data
it processes. On the temporal side, they do not demand a particular temporal logic,
but rather provide assumptions such a logic must fulfil so that it can be combined.
More precisely, (1) as verdicts of multiple monitor instances need to be combined,
truth values need to be from a complete lattice, (2) a propositional monitoring algo-
rithm for the logic must exist that can be integrated in their framework, and (3) the
temporal logic must be linear as well as having a propositional semantics (i.e., propo-
sitions can be substituted without effecting the temporal meaning of a formula).
Their algorithm supports monitoring of first-order logic formulae without re-
stricting to a closed-world assumption as in LTLFO. The authors argue that this allows
for a more natural specification of properties in some cases. However, since their pro-
posed logic differentiates between a foreground (temporal) and a background (data)
part, their monitoring solution for a chosen background logic depends on the avail-
12https://github.com/selig/qea
13http://rv2014.imag.fr/monitoring-competition/results
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ability of a corresponding theory solver. In practice, this means that this approach
is targetting those domains, where so-called SMT-solvers have made an impact in
recent years (e.g., using linear integer inequalities, or arrays), whereas the approach
in this thesis is general in that regard. Also see Nieuwenhuis et al. [2006] for an
overview on techniques and logics used in SMT-solving. Furthermore, the particu-
lar theory and universe is fixed on the data side and satisfiability for the first-order
theory (such as arithmetic, arrays, lists, or uninterpreted functions) is decidable.
Tool support for TDL is implemented as part of jUnitRV [Decker et al., 2013], and
currently uses the SMT solver Z3 [de Moura and Bjørner, 2008].
First-order RV-LTL with numerical constraints (LTL4–FOC). More recently Med-
hat et al. [2014] have presented an extension of the 4-valued RV-LTL semantics (see
Def. 2.5.2) to first-order temporal logic, where quantifiers can have metric constraints;
that is, quantifiers are of the form
∀∼k x : p(x)⇒ ϕ or ∃∼l x : p(x)⇒ ϕ,
where ∼∈ {<,>,≤,≥,=}, k ∈ R, and l ∈ Z+. One can see that quantifiers are
guarded in a similar way as in Stolz [2010] as well as in our logic. A metric constraint
of the universal quantifier, for example ∀>0.5, denotes that only more than 50% of
property instances of ϕ have to evaluate to true to satisfy the quantified formula (i.e.,
∀=1 denotes the standard semantics of the universal quantifier), whereas ∃<3 means
there have to be strictly less than 3 property instances of ϕ evaluating to true (i.e.,
∃≥1 denotes the standard semantics of the existential quantifier).
The logic further differs from LTLFO in that nested quantifiers are restricted to
appear leftmost in a formula without being mixed with temporal operators. Their
monitoring algorithm, much like the one presented in this thesis, also constructs
submonitors to evaluate quantifiers at runtime inspired by a divide and conquer al-
gorithm. They then present an implementation using MapReduce [cf. Dean and
Ghemawat, 2010], capable to run in parallel on GPUs, which leads to almost negligi-
ble monitoring overhead at runtime.
Temporal description logic (ALC-LTL). Baader et al. [2012] propose a monitoring
approach for the logic ALC-LTL, which is a combination of LTL and the description
logic ALC. More precisely, instead of propositional variables like in LTL, axioms of
the description logic ALC are used to describe the state of a system. Their monitor
construction essentially boils down to reusing the one for LTL based on BAs intro-
duced by Bauer et al. [2011]; that is, they abstract ALC-formulae by propositions and
ensure that ω-words in the propositional case correspond to abstractions of ALC-
LTL-structures, to then follow the known propositional BA construction. Like in the
LTL case, they solve the prefix problem. The size of the constructed monitors is like
in the propositional case double-exponential and also optimal.
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4.6 Summary
The first part of this chapter introduces general definitions of an SA and provides
a sound translation from LTLFO to an SA. In the second part, a monitor construc-
tion based on the new automaton model is provided, and optimisations for its
implementation—to reduce the monitor’s states at runtime—are discussed. To the
best of the author’s knowledge, the algorithm presented in this chapter is the first
to devise impartial monitors, i.e., address the prefix problem instead of a (variant of
the) word problem, for policies given in an undecidable first-order temporal logic.
Furthermore, experiments put the size of the monitor at runtime in relation with
its optimised version, and further with a naive rewriting-based monitor for LTLFO.
What is more, the monitor (and LTLFO) are compared with other approaches (and
their according languages defined in a broader sense also wrt. traces with data) in
the literature.
Chapter 5
Towards a hierarchy of effectively
monitorable languages
The experimental results of the previous chapter, although not comprehensive, have
shown that it is possible to build an LTLFO monitor for a large variety of formulae,
including those on which the popular software specification patterns are based (see
§2.4); i.e., practically useful ones. However, as both the satisfiability as well as the
prefix problem are undecidable in LTLFO (or any other extension of LTL towards full
first-order logic), it is natural to ask what properties a language (or formula) needs to
have, in order to be effectively monitorable; that is, by a monitor (the one presented in
the previous chapter or otherwise) which does not have to store unbounded amounts
of observed data, or by one which does not return ? until the end of time.
Due to the undecidability results, there exist obviously boundaries to what a
monitor can achieve, irrespective of the algorithm it is based upon. In this chapter,
we will outline and formalise some of these boundaries and this way provide a first
classification towards a kind of hierarchy of monitorable languages or more precisely:
languages, for which practically useful monitors can be built.
5.1 Monitorability
Pnueli and Zaks [2006] were the first to formalise a notion of monitorability in the set-
ting of propositional LTL, which can be expressed in terms of good and bad prefixes
as follows.
Definition 5.1.1 (Monitorability). A formula ϕ ∈ LTL(AP) is monitorable, if for all
u ∈ (2AP)∗ there exists a v ∈ (2AP)∗ s.t. uv ∈ good(ϕ) or uv ∈ bad(ϕ) holds.
This definition asserts that a monitor (the one in this thesis or otherwise) cannot
reasonably monitor a language that does not have a good or a bad prefix, because
these are exactly what the monitor detects. Consider, for example, the propositional
LTL formula G(p ⇒ Fq): it describes a typical liveness property,1 meaning that
1According to Alpern and Schneider [1985], a language L ⊆ Σω is called a liveness language, if for all
prefixes u ∈ Σ∗, it holds that ∃w ∈ Σω : uw ∈ L. As from the definition follows that infinite traces are
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always every request is eventually answered at some point in time in the future. This
property clearly has no good or bad prefix. Therefore, a monitor being coherent with
a prefix semantics, such as the LTL3 semantics (see Def. 2.5.1), could only return ?
ad infinitum (recall the RV-LTL semantics in Def. 2.5.2, which was invented to return
somewhat more meaningful information).
For LTL, monitorability can be decided in ExpSpace [Bauer, 2010], but the unde-
cidability of the satisfiability (and therefore prefix) problem of LTLFO means that for
LTLFO monitorability is also undecidable by way of a similar reduction already used
in the proof of Theorem 3.2.5 or Bauer [2010, Theorem 2].
Theorem 5.1.1. Monitorability for LTLFO is undecidable.
Proof. We will reduce the undecidable satisfiability problem to the monitorability
problem of LTLFO, i.e., we show for a given ϕ ∈ LTLFO and first-order structure A that
L(ϕ)A = ∅ iff ψ is monitorable, where ψ is constructed in the following way:
ψ := Gp(c) ∨GF(q(c) ∧ ϕ),
(⇒:) If L(ϕ)A = ∅, then ψ ≡ Gp(c) is clearly monitorable.
(⇐:) Assume that ψ is monitorable, but that L(ϕ)A 6= ∅. Let (A, u) be a trace,
where u ∈ (2Act′)∗ and Act′ := ⋃p′∈U\{p,q}{(p′, d) | d ∈ Dp′} and A ∼ A. It is easy
to see that {(A, uw) | (A, w) ∈ Evω} ∩ L(Gp(c))A = ∅, but {(A, uw) | w ∈ Evω} ∩
L(ψ)A 6= ∅. Hence, for ψ to be monitorable, u has to be extensible with some (A, v),
where v ∈ Ev∗, such that either {(A, uvw) | w ∈ Evω} ∩ L(GF(q(c) ∧ ϕ))A = ∅, or
such that {(A, uvw) | w ∈ Evω} ⊆ L(GF(q(c) ∧ ϕ))A. Now, observe that irrespective
of our choice of ϕ (including the case ϕ = true), as long as L(ϕ)A 6= ∅, the set
L(GF(q(c)∧ ϕ))A neither has a bad nor good prefix. This means that ∃u ∈ Ev∗ . ∀v ∈
Ev∗ . {(A, uvw) | w ∈ Evω} ∩ L(ψ)A 6= ∅ ∧ {(A, uvw) | w ∈ Evω} 6⊆ L(ψ)A; that is, ψ
is not monitorable. Contradiction.
5.2 Trace-length independence
However, assuming we have a monitorable LTLFO specification in the above sense
(e.g., in form of a safety formula for which monitorability is obvious), it does not
automatically mean, there exists an efficient monitor for it. Unlike in the setting of
propositional LTL, a first-order monitor may have to store parts of or even the entire
trace—depending on the formula. For example, an arithmetic LTLFO formula such
as G∃x : p. XG∃y : q. x 6= y requires storing all the different ground atoms p(d)
appearing in the trace over time. Note that storing of all the p(d)s can be necessary
even if we restrict ourselves to structures without interpreted predicate symbols,
which becomes clear when looking at the formula G∃x : p. XG(¬p(x)∧ ∃y : p. p(y)).
On the other hand, a monitor for a formula, such as G∀x : p. x ≥ k, where k is a
required for detecting satisfaction (or violations) of liveness properties, these are generally inadequate
for runtime monitoring.
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constant, does not need to accumulate any information over time at all. The reason
is that for every new occurring event added to the trace, it can be directly decided
whether for all contained p(d) it holds that d ≥ k. Then, if they are, the monitor will
continue, and if at least one of them is not, the monitor has detected a bad prefix
and can stop. While we have already informally stated what trace-length independent
means in Property 2, §1.2.2, we formalise its notions in the following.
By |Mϕ|, we refer to the size (i.e., space) consumption of the monitor (see, for
example, §4.4.1, for the definition of the size of the monitor in this thesis).
Definition 5.2.1 (Trace-length independence). A formula ϕ ∈ LTLFO is trace-length in-
dependent, if it is monitorable and there are constants k, c ∈N and a sound and anticipatory
monitor for ϕ, Mϕ, s.t. for any trace with no event σ, s.t. |σ| > c, it holds |Mϕ| ≤ k.
Defining trace-length independence without a bound c on individual events of all
traces would exclude certain formulae, which one might obviously want to consider
as trace-length independent; that is, the definition would be too tight. Consider for
example the formula G∀x : p. Xp(x), where two consecutive events have to contain
a common subset of actions. This formula obviously requires a monitor to only
store parts of a constant length of the trace (and therefore never depends on the
complete trace), as only actions of the previously event need to be kept to compare
with the ones in next. Without considering c, however, one could always construct a
trace which contains individual events whose cardinality is sufficiently large, s.t. the
corresponding monitor’s size has to exceed k, i.e., |σ| > k (this even the case if the
monitor does not store, but just processes events, like for the formula G∀x : p. x ≥ k
above). Hence, we require a k to exist always wrt. a given c.
The reason for demanding a sound (i.e., impartial) monitor for a given ϕ is obvi-
ously due to the fact that one could always come up with a monitor that completely
ignores the LTLFO semantics, but whose space consumption is bounded by 1, for ex-
ample. But assuming that we are, in fact, dealing with a sound monitor, it could still
return ? until the end of time and thus render the monitoring process useless. Hence,
we demand that Mϕ also be anticipatory, although this constraint (unlike soundness)
could also have been weakened: all we really need here is that the monitor whenever
it reads a good (resp. bad) prefix for ϕ informs the user about it as soon as possible.
In other words, a sound monitor that does not return the correct result until some
exponential time in the future, could be as practically useless as an incorrect one.
Finally, note that the monitor construction for propositional LTL formulae given
by Bauer et al. [2011] provides a formal argument to our intuition, namely that every
monitorable propositional LTL formula is also trace-length independent. Therefore,
we have not defined this notion first for LTL and then lifted it to first-order logic, as
we have done it in §3.2, but stated it immediately in the context of LTLFO.
5.3 Strong trace-length dependence
Def. 5.2.1 is not sufficiently distinctive for our purposes, which becomes obvious
when we consider yet another simple (even though practically rather useless) exam-
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ple, the LTLFO formula G∃x : p. (r(x)U∃y : q. x = y), which helps to illustrate the
following point: the amount of information a corresponding monitor needs to accu-
mulate over time is not a priori clear, because it depends on the actual data inside the
trace; that is, if every new event that is added to the trace contains a p(d), r(d), and
a q(d′) with d = d′, then it is clearly not necessary to keep any of this information
around. If, on the other hand, a trace contains a p(d) and r(d), in each new addition,
but no corresponding q(d′) (or, at least, not for a very long time), then the monitor
needs to memorise the individual p(d) until the corresponding q(d′) occurs. If the
q(d′)s never occur, then the monitor will have to remember an unbounded amount
of trace information. And if they do occur, its memory consumption increases until
that point (after which “garbage collection” will clean up again), which we cannot
determine in advance. Another such formula with similar characteristic was already
introduced in Example 4.2.1, where logins and according IP addresses need to be
kept until the logout of a user. These kind of formulae can be arguably effectively
monitored, as the system under scrutiny will grow comparatively and need to keep
the logins around as well. In other words, monitors for these formulae grow and
shrink linearly in relation to the memory required by the system, which is practically
acceptable.
This is different from the trace-length dependent example given in §5.2, where
the corresponding monitor’s space consumption was bound to grow ad infinitum,
irrespective of the data in the trace (unless, of course, the monitor finds a bad prefix,
in which case it can stop altogether).
Definition 5.3.1 (Strong trace-length dependency). Let |Mϕ(t)| denote the space con-
sumption of some monitor Mϕ after processing prefix t. Then, ϕ is called strongly trace-
length dependent, if it is monitorable and for any such t, there exists a suffix t′, s.t.
|Mϕ(tt′)| > |Mϕ(t)|, but no suffix t′′, s.t. |Mϕ(tt′′)| < |Mϕ(t)|.
LTLFO
strongly
trace-length
dependent
trace-lenght
independent
monitorable
Figure 5.1: The hierarchy of effectively monitorable languages.
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To be absolutely clear: the formula G∃x : p. (r(x)U∃y : q. x = y) is merely trace-
length dependent, but not strongly trace-length dependent, whereas G∃x : p. XG∃y :
q. x 6= y is strongly trace-length dependent. Clearly, one can monitor the former,
but not the latter, or at least, not for a very long time, because then the monitor
will necessarily run out of space. Both formulae, however, satisfy the conditions
of monitorability (see Definition 5.1.1). If a formula is both monitorable and not
strongly trace-length dependent, we say it is effectively monitorable. Consequently,
Fig. 5.1 depicts the different categories of languages defined in this chapter, and how
these are related in the hierarchy. While the outer rectangle indicates all definable
LTLFO languages, the grey area marks the effectively monitorable subset of languages.
Table 5.1 shows example formulae in each of the categories, without using any
interpreted predicate symbols; thus, these categories are even relevant independent
of the concrete computable structure chosen for monitoring (e.g., predefined arith-
metic operators). Note that all formulae in Table 5.1 are monitorable. This is because
Table 5.1: Trace-length (in)dependent example formulae.
independent dependent, but not strongly strongly dependent
G∀x : p. r(x) G∃x : p. X¬p(x)Uq(x) G∃x : p. XG(¬p(x) ∧ ∃y :
p. p(y))
a monitor does not need any storage if it is known that no conclusive result can be
ever given; and therefore a further characterisation of non-monitorable formulae is
by definition meaningless.
5.4 Summary
This chapter proposes definitions towards a classification of effectively monitorable
languages; that is, a language must be monitorable and not strongly trace-length
dependent to fulfil this property. In a nutshell, monitorability ensures that a monitor
is able to return meaningful results for a formula, and not an inconclusive verdict
until the end of time. Strongly trace-length dependent means that a monitor cannot
check such kind of formula, unless growing continuously without ever shrinking.
Trace-length independent means that a monitor’s required memory is bound by a
constant. Note that every LTL formula can be monitored trace-lenght independently.
While definitions in this chapter allow for a classification of languages (and for-
mulae) according to how efficient a monitor is that we can build for them, it is cur-
rently not known whether or not (strong) trace-length dependence is decidable. Hav-
ing said that, in many practical scenarios the user knows whether or not a formula
is monitorable and trace-length independent, so that this is not really a showstopper
for first-order monitoring in itself, but more of theoretical interest.
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Chapter 6
Proof of concept:
Android malware detection
The landmark work undertaken by the AMGP, initialised by Zhou and Jiang [2012],
is the first in the security community that comprehensively collected and systemat-
ically analysed more than 1, 200 Android malware samples. Despite the high total
amount of unique samples, their study reveals that those can be divided into only
49 families and described by even fewer recurring attack patterns, which fall into
the following categories: personal information stealing, financial charges, privilege
escalation, and malicious payload activation. Based on these patterns and the actual
Figure 6.1: Process of malware detection via runtime verification.
malware files from the AMGP, a proof of concept has been conducted: First, §6.3
formalises common malicious behaviour in the specification language LTLFO. Sec-
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ond, §6.4 discusses experimental results from identifying real malwares on a user’s
Android device—by checking their runtime footprint against the set of specifications.
False positives are analysed for a set of 61 popular benign apps in the Android Play
Store.1 Suspicious behaviour was detected for 46 out of 49 malware families (93.9%),
while generating 28% false positive alerts. Fig. 6.1 depicts the idea of using runtime
verification for malware detection.
Section §6.2 introduces the developed monitoring app, MonitorMe, which was
built to undertake the experiments. More precisely, this section details on the techni-
cal means of the DroidTracer library for Android event interception. DroidTracer is
used by MonitorMe to retrieve relevant events about app behaviour.
Section §6.5 discusses related work and DroidTracer’s major advantage compared
to other tools which are usually either app- or platform-centric (i.e., approaches that
modify either apps or the Android OS, respectively).
6.1 Android security concepts in a nutshell
Let us discuss the important details of the Android architecture and security concepts
that are relevant to this chapter.2 Firstly, Android apps and most of the Android stack
are written in Java (two topmost layers in Fig. B.3), whereas a modified Linux kernel
serves as the platform’s low-level OS (bottom layer in Fig. B.3). Apps on Android
are “sandboxed”, meaning that each executes within its own virtual machine (VM),
and, from an OS point of view, as unique user; unlike standard Linux processes,
which inherit the user identifier (UID) of the user who started them, Android apps all
have a unique UID. In other words, each app is treated as an individual user from
the low-level OS’s point of view.3 This strict “sandboxing” basically ensures that
one app cannot modify (or even read it, unless dedicated inter process communication
(IPC) takes place, which is discussed on a technical level in more detail in §6.2) the
data of another installed app. For the same reason, apps cannot access sensitive in-
formation from system resources or built-in sensors unauthorised, including contact
book entries (which are stored by the Android OS in an SQLite database) or Global
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates. The “sandboxing” also encompasses system
calls. Apps can invoke system calls directly (or more commonly through ways of
the Java application programming interface (API)), in order to access files or connect to
the internet; however, the underlying Linux kernel has been modified to check the
permission of such calls based on group identifiers (GIDs). These are assigned to apps
at installation time. Unfortunately, the harm caused by a malicious apps, is therefore
not restricted to its “sandbox.” In fact, there are several ways in which a malicious
app could exploit the device’s capabilities, or spy on its users. One way is to exploit
vulnerabilities of some system library or the Linux OS, in order to gain superuser
1https://play.google.com/apps
2For a more comprehensive overview see Felt et al. [2011a], http://developer.android.com/ or http:
//developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/security.html.
3There is an exception to this rule, but this is not relevant here: apps which share a developer’s
signature may run under the same UID.
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rights on the device [Davi et al., 2010]. Another way occurs through users uninten-
tionally granting malware access during installation. This is due to Android’s static
permission system, which we discuss in the following.
Whether or not an app is allowed to use a certain functionality that an Android
device offers is primarily determined at install-time, when the standard Android
installer presents to the user a list of required app permissions. Users cannot re-
voke individual permissions that they may not feel comfortable with or that they do
not understand, rather they need to grant all permissions or cannot install the app.
Consequently, many users do not review the permissions at install-time [Felt et al.,
2011b]. In fact, Android’s permission system is predominantly static, meaning that
once an app is installed, users have basically no means of controlling that app’s run-
time behaviour. For example, once an app has been granted permission to send SMS,
it may do so in the background without requesting further user confirmation. Ac-
cording to the official documentation,4 the lack of dynamic security mechanisms is a
design principle: “Android has no mechanism for granting permissions dynamically
(at run-time) because it complicates the user experience to the detriment of security.”
Note that the situation on other mobile platforms, like the outdated Nokia’s Symbian
OS, is similar [cf. Bose et al., 2008].
Since Android 6.0, which has been released at the time of writing this thesis, users
are able to revoke permissions individually from apps at anytime. Therefore, apps
developed for an older Android version often crash, as they usually do not catch ex-
ceptions when access to a resource is suddenly forbidden. Apps for Android 6.0 can
be developed in such a way that they request permissions from the user at runtime.5
These kind of apps will be installed right away without review of permissions. The
first time they use a feature that uses a new permission, the user can allow or deny
the access of requested sensitive information or system capabilities. Note that this
new feature, unlike MonitorMe, does not let the user analyse the behaviour of apps
nor provide patterns for identifying whether apps are potential malware.
6.2 A monitoring tool for the Android platform
To enable the modular way of malware detection on a user’s device, the author of this
thesis has developed a monitoring app, called MonitorMe [Küster and Bauer, 2015].6
This has two main components, which are depicted in Fig. 6.2: (1) a framework for
collecting system events on Android (grey area, called DroidTracer),7 and (2) an anal-
ysis part running on top of DroidTracer, which receives those events in chronological
order and incrementally “feeds” them into monitors generated by Ltlfo2mon8. For
details of the monitor construction recall §4.2. MonitorMe creates a monitor for each
policy that specifies a certain malware behaviour and runs a copy of them per app
4http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/security.html
5https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/permissions.html
6http://kuester.multics.org/MonitorMe/
7http://kuester.multics.org/DroidTracer/
8https://github.com/jckuester/ltlfo2mon
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Figure 6.2: Architecture of MonitorMe.
under inspection. In other words, verdicts are returned individually per attack pat-
tern and app.
Recall that Ltlfo2mon is written in Scala, but is compatible to run as part of
an Android app in Java. It is worth pointing out that DroidTracer works without
polling for events, i.e., a Java callback method is triggered whenever a new system
event occurs.
DroidTracer. In the following are explained the inner workings of DroidTracer
(three sub-components marked in white inside the grey area); meaning, the novel
way on how interactions between apps and the Android platform are intercepted
without requiring platform or app modifications. As there is no public API for
this task—not even on a rooted device—nor any complete documentation about An-
droid’s internal communication mechanism, this approach is mainly based on in-
sights gained from reverse engineering.
6.2.1 System call interception
We exploit the Android security design, which ensures that the control flow of all
apps’ actions that require permission, such as requesting sensitive information (GPS
coordinates, device ID, etc.) or connecting with the outside world (via SMS, internet,
etc.), must eventually pass by one of the system calls in the Linux kernel. This way,
requests are delegated to a more privileged system process that handles the request.
In other words, intercepting the control flow at a central point in kernel space does
not allow apps to bypass the approach in this thesis. Furthermore, system calls are
unlikely to change so that hooking into them is robust against implementation details
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on different Android versions.
Hence, the idea is to use kprobes9 (the kernel’s internal debugging mechanism)
to intercept system calls in a non-intrusive way. More specifically, a custom kernel
module was built (bottom sub-component in Fig. 6.2), which contains handler meth-
ods that get invoked by small bits of trampoline code (so-called probes). Those are
added by kprobes dynamically to the following system calls:
• sys_open(const char __user *filename, ...),
opens files for read or write that are identifiable by the path filename.
• sys_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *addr, ...),
establishes an internet connection, where addr indicates the according IPv4 or
IPv6 address.
• do_execve(char *filename, char __user *__user *argv, ...),
executes a program or shell script with name filename and with arguments
argv.
• ioctl(...),
is generally used to control kernel drivers, such as Android’s Binder driver.
From the function arguments of ioctl we cannot directly retrieve relevant informa-
tion (unlike for the other system calls shown above, which provide to us IP addresses,
opened files, or executed program names). The reason is that information is com-
pactly encoded (for efficiency reasons), when sent through ioctl by Android’s own
IPC mechanism, called Binder.10 As Binder handles the majority of interesting in-
teractions between apps and the Android platform, its decoding is crucial for the
malware analysis. Hence, for a deeper understanding of Binder’s control flow, we
look at the following Java code snippet of a method call that an app developer might
write to send an SMS.
SmsManager sms = SmsManager.getDefault();
sms.sendTextMessage("12345", null, "Hello!", null, null);
Fig. 6.3 illustrates the control flow of the Binder communication when this code
is executed. All Java code of an app is compiled into a single Dalvik executable
classes.dex (upper left box), which runs in its own Dalvik VM. The called method
sendTextMessage is part of the Android API (lower left box), which is linked into
every app as a JAR file. But instead of implementing the functionality of sending an
SMS itself, it rather hides away the technical details of a remote procedure call (RPC);
that is, a call of a Java method that lives in another Dalvik VM (right box). What
further happens is that SmsManager calls the method sendText of the class Proxy,
which has been automatically generated for the ISms interface. The Proxy then uses
the class Parcel to marshal the method arguments of sendText into a byte stream,
9https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/kprobes.txt
10http://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Binder.html
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Figure 6.3: An app (left) requesting the Android platform (right) to send an SMS.
which is sent (together with other method call details) via the Binder driver to the
matching Stub of ISms (lower right box). There, the arguments are unmarshalled
and the final implementation of sendText in the SMS service is executed. As the
SMS service is running on a Dalvik VM privileged to talk to the radio hardware, it
can send the SMS. The Proxy and Stub are marked in grey to denote the interface
endpoints of the RPC calls on both sides of the client and server, respectively.
6.2.2 Unmarshalling
The main challenge in reconstructing method calls was to reverse engineer how
Binder encodes them to send them through the kernel, so that the task of unmar-
shalling for the malware analysis can be automated. Like for the code snippet of
sending an SMS, we aim at reconstructing every method call in its original human
readable format (including its Java method arguments and types). In what follows, it
is described how it was achieved and what the implementation of this feature looks
like on a technical level.
All we can intercept in the kernel is the following C structure, which wraps the
information copied by Binder driver from the sender into the address space of the
receiving process.
struct binder_transaction_data {
unsigned int code; // contains for the SMS example value 5, which
// encodes the method name of sentText
uid_t sender_euid; // UID of app initiating the request
const void *buffer; // Fig. 6.6 shows its content of sendText
};
A comprehensive technical report contains more details on the implementation [Küster
and Bauer, 2014] and shows how binder_transaction_data is intercepted during
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a certain stage of the Binder driver communication, which follows a strict protocol.
The integer sender_euid provides us with the UID to unambiguously identify the
sender app of a request (i.e., for the SMS example in Fig. 6.3 the UID of the app in
the left box). However, the method name the integer code translates to, and which
arguments are encoded in the byte stream of buffer, is not transmitted. This is
mainly for efficiency reasons. We have a closer look at some code of the Proxy in
Fig. 6.4 and Stub in Fig. 6.5, which are automatically generated for the interface ISms,
to better understand why there is no need for Binder to send this information.
01: public void sendText(String destAddr, ...,
02: String text, ...) ...
03: {
04: android.os.Parcel _data =
05: android.os.Parcel.obtain();
06: ...
07: _data.writeInterfaceToken(DESCRIPTOR);
08: _data.writeString(destAddr);
09: ...
10: _data.writeString(text);
11: ...
12: mRemote.transact(Stub.TRANSACTION_sendText,
13: _data, ...);
14: ...
15: }
Figure 6.4: Auto-generated Proxy for the ISms interface.
01: private ... String DESCRIPTOR =
02: "com.android.internal.telephony.ISms";
03: ...
04: switch (code) { ...
05: case TRANSACTION_sendText: {
06: data.enforceInterface(DESCRIPTOR);
07: ...
08: _arg0 = data.readString();
09: ...
10: _arg2 = data.readString(); ...
11: this.sendText(_arg0,..., _arg2,...);
12: }}
13: ...
14: static final int TRANSACTION_sendText =
15: (IBinder.FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION + 4);
Figure 6.5: Auto-generated Stub class for the ISms interface.
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When the Proxy makes the actual RPC for sendText via Binder (Fig. 6.4, line 12),
it includes the integer TRANSACTION_sendText defined in its corresponding Stub
(Fig. 6.5, lines 14-15). It was discovered that this is the value of code that can be
found in binder_transaction_data. The second argument _data is an instance
of the class Parcel and relates on a lower level to the buffer that is intercepted.
More specifically, the Proxy takes a Parcel object (reused from a pool for efficiency)
and then writes the DESCRIPTOR (Fig. 6.4, line 7), which is the name of the interface
ISms (Fig. 6.5, lines 1-2), followed by the method arguments into it (Fig. 6.4, lines
8-10). It can be observed that this is done in the order of the arguments appearing
in the method signature. Furthermore, dedicated write methods are used provided
by Parcel, such as writeString. When the Stub receives the call, it executes the
TRANSACTION_sendText part of a switch construct (Fig. 6.5, line 5), which recon-
structs the arguments from the byte stream of the Parcel object. It uses thereby the
equivalent read methods in the exact same order as the write methods have been
used. Based on those key observations was designed the following three-step algo-
rithm, in order to automate unmarshalling for arbitrary method calls with Droid-
Tracer (top sub-component in Fig. 6.2):
1) Unmarshal interface name (ISms)
(a) Take a Parcel object and fill it with the byte stream buffer. This is possi-
ble, as the class Parcel is public and provides an according method.
(b) Read the DESCRIPTOR from the Parcel object via method readString, as
it is always the first argument in buffer (see Fig. 6.6).
2) Unmarshal method name (sendText)
(a) Use Java reflection to find the variable name with prefix TRANSACTION_
and code assigned to in the Stub of the unmarshalled interface name. This
works, as every app, including MonitorMe, has access to the dynamically
linked JAR of the Android API.
3) Unmarshal method arguments (“12345”, null, “Hello!”, null, null)
(a) Determine the order and types of method arguments by accessing the
signature of the unmarshalled method name via reflection.
(b) Apply Parcel’s read methods according to the type and order of argu-
ments appearing in the method signature. This works for Java primitives,
but it was also reverse engineered how complex objects are composed into
Java primitives.
It is worth pointing out that the unmarshalling algorithm does not rely on low-
level Binder implementations. Even if these vary for different Android versions, it
is always possible to use the correctly functioning Java read methods of the class
Parcel, which are also used by the Android framework itself on a specific device.
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"com.android.internal.telephony.ISms" "12345" "Hello!"6535
255 255 255 255 6 0 0 0 72 0 101 0 108 0 108 0 111 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
... null null null
Figure 6.6: The buffer sent via Binder containing the arguments of the method
sendTextMessage.
6.2.3 Netlink communication
As event interception takes place solely inside the kernel space and unmarshalling
relies on access to the Android API, we need a mechanism that allows to pass data
from inside the kernel module up to DroidTracer in user space. Moreover, we need
to send data also in the other direction so that the user can control the kernel mod-
ule for even the most basic tasks, for example, to switch event interception on and
off. Android has no built-in way to serve as a solution, but it was possible to use
netlink11 (a socket based mechanism of the Linux kernel) to bidirectionally commu-
nicate with user space. As only the kernel but not the Android API offers netlink
support, a custom endpoint was built (middle sub-component in Fig. 6.2), using the
Netlink Protocol Library Suite (libnl12). This means, the middle component of Droid-
Tracer is a shared C++-library. It contains extracted core functionality for netlink
from libnl and was recompiled for Android using Android’s Native Developer Kit
(NDK). Note that netlink implements a callback principle so that rather than polling
the kernel module for new occurring system events, DroidTracer can push them all
the way to the analysis component.
6.3 Specifying malware behaviour
Section §6.3.1 describes the underlying system model of app behaviour, which is
based on DroidTracer results, i.e., DroidTracer determines the different U-operators
that can appear in a trace. Section §6.3.2 provides a specification manual on how
unwanted app behaviour can be described and §6.3.3 discusses formulae derived
from common malware behaviour of the AMGP. From a formal point of view, we
merely use safety formulae and MonitorMe to detect finite counterexamples (i.e., bad
prefixes, as defined in Def. 3.2.2).
6.3.1 System model of app behaviour
The observable behaviour of apps on a technical level equals the system events that
can be collected with DroidTracer. Hence, whenever an app causes a native system
event on the Android platform that can be intercepted with DroidTracer, we capture
11http://www.linuxfoundation.org/collaborate/workgroups/networking/generic_netlink_howto
12http://www.carisma.slowglass.com/~tgr/libnl/
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it as an action. We represent actions in the internal, logical model by ground terms
p(d1, . . . , dn), where p is an uninterpreted predicate symbol (i.e., U-operator) and di
is a domain value. Recall that LTLFO is sorted, so that we can distinguish the dis
coming from different sub-domains (e.g., the set of all integers or strings). Typically,
p denotes the method and interface name of an intercepted method call, and di (if
the method has any) its ith unmarshalled method argument. For example, we write
sendText@ISms(“12345”, null, “Hello!”, null, null)
for a ground term representing the sending of an SMS with text “Hello!” to phone
number 12345, where we conventionally delimit method and interface name by the
@-symbol. See Table B.4–B.6 in the appendix for the more than 100 interface names
that DroidTracer has intercepted on real phones. For sorts of the arity of p, we use
the Java types of the actual method’s arguments involved in the RPC. Note that
the phone number “12345” is here of type String (and not int), as the Java type is
defined this way for the method signature of sendText. This allows for characters
such as “+” to account for factors like country codes.
Recall that we refer to finite sets of actions as events. An app’s observed behaviour
over time is therefore a finite trace of events. In the undertaken analysis, events
contain only one action, and are ordered by the position at which the corresponding
system event has been sent from DroidTracer’s kernel module via netlink. In other
words, there is no predefined delay between events as the trace is only extended
by one event whenever a new system event occurs. Table 6.1 shows a selection of
events from a trace that was collected for a sample of the malware family Walkinwat.
Distinct malware samples (i.e., with different hash values) are usually grouped under
the same family name if they share the same attack patterns. Note that Table 6.1
resembles the table of an SQLite database that DroidTracer uses to persist events on
the phone. Each row represents a system event. The column ID indicates its position
in the trace and the remaining columns show the outcome of the three steps in the
unmarshalling algorithm (see §6.2.2). For all other system calls that are intercepted
additionally to Binder—and which require no unmarshalling—DroidTracer returns
the generic interface name “syscall”, the actual function name of the system call in
the kernel, as well as the function’s intercepted arguments. Let us look for example
at the third row, which can be written as a ground term
sys_connect@syscall(”wringe.ispgateway.de”).
This means an internet connection has been established to wringe.ispgateway.de via
the system call sys_connect. An action at position i ∈ N in some trace means that
at time i this action holds (or, from a practical point of view for the 397th event in
Table 6.1 that Walkinwat has requested the Android framework to send an SMS to
number 451-518-646 with text “Hey, just ...”).
The row with interface name ISurfaceComposer contains for the method name
value “N/A, code: 10”. This denotes that DroidTracer was unable to decode the
real Java method name; and therefore, it returns at least the value of code found in
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Table 6.1: Trace of system events for malware Walkinwat collected by DroidTracer.
ID Interface Method Arguments
334 IPhoneSubInfo getDeviceId
386 IContentProvider QUERY content://contacts/phones, null,
null, null, display_name ASC
392 syscall sys_connect wringe.ispgateway.de
397 ISms sendText 451-518-646, null, “Hey,just down-
laoded a pirated App off the Inter-
net, Walk and Text for Android. Im
stupid and cheap,it costed only 1
buck.Don’t steal like I did!”, null,
null
407 IActivityManager getIntentSender 1, com.incorporateapps.walktext,
null, null, 0, Intent { act=SMS_SENT
}, null, 0
408 IActivityManager getIntentSender 1, com.incorporateapps.walktext,
null, null, 0, Intent {
act=SMS_DELIVERED }, null,
0
414 ISurfaceComposer N/A, code: 10
492 syscall sys_connect wringe.ispgateway.de
578 IActivityManager startActivity null, Intent {
act=android.intent.action.VIEW
dat=market://details?id=
com.incorporateapps.walktext },
null, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A, N/A,
N/A, N/A
binder_transaction_data. Recall that without knowing the method name, Droid-
Tracer cannot unmarshal any method arguments, unlike in the last row of Table 6.1.
Here, arguments could at least be partially unmarshalled, wherefore the last seven
arguments are represented by the placeholder “N/A”.
6.3.2 A user manual: How to specify malware behaviour in LTLFO
Let us now look at some common Android malware behaviour and explain how to
model this behaviour in terms of LTLFO formulae. The intention of this section is to
ease the understanding of specified attack patterns in the following section—or for
the curious reader, to be able to write their own policies for protection against future
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or otherwise unwanted behaviour occurring on Android phones.
Lots of malware is “spyware”, i.e., it sends private user data or sensitive device
details “home” to remote locations. In order to access any of this information, “sand-
boxed” malware has to request a system service; thus, a Binder call takes place and
we can refer to its according action when writing a policy. In case of the device ID,
we can write
G¬getDeviceId@IPhoneSubInfo,
meaning that an app should never query the device ID. As the method getDeviceId
has no arguments, the according U-operator is merely a proposition and therefore no
quantifiers are needed. In case we do not want an app to read any names, addresses,
etc. from the contact book of the phone, we write
G¬∃(uri, _) : QUERY@IContentProvider. regex(uri, “. ∗ contacts.∗′′),
meaning and app should not query a content provider, where the Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI) matches the regular expression “.*contacts.*”. A content provider is a
wrapper (here of an SQLite database that stores the contacts), which can be queried
from other apps via RPC if having the right permissions. In other words, we check
if the first argument of the method QUERY contains the URI “content://contacts/
phones”, as this unambiguously identifies a query to the contact database. Note
that the method QUERY has more than one argument. For readability we use the
“_”-symbol as a placeholder for all remaining variables that do not appear in the
formula. Similarly, access to most other data stores on Android can be monitored,
such as the one containing all SMS messages, the call history, etc. The predicate
regex is an I-operator, which returns true if a string—here the one bound to uri—
matches a regular expression. Note that in both cases above, the formulae resemble
the “absence” pattern from the LTL specification patterns discussed in §2.4.
The examples above are generic and therefore likely generate false positives.
Therefore, one usually wants to describe behaviour in a more specific way; for ex-
ample, by expressing that after accessing sensitive information, an app should not
forward the information to some “sink” on the device (e.g., the internet). How to
specify this is discussed in the following.
All apps of type Android/Actrack.A send GPS location, battery and radio status
to a central internet server controlled by the vendor at regular intervals. A policy
we may want to monitor in regards to that, more generally, could be “no app should
request the GPS location, and later connect to the internet (possibly to transmit said
location)”, which is captured by the following formula, where sys_connect@syscall
appears in a trace whenever the app under scrutiny triggers the Linux system call
sys_connect to some IP address y, and getLastLocation@ILocationManager whenever
it requests the device’s current location:
G(∃x : getLastLocation@ILocationManager. regex(x, ”. ∗ gps. ∗ ”)→
G¬∃y : sys_connect@syscall. true).
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An example for the parameter of getLastLocation is “Request[ ACCURACY_FINE
gps requested=0 fastest=0 num=1 ]; <app-package-name>”. This is an object of
class LocationRequest printed as string, which tells Android how an app wants
to request the location. For instance, “fastest=0” means that location updates are
requested within the fastest interval possible, which is usually only necessary for
navigation apps. Based on this information we could adapt the policy above to re-
veal specifically tracking behaviour. The formula’s pattern is of type “absence” with
scope “after”.
Android/NickiSpy, for example, represents a family of apps which secretly record
a user’s phone conversation on SD card in the compressed .amr format (adaptive
multi-rate). We can detect this family of malware via a simple policy,
G∀x : sd_write@syscall. ¬regex(x, “.*\.amr′′).
However, should there be legitimate recording of .amr files to SD card, the user
is always able to ignore any reported violations of this policy.
As another example, consider the first ever Android Trojan (Trojan-SMS.An-
droidOS.FakePlayer.a), disguised as media player, which secretly sent SMS mes-
sages to expensive premium numbers [Leyden, 2010]. This could be monitored by a
more general behaviour, i.e., to be notified if any app sends an SMS to a number not
in the contacts:
G∀x : sendText@ISms. contact(x).
While there may be legitimate violations of this policy, its monitoring at least lets
users keep track of which apps exhibit this type of behaviour. It’s then up to them
to decide to remove an app, if they feel it is not justified. It was predefined a special
I-operator, contact, which is non-rigid, i.e., its return value can change for the same
x depending if the number at the time queried is in the contact book or not. Recall
that we discussed this example already earlier in §3.1. The framework Ltlfo2mon lets
the user define further predicates for the specific need to check for certain behaviour,
which is usually not supported by other specification languages. In other words,
the feature of arbitrary computable predicates is needed for the following Android
analysis.
6.3.3 Common, recurring malware patterns
Based on the patterns from four different categories identified by Zhou and Jiang
[2012] in the AMGP, Küster and Bauer [2015] have formally specified various key
characteristics of malware behaviour in LTLFO. The outcome are the policies listed in
Table 6.2. For readability, we write ϕi∈[a,b], grouping policies of the same pattern
together, where ψi, ψ′ or ψ′′ are auxiliary formulae listed in Table 6.3. We surround a
policy ϕi with n square brackets (calling it the nth refinement of ϕi), if its bad prefixes
are a strict subset of the bad prefixes of ϕi surrounded with n− 1 square brackets.
For example, a bad prefix of [ϕ1]—the first refinement of ϕ1—has to contain as well
an event of establishing a connection to the internet, after accessing the device ID.
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Table 6.2: Key characteristics of Android malware behaviour specified in LTLFO.
Personal information stealing
ϕi∈[1,14] G¬ψi
[ϕi∈[1,14]] G(ψi ⇒ ¬Fψ′)
[[ϕi∈[1,14]]] G(ψi ∧ ¬ψ′ ⇒ (¬ψ′W(N/A@ISurfaceComposer ∧ ¬ψ′)))
[[ϕi∈[1,4]]]′ G(ψi ⇒ ¬Fψ′′)
Privilege escalation
ϕ15 G¬∃(args) : do_execv@syscall.
regex(args, ′′. ∗ su.∗ | pm(un)?install | amstart.∗′′)
Launching malicious payloads
ϕi∈[16,17] G¬ψi
[ϕ17] G(ψ17 ⇒ ¬Fψ′)
[[ϕ17]] G(ψ17 ⇒ ¬Fψ′′)
Financial charges
ϕ18 G∀(dest, _) : sendText@ISms. inContactBook(dest)
ϕ19 G(ψ17 ⇒ ¬F∃(w, x, y, z, abort) : finishReceiver@IActivityManager.
regex(abort, “true”))
This describes from a practical point of view a more severe malware behaviour for
the user.
Category 1: Information stealing. The AMGP discovered that malware is often ac-
tively harvesting various sensitive information on infected devices. Thus, the policies
ϕi∈[1,11] specify that an app should neither request any permission secured sensitive
data, such as the device or subscriber ID, subscriber identity module (SIM) serial or
telephone number, or device software version, nor should it query any of the content
providers that contain the call history, contact list, phone numbers, browser book-
marks, carrier settings or SMS messages. Policy ϕ12 covers the harvesting of installed
app or package names on a device. Policy ϕ13 covers the reading of system logs via
the Android logging system, called logcat. Note that before Android 4.1, an app
could read other apps’ logcat logs, which might contain sensitive messages. Policy
ϕ14 specifies that neither the coarse grain location based on cell towers nor the more
precise GPS location should be accessed.
The policies [ϕi∈[1,14]] refine the policies above towards the more suspicious be-
haviour that an app should not, after requesting the sensitive information, eventu-
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Table 6.3: Auxiliary formulae for Table 6.2.
ψ1 getDeviceId@IPhoneSubInfo
ψ2 getSubscriberId@IPhoneSubInfo
ψ3 getIccSerialNumber@IPhoneSubInfo
ψ4 getLine1Number@IPhoneSubInfo
ψ5 getDeviceSvn@IPhoneSubInfo
ψ6 ∃(uri, _) : QUERY@IContentProvider. regex(uri, “. ∗ calls.∗′′)
ψ7 ∃(uri, _) : QUERY@IContentProvider. regex(uri, “. ∗ contacts.∗′′)
ψ8 ∃(uri, _) : QUERY@IContentProvider. regex(uri, “. ∗ phones.∗′′)
ψ9 ∃(uri, _) : QUERY@IContentProvider. regex(uri, “. ∗ bookmarks.∗′′)
ψ10 ∃(uri, _) : QUERY@IContentProvider. regex(uri, “. ∗ preferapn.∗′′)
ψ11 ∃(uri, _) : QUERY@IContentProvider. regex(uri, “. ∗ sms.∗′′)
ψ12 (∃(_) : getInstalledPackages@IPackageManager. true)∨
(∃(_) : getInstalledApplications@IPackageManager. true)
ψ13 ∃(args) : do_execv@syscall. regex(args, “. ∗ logcat.∗′′)
ψ14 (∃(_) : notifyCellLocation@ITelephonyRegistry. true)∨
(∃x : getLastLocation@ILocationManager. regex(x, “. ∗ gps.∗′′)
c16 ′′. ∗ BOOT_COMPLETED.∗′′
c17 ′′. ∗ SMS_RECEIVED.∗′′
ψi∈[16,17] ∃(intent, txt, _) : system#scheduleReceiver@IApplicationThread.
(regex(intent, ci) ∧ regex(txt, “.∗ < pkg > .∗′′))
ψ
′
(∃(_) : sys_connect@syscall. true) ∨ (∃(_) : sendText@ISms. true)∨
(∃(x, intent, _) : startActivity@IActivityManager.
regex(intent, “action.SEND′′)
ψ
′′
(∃(dest, x, msg, _) : sendText@ISms. regex(msg, “.∗ < sensitiveInfo > .∗′′))∨
(∃(x, intent, _) : startActivity@IActivityManager.
regex(intent, “.∗ < sensitiveInfo > .∗′′)
ally connect to the internet, send an SMS or exchange data with another app. Even
though a detected bad prefix for those policies does not guarantee that information
has been leaked, the usage of above “sinks” bears at least its potential. As we treat
apps as “black boxes” and sent data could have been encrypted or in other ways
obscured by malware, we generally cannot prove leakage—unlike approaches for
information flow analysis [cf. Enck et al., 2010]—based on traces we collect. Fur-
thermore, [[ϕi∈[1,14]]] expresses that there should exist some screen rendering (via
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N/A@ISurfaceComposer) in between information request and potential leakage. A de-
tected bad prefix would mean in this case that the sending of data could not have
been caused by some normal user interaction with the app, but rather by some app’s
malicious background service. Note that we represent with N/A method names
which could not be decoded with DroidTracer. Further note that the first and sec-
ond refinements are based on the “absence after” and “exists between” specification
patterns, respectively.
[[ϕi∈[1,4]]]′ are further refinements, which only trigger if we find the device ID,
etc., as cleartext (represented by the placeholder “< sensitiveInfo >”) in the trace.
Category 2: Privilege escalation. The attack of exploiting bugs or design flaws
in software to gain elevated access to resources that are normally protected from
an application is called privilege escalation. From the samples in Zhou and Jiang
[2012], 36.7% exploit a version-specific known software vulnerability of either the
Linux kernel or some open-source libraries running on the Android platform (such
as WebKit or SQLite) to gain root privileges (e.g., to replace real banking apps with a
fake one, for phishing attacks). Therefore, policy ϕ15 lets us for example detect when
an app opens a root shell, secretly starts, installs, or removes other packages via the
activity manager (am) or the package manager (pm). Monitoring of this behaviour is
possible, because the system call do_execve is exclusively used for the execution of
any binary, shell command, or shell script on the underlying Linux OS.
However, not all root exploits need to use the su command to be executed (see,
e.g., the “RageAgainstTheCage” exploit [cf. Drake et al., 2014, p.75], which leverages
on the root shell obtained via the Android Debug Bridge (adb)). Therefore, it is not
possible to detect root exploits in general with this formula. Once an app has gained
root privileges, it can in principle not just unload MonitorMe’s kernel module, but
also uninstall the app itself. In other words, malware on a compromised device
would be able to successfully evade the detection from MonitorMe as well as any
other mobile anti-virus software.
Category 3: Launching malicious payloads. Apps’ background services—which
do not have any UI—cannot only be actively started when clicking on an app’s launch
icon, but also by registering for Android’s system-wide events, called broadcasts. The
AMGP discovered that 29 of the 49 malware families contain a malicious service that
is launched after the system has been booted, or for 21 families when an SMS was
received (i.e., they registered for the BOOT_COMPLETED or SMS_RECEIVED broadcast,
respectively). Therefore, we consider it as suspicious if services are activated by
the broadcasts mentioned above, which we specify in form of ϕi∈[16,17]. We replace
“< pkg >” for each app individually with its package name. Note that to monitor
this behaviour, we need to intercept system events of the Android system—which
has UID 1000—as it starts the services that have registered for a certain broadcast via
scheduleReceiver@IApplicationThread. We add the prefix “system#” to those actions;
that is, to distinguish them from an app’s action in a trace. Since malware has access
to the sender and content of an incoming SMS after registering for SMS_RECEIVED,
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we check with the refinements [ϕ17] and [[ϕ17]] for information stealing. This means,
similar as specified by the refinements of ϕi∈[1,14], the internet should not be accessed,
and so on, after the broadcast was received.
Category 4: Financial charges. The AMGP discovered apps, such as the Android
malware FakePlayer, which secretly calls or register for premium services via an
SMS. As this behaviour can result in high financial charges for the user, Google
labels the permissions that allow to call or send an SMS with “services that cost you
money”. This policy is used as an example throughout this thesis. Recall that instead
of defining policies that check outgoing messages against a fixed list of potential
premium numbers, ϕ18, more generically specifies that an SMS should not be sent to
a number not in the user’s contact book. Since Android 4.2, Google added a similar
security check, where a notification is provided to the user if an app attempts to
send messages to short codes as those could be premium numbers. We could have
specified that apps should not make phone calls to numbers not in the phone book as
well, but as this behaviour has not been observed during experiments we neglected
to do so.
Before Android 4.4, apps were allowed to block incoming SMS messages. This
was used by malware to suppress received confirmations from premium services
or mobile banking transaction authentication numbers (TANs). The latter were then
forwarded to a malicious user. Thus, policy ϕ19 checks if apps abort a broadcast after
receiving SMS_RECEIVED, in which case the SMS would not be delivered further to
appear in the usual messaging app on a device. In other words, if an SMS is blocked,
malware can silently register users for premium services.
6.4 Identifying malware behaviour
MonitorMe was installed and provided with the policies introduced in §6.3.3 on the
test device Nexus S, which was running Android 2.3.6. This old Android version was
used, as most malware from the AMGP was built for version 2.3.6. During the exper-
iments, one malware sample for each of the AMGP-families was monitored; that is,
first its application package (APK) was installed, and before starting it (i.e., by clicking
on its launch icon if it had any), test using and finally uninstalling it, potential back-
ground services have been tried to activate by sending the broadcast BOOT_COMPLETE
via the adb and an SMS to the Nexus S. Even though MonitorMe performed online
monitoring, the trace for each malware was also persisted in an SQLite database on
the phone both for repeatability of the experiments and to provide them to other
researchers.13
13Traces are available at http://kuester.multics.org/DroidTracer/malware/traces
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6.4.1 Experimental results
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 summarise for which malware families (49 in total) and poli-
cies MonitorMe detected bad prefixes during the experiments. The second column
indicates, whether a malware or one of its services crashed during the experiments
(e.g., due to incompatibility with the Android version on the test device). Accord-
ingly, observing some critical behaviour might have been missed. The third column
tells us if a malware had no launch icon, which is usually intended to stay hidden
and spy on the user. SMSReplicator, for example, is used by parents to secretly for-
ward all SMS messages received on their childrens’ phones. As in general all UIDs
above 10000 were monitored,14 apps without an icon could not bypass the analysis
unnoticed. The fourth column shows the number of system events that has been
recorded for each malware. The next four columns contain the individual monitor
results for the categories introduced in Table 6.2. Note that for readability, monitor
results for the first category (information stealing) are aggregated; that is, the fifth
column contains the number of all bad prefixes discovered in that category per app.
The complete results for this category can be found in the appendix in Table B.1. The
cell containing [[ϕ18]]397 in the row for Walkinwat denotes that the monitor for [[ϕ18]]
found a bad prefix for the Walkinwat sample after 397 events. As this implies that
the same prefix is also a bad one for lower refinements of ϕ18, we neglect showing
this information. The last column shows the number of bad prefixes found in total
per malware.
In summary, for 46 out of 49 families (93.9%), suspicious behaviour was detected.
This is under the assumption that we consider bad prefixes for policy ϕ16 alone as
not critical. Note that the results take into account that, according to Zhou and Jiang
[2012], it could have been observed additional malicious behaviours guarded by ϕ15,
ϕ18 and ϕ19 (indicated by an  in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5). The reason that this was
not the case for ϕ15 is that the nine marked families targeted Android versions below
2.3.6. Thus, their exploits were not attempted in the first place or were unsuccessful.
Bad prefixes for ϕ18 were missed, as malware was often waiting to receive instruc-
tions from a remote server, which was not active anymore. The servers are needed for
malware to send an SMS, as they provide premium numbers dynamically. Regard-
ing ϕ19, the blocking of incoming SMS messages could rarely be observed, as most
malware was designed to only suppress the received confirmation from specific pre-
mium numbers. Out of 46 detected families, 34 can be associated with potential
information stealing, as they use the internet or other sinks after accessing sensitive
information. For NickySpy and SMSReplicator has been discovered that the device
ID is leaked cleartext via an SMS, and an SMS received was forwarded to a malicious
user, respectively.
To discuss limits of the malware detection, which are by no means unique to the
approach in this thesis, consider the FakeNetflix family. It uses a phishing attack
for which is no observable behaviour in the trace; that is, it shows a fake login screen
to the user and then sends the entered credentials to a malicious server.
14UIDs below 10000 are reserved for system apps with higher privileges.
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Table 6.4: Monitor results for malware of the AMGP—Part 1.
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6.4.2 False positives analysis
Finally, it was checked if policies are suitable to distinguish malware from benign
apps. Therefore, MonitorMe ran on a Nexus 5 with Android 5.0.1 that had more
than 60 apps from common app categories in the Google Play Store installed: social
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Table 6.5: Monitor results for malware of the AMGP—Part 2.
M
al
w
ar
e
fa
m
il
y
C
ra
sh
H
id
e
Ev
en
ts
C
at
.1
C
at
.2
C
at
.3
C
at
.4
To
ta
l
⊥
26
.
G
in
ge
rM
as
te
r
62
7
5

ϕ
16
12
4
6
27
.
G
ol
dD
re
am
15
17
1

1
28
.
G
on
e6
0
55
5
5
5
29
.
G
PS
SM
SS
py
3
23
ϕ
17
25
3

1
30
.
H
ip
po
SM
S
88
8
2
ϕ
16
12
9
ϕ
18
32
9

4
31
.
Ji
fa
ke
3
58
4
ϕ
18
41
4
1
32
.
jS
M
SH
id
er
12
83
3
ϕ
15
25
0


4
33
.
K
M
in
85
0


34
.
Lo
ve
Tr
ap
3
17
91
1
ϕ
16
11
9
[ϕ
17
]
37
8


3
35
.
N
ic
ky
Bo
t
61
9
3
ϕ
16
13
5

4
36
.
N
ic
ky
Sp
y
3
44
1
1
ϕ
16
13
5
ϕ
18
21
9
3
37
.
Pj
ap
ps
18
08
1


1
38
.
Pl
an
kt
on
56
1
1
[ϕ
17
]
38
6
2
39
.
R
og
ue
Le
m
on
20
77
3
[ϕ
17
]
52
6


4
40
.
R
og
ue
SP
Pu
sh
16
53
3


3
41
.
SM
SR
ep
lic
at
or
3
31
6
1
[[
ϕ
17
]]
23
6
ϕ
18
23
6
3
42
.
Sn
dA
pp
s
55
9
2
2
43
.
Sp
it
m
o
3
77
1
1
[ϕ
17
]
24
2

ϕ
19
24
0
3
44
.
Ta
ps
na
ke
3
35
5
ϕ
16
20
2
1
45
.
W
al
ki
nw
at
84
8
3
ϕ
18
39
7
4
46
.
Y
Z
H
C
63
1
4
ϕ
16
35
0


5
47
.
zH
as
h
86
5
7

7
48
.
Z
it
m
o
20
27
1
1
49
.
Z
so
ne
3
55
3
[ϕ
17
]
34
4
ϕ
18
38
4

2
To
ta
l⊥
2
13
9
8
1
(Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.), communication (Whatsapp, etc.), news (Feedly,
New York Times, BBC news, etc.), transportation (Uber, etc.), travel & local (Yelp,
TripAdvisor, etc.), and games (Cut the rope, etc.) to name a few.
The result are shown in the appendix in Table B.2–B.3. It was discovered suspi-
cious behaviour for 17 out of 61 apps (28%), using the same assumption as above
that policy ϕ16 alone is not critical. The false positive rate seems high at first glance.
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However, a closer look reveals that some benign apps bear unwanted behaviour for
the user, so that a warning by MonitorMe seems reasonable. For example, eleven
apps surprisingly requested the device or subscriber ID, which is explicitly not rec-
ommended by the Google developer guidelines.15 Amongst those apps were a soccer
news and Yoga app, which in the author’s opinion both do not require this data for
its functionality, but rather collect sensitive data from the user. Another app was the
private taxi app Uber, which has been criticised in the past due to collecting personal
data without the user’s permission.16 Only five apps started after boot, such as the
Dropbox app, which we can consider as necessary regarding its purpose, and only
two apps after an SMS was received. These were a secure SMS app and Twitter.
6.4.3 Performance and portability
Table 6.6: Execution of Android method calls (each up to 10,000 times) with and
without kprobes. The margin of error (MoE) is given for the 95% confidence interval.
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Execution (ms) 5309 5346 3516 9166 15730 5769 15360
MoE (ms) ± 15 ± 16 ± 13 ± 13 ± 204 ± 53 ± 72
Kprobes
Execution (ms) 5517 5524 3562 9396 15514 5841 15531
MoE (ms) ± 18 ± 16 ± 13 ± 13 ± 202 ± 60 ± 67
Overhead (%) 3.92 2.51
DroidTracer
Execution (ms) 5811 5817 4126 10216 15422 5671 15455
MoE (ms) ± 11 ± 7 ± 5 ± 10 ± 172 ± 7 ± 38
Overhead (%) 9.46 8.81 17.35 11.46
15http://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-tips.html#UserData
16http://thehackernews.com/2014/11/ubers-android-app-is-literally-malware_28.html
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DroidTracer and MonitorMe’s (1) performance was evaluated, i.e., the bare sys-
tem event interception including unmarshalling as well as when running the moni-
tors on top. Moreover, we (2) demonstrate that the proposed automated approach to
unmarshalling is portable to different Android devices and versions.
Performance. The performance tests are based on seven specifically built test apps,
where each was designed to generate 100 runs of up to 10, 000 system events named
by the interface and method names in Table 6.6. When MonitorMe is being executed
with the policies in §6.3.3 and monitors the test apps individually, the highest perfor-
mance overhead is 38.6% for the system event sendText@Isms. This was determined
on a Nexus 7 (quad-core CPU, 1 GB RAM) with Android 4.3. Note that the over-
head involves the monitor for ϕ18 checking the contact book each time an SMS was
sent. However, in practice sendText@Isms and other system events relevant to our
policies rarely occur; and therefore the respective monitors rarely cause overhead.
Even though, in practice MonitorMe runs several monitors at the same time, a signif-
icant overhead is only noticeable if a system event is intercepted that appears in the
monitored formulae and, therefore, requires the respective monitors to change their
inner state.
Furthermore, as the results of these test runs are specific only to the implemen-
tation of runtime verification, it was also measured the performance overhead of
DroidTracer when no further analysis was undertaken. Table 6.6 shows the execution
time when intercepting the method calls of the above seven system events in three
different modes of operation: (1) without DroidTracer enabled to get a reference ex-
ecution time for the unmodified system, (2) with only the event interception part of
our kernel module enabled, and (3) with unmarshalling and netlink communication
added. During the experiments, all four cores of the Nexus 7 ran on a fixed frequency
rate. This allowed to reduce the margin of error dramatically. Note that cells are left
empty, if overhead could not significantly be determined wrt. the t-test. The results
show that the actual performance overhead of using just the kernel module with
kprobes is only 2.51–3.92%, whereas the complete performance overhead of Droid-
Tracer is 8.81–17.35%. What is noteworthy is that a method call getDeviceId and
getIccSerialNumber have significant lower overhead than getLastKnownLocation
and sendText, as both former method signatures have no arguments that require
unmarshalling. The call of getLastKnownLocation has the highest overhead. Most
likely, because its arguments contain several complex objects, for example, one of
type LocationRequest, which unmarshalling involves additional reflection calls. As
sendText contains only Java primitives as arguments, its unmarshalling overhead is
slightly lower.
Portability. DroidTracer was executed on three different devices and Android ver-
sions, including 5.0.1. At the time of writing, this is the second most recent one.
Table 6.7 demonstrates the success of unmarshalling events that were intercepted.
While the interface name of all method calls could be unmarshalled, this was pos-
sible only for 45.77%-68.78% of unique method names; that is, it was possible to
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Table 6.7: Unmarshable parts of observed system events.
Device Nexus S Nexus 7 Nexus 5
Android version 2.3.6 4.3 5.0.1
Events 102,545 107,977 449,429
Interfaces (Unique) 58 89 108
Methods
Unique 804 378 474
Unmarshalled 368 236 326
Success rate (%) 45.77 62.43 68.78
Events with arguments
Total 54,596 70,746 264,058
Totally unmarshalled 43,318 67,866 227,708
Success rate (%) 79.34 95.93 86.23
Partially unmarshalled 47,923 69,474 255,263
Success rate (%) 87.78 98.20 96.67
discover for an integer code its according method name in the Android API via re-
flection. The number of unmarshalled method names seem low, but missing ones
are mainly specific to Android internals, for example to render the screen. As such,
they have no Stub or Proxy in the Android API, but only in some native C library.
This functionality is also not accessible to the developer and therefore usually con-
tain no relevant events for the analysis. If method calls had arguments, all arguments
for 79.34%-95.93% and at least some arguments for 87.78%-98.20% could be unmar-
shalled. Note that if we fail to unmarshal one argument of a call, we also fail to
unmarshal all the remaining arguments of that call, as Parcel’s read methods have
to be applied in the correct order.
This high unmarshalling rates for a wide range of different Android versions—
from an early to a recent one—support the hypothesis that DroidTracer is robust
against the Android fragmentation problem. Recall that this is possible, because
of mainly two reasons: (1) DroidTracer hooks into the kernel’s system calls, which
are unlikely to change, and (2) the unmarshalling algorithm does not rely on low-
level Binder implementations, as the high-level Java methods of the class Parcel are
used. However, if the data structure binder_transaction_data changed, which
transmits data in the kernel between processes, the implementation would have to
be adapted. Furthermore, the approach in this thesis would have to be modified if
the class Parcel could not be filled with a byte stream directly anymore. Another
weak point is the communication between kernel and app. Since Android 5.0, the
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system is hardened by SELinux17, which runs in enforcement mode, so that netlink
communication is forbidden. As root, however, SELinux can be switched back to
permissive mode. Another point is that with every new Android API version, not
only a lot of new methods appear that can be monitored, but also names of existing
methods or their signatures are subject to change; especially, if those are not exposed
publicly in the Android API. As these kind of changes require the formulae to be
adapted, it becomes necessary to introduce and maintain a layer of abstraction, which
maps internal methods to a fixed set of predicates.
6.5 Related work
Since the initial release of the Android OS, there has been various research with focus
on enhancing the security of this OS or identifying apps that are malware.
One major research direction statically [cf. Enck et al., 2011; Arzt et al., 2014] and
dynamically [cf. Bläsing et al., 2010; Spreitzenbarth et al., 2015] analyses apps before
those get installed on a user’s device. For example, Mobile-Sandbox [Spreitzenbarth
et al., 2015] combines both techniques to detect malicious behaviour. Results from
static analysis are used to guide dynamic analysis. This helps to get insights into
function calls to native libraries outside the Dalvik VM.
There are works validating permission assignment at the installation time of apps,
which refine for that purpose for example Android’s default permission system [cf.
Enck et al., 2009; Ongtang et al., 2012; Nauman et al., 2015]. The central components
of the Saint framework described in Ongtang et al. [2012] are a modified Android
application installer and a so called AppPolicy Provider. The custom installer ensures
that at install-time only apps which do not violate policies stored in the AppPolicy
Provider can be installed. The authors of Saint have gone to great lengths to check
existing apps’ permissions for suspicious permission requests and from that derived
practically useful policies for that purpose.
Another static approach by Gunadi et al. [2015] provides a type-based method
to formally certify non-interference properties of Android bytecode. The goal is to
eventually have a compiler tool chain, which developers can use to check if their apps
comply with a given policy. Furthermore, they can generate final non-interference
certificates as a guarantee for the user’s of apps. FlowDroid [Arzt et al., 2014] is a
static taint-analysis system that analyses apps’ bytecode and configuration files to
identify potential privacy leaks, either caused accidentally by developers or created
with malicious intention.
Moreover, there are virtualisation techniques aiming at isolating the data and
apps on different trust levels (e.g., to separate environments for private and corporate
use) [Bugiel et al., 2011; Andrus et al., 2011; Lange et al., 2011].
As this thesis is concerned with online monitoring, let us also consider related
work that is, like MonitorMe, running completely on the phone and that checks the
behaviour of running apps. One corner stone of the approach around MonitorMe is
17https://source.android.com/security/selinux/
§6.5 Related work 99
the ability to specify policies over traces with data. Other runtime verification works
that have not been applied to Android, but which also allow parameterised moni-
toring, have been discussed in §4.5. Some could in principle be ported to monitor
policies based on DroidTracer events as discussed in this chapter. However, they
need to incorporate the semantics of the “regex”- or “contact”-operator, which are
possible in LTLFO due to its capability of defining arbitrary computational predicates.
An aspect that has not been covered in this thesis, is the type of privilege esca-
lation attack where an app gains access to certain resources or functionalities that
are not explicitly granted to it by the user, through indirect control flow. To tackle
this problem, Gunadi and Tiu [2014] have developed the framework LogicDroid. It
uses a tailored logic for that problem, called recursive metric temporal logic (RMTL).
This logic is essentially a past-fragment of metric linear temporal logic (MTL) that is
extended with first-order quantifiers and recursive definitions. The latter are used to
express call chains between apps. It is currently not known whether the recursive call
chains are expressible in LTLFO. Their monitoring algorithm is based on the rewrit-
ing based procedure for past-time LTL introduced by Havelund and Rosu [2002]. It
is noteworthy that the form of intervals of metric operators are restricted in such a
way that the monitor is proven to be trace-length independent. Another restriction
to achieve this is that only safety properties can be monitored. A similar approach to
LogicDroid, but based on maintaining call graphs, is XManDroid [Bugiel et al., 2012].
From an instrumentation point of view, most monitoring approaches for Android
can be divided into two categories:
App-centric ones [cf. Backes et al., 2013; Rasthofer et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2012;
Falcone et al., 2012a; Jeon et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2012] intercept events inside the
apps by rewriting and repackaging them, so that neither root access nor modifying
the Android OS is necessary. As a consequence, they are portable to most phones
and Android versions and are easy to install even for non-experts. Examples are
AppGuard [Backes et al., 2013] and Aurasium [Xu et al., 2012], which is even able to
enforce security policies for apps’ native code as it rewrites Android’s own libc.so,
which is natively linked into every app. However, the ease in portability comes at
the expense of inherent vulnerabilities, namely that security controls run inside the
apps under scrutiny and thus could be bypassed (e.g., by dynamically loading code
after rewriting). Also, since apps have to be actively selected for rewriting, hidden
malware, such as the ones without launch icon that we came across in §6.4.1, might
be overlooked.
Platform-centric approaches [cf. Enck et al., 2010; Bugiel et al., 2012; Hornyack
et al., 2011; Gunadi and Tiu, 2014; Nauman et al., 2010] usually tie deep into the
source code of the Android OS and are therefore less portable. TaintDroid [Enck
et al., 2010], a pioneering platform-centric tool for taint flow analysis, requires mod-
ifications from the Linux kernel all the way up to the Dalvik VM. Although it is
being actively ported, users have to be sufficiently experienced to not only compile
their own version of Android, including the TaintDroid changes, but also to make it
work on a hardware of their choice. The approach proposed in this thesis is, con-
ceptually, a combination of the advantages of app- and platform-centric monitoring:
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DroidTracer can be loaded even into a currently running Android system, yet is able
to trace app (even preinstalled Google apps that cannot be rewritten) and Android
system interactions all the way down to the OS kernel level.
Recently, there have been in-memory patching approaches, such as PatchDroid
[Mulliner et al., 2013] and DeepDroid [Wang et al., 2015], whose advantages are sim-
ilar to DroidTracer. They also run on a stock device, do not modify apps, but require
a rooted phone. Another recent approach that requires neither root nor modifications
is Boxify [Backes et al., 2015]. It is essentially a normal app that can be installed on a
stock device where it acts as an app virtualisation environment. It proxies all system
calls and Binder channels of the apps that it is running in a de-privileged, isolated
process.
While policies describing malware behaviour were derived manually in this work,
there are works trying to achieve this automatically. Chen et al. [2016a] automatically
construct formal, temporal properties from Android malware instances in form of fi-
nite state machines. Other works try to classify malware based on machine learning
techniques [cf. Gascon et al., 2013; Yerima et al., 2013]. These works can be com-
plemented by the results of this thesis, in the way that the detected bad prefixes of
policies can be used as a feature set to the machine learning models.
6.6 Summary
This chapter presents a proof of concept that was carried out on the Android OS,
mainly to show that monitoring wrt. traces with data benefits real systems and is ef-
ficiently feasible. The first part of this chapter explains the means of the DroidTracer
library (used by the MonitorMe app). It details on how it is able to intercept and
unmarshal arbitrary Binder events as well as other system calls without changes to
the Android OS. The second part discusses experimental results from malware de-
tection using runtime verification. It is based on malware files from the AMGP and
derived specifications of common malicious behaviour. A performance and porta-
bility study shows that MonitorMe runs efficiently on various Android devices with
different versions, i.e., interception and unmarshalling can be sufficiently automated
to a large degree.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter provides an outlook on possible future research directions (§7.1). It
further discusses problems that remain open in this thesis, and which might be of
interest to being solved for the runtime verification community (§7.2).
7.1 Future research
It has been pointed out that the categorisation of monitoring problems by means of
classical computational complexity theory does not adequately reflect the difference
in what has to be solved solely once (ahead of monitoring) and what has to be solved
for each processed event (during monitoring). The “hard work” should preferably
be carried out upfront, in order to minimise recurring overhead. However, the com-
plexity classes in Table 3.1 provide at least a lower bound on the overall complexity
of the actual monitoring problem. For this reason, one future research direction is
to formally define specific notions of “runtime complexity” classes, which make the
differences between runtime overhead and generation explicit. In offline monitoring,
where a trace is not expanding, the according decision problems suitably express the
worst case of what is required wrt. space or computation time.
For the introduced definitions of an SA, one aspect would be to study the expres-
siveness of this novel automaton model. Similarly, to the relation of a BA and LTL,
an SA is more expressive than LTLFO-definable languages. However, while a BA is
known to agree with the ω-regular expressions, it is interesting to investigate which
language-defining notions SAs correspond to.
Section §4.5 has discussed the various formalisms for monitoring data. Each logic
usually comes with their own monitoring technique. Therefore, it is worth investi-
gating whether monitor constructions can be reused between formalisms. However,
formally comparing the expressiveness of different approaches is usually difficult. It
is even unknown if past operators add expressiveness compared to having only fu-
ture operators in first-order temporal logic. Reger and Rydeheard [2015] have made
a first step towards unifying first-order LTL and notions of parametric trace slicing.
They propose a fragment of the former, which can be monitored by QEAs as well
(discussed in §4.5).
Regarding the proof of concept carried out in this thesis, to the best of the author’s
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knowledge, this work is the first runtime verification approach to comprehensively
monitor the vast set of real malwares collected by the AMGP. Detection rates are
promising and help substantiate the claim that methods developed in the area of
runtime verification are suitable not only for safety-critical systems, but also when
(mobile) security is critical. Indeed, at the time of writing, the samples of the AMGP
are about three years old, which in the rapid development of new attacks seems
like a long time. However, the database has grown over a number of years and the
underlying patterns emerged as a result of that. While there are always innovative,
hard to detect malwares, it is not unreasonable to expect the bulk of new malwares
to also fall into the existing categories, identified by the AMGP, and therefore be
detectable by the approach in this thesis. Validation of this hypothesis, however,
must be subject to further work, for which more recent malware collections should
be used.1
Furthermore, the AMGP or other more recent malware collections could serve
as a benchmark; that is, these could be used to compare monitors and policies in
runtime verification in terms of their effectiveness towards mobile security. An idea
is to extend the recently introduced runtime verification challenge in a way to discuss
detection and false positive rates in its own category.2
7.2 Open problems
We have discussed in §5 examples that show that LTLFO is clearly not trace-length in-
dependent, even if we restrict the logic to only uninterpreted predicates. A practically
relevant problem is, therefore, to characterise a given formula as being trace-length
independent or not. This way one can be warned upfront whether a monitor might
steadily grow or whether its memory consumption can be bound by a constant. How-
ever, regarding the given notions of trace-length (in)dependence, it is unfortunately
currently not known if these are decidable, although it is suspected that they are not.
An intuitive argument for this can be given by the theorem of Rice [1953], which in-
tuitively asserts that nontrivial properties of Turing machines are not decidable. For
a formal proof, a monitor has to be considered as something as generic as a Turing
machine, and an upper bound on its memory (i.e., tape) is a nontrivial property. If
the notions of trace-length independence were proven decidable, it is also not clear
if a proof could provide us with a meaningful decision procedure that takes into
account more than just the syntax of a given formula.
Some insight about trace-length independence can be gained by looking at the
proposed monitor construction. It is expected that the monitor is trace-length inde-
pendent for formulae that contain no interpreted predicates (and, of course, satisfy
trace-length independence). An intuition is that every spawned submonitor essen-
tially stores information about its local language in terms of an ordinary GBA, which
1For example, the mobile malware dump provided by http://contagiominidump.blogspot.de/.
2To evaluate this idea, the persisted events of malware behaviour can be found under http://kuester.
multics.org/DroidTracer/malware/traces.
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is structurally equivalent to the optimal LTL3 monitor by Bauer et al. [2011]. For
example, for a quantifier-free formula, the monitor is exactly the optimal monitor for
LTL3 (in case of applying the optimisation in §4.3).
However, it seems that there is no interesting fragment that can be trace-length
independently monitored. The nesting of a temporal “until”- or “globally”-operator
with a quantifier in between leads to a trace-length dependent formula. It is likely
that all quantified subformulae have to have bounded prefixes [Kupferman et al.,
2006] (which is only the case for the “next”-operator in LTL), so that submonitors
can return a verdict in constant time.
Furthermore, it can be easily seen that the monitor is not trace-length inde-
pendent if arbitrary computational relations are allowed. Consider, for example,
the formula G(∀x : time. G(∀y : time. x >= y)), which expresses that all fu-
ture time stamps must be greater or equal to any time stamp in the past. At
first glance this formula looks like it would be trace-length dependent, but due to
the transitivity of the order relation, a more succinctly and equivalent formula is
G(∀x : time. X(∀y : time. x >= y)). This is clearly trace-length independently moni-
torable. However, the monitor in this thesis currently does not take the semantics of
interpreted predicate symbols into account, but merely the temporal structure of the
formula. Hence, it is not, as requested, trace-length independent if arithmetic is in-
volved. It is the question whether one can build a trace-length independent monitor
at all in the case where arbitrary predicate symbols are allowed. In this context, it is
noteworthy that Du et al. [2015] recently proposed a characterisation of trace-length
independence as well as an according monitor for past-time LTL with a counting
quantifier.
Last but not least, an interesting and still open decision problem—that has not
been researched in this thesis, but is worth mentioning in this context—exists for the
propositional setting of LTL: the complexity of monitorability. It is still unknown
how tight the bounds really are; that is, the problem is currently only known to be
in ExpSpace (can be shown by ways of using the construction of the LTL3 monitor)
and PSpace-hard. For LTLFO, this thesis shows that monitorability is undecidable.
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Appendix A
Detailed proofs
This appendix provides additional proof details for the assertions made in §3 and §4
of this thesis.
A.1 Complexity results
This section details on the proofs in §3.2.2, which are Lemma 3.2.1 and Lemma 3.2.2
(used to show the undecidability of LTLFO and the prefix problem, respectively). Fur-
thermore, it contains the complexity proofs of the word problem (see Theorem 3.2.3)
and model checking problem (see Theorem 3.2.4).
First of all, let us provide necessary definitions, which are the Quantified Boolean
Formula Problem (QBF) for the proof of Theorem 3.2.3, the Post Correspondence Problem
(PCP), on which the proof of Lemma 3.2.2 is based, and a deterministic Turing machine
(DTM), needed in Lemma A.1.1.
Definition A.1.1 (Quantified Boolean Formula Problem). A quantified Boolean formula
has the form
F = Q1x1. Q2x2. . . . Qnxn. E(x1, x2, . . . , xn),
where Q ∈ {∀, ∃} and E is a Boolean formula over variables x1, x2, . . . , xn. The expression
∀x. E(x) evaluates to > if E(x) evaluates to > for both assigning 1 (meaning >) to all
occurrences of x, as well as assigning 0 (meaning ⊥) to all occurrences of x. On the other
hand, ∃x. E(x) evaluates to > if E(x) evaluates to > for either all x being 0 or 1, or both.
Given a formula F from above with no free variables, the QBF then asks: “Does F evalu-
ates to >?”
Definition A.1.2 (Post Correspondence Problem). An instance of the PCP, given an
alphabet Σ, consists of k corresponding pairs (xi, yi)0≤i<k, where xi, yi ∈ Σ∗.
The question is then: “Does this instance of the PCP has a solution?”, where we say it has
a solution, if there is a sequence of one or more indices i1 . . . im, when interpreted as indices
for the strings of the pairs, xi1 . . . xim = yi1 . . . yim holds.
Definition A.1.3 (Deterministic Turing machine). A DTM is a tuple M = (Q, Γ,Σ, δ,
q0, B, F), where
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• Q is a finite set of states,
• Γ a finite set of tape symbols,
• Σ ⊆ Γ a finite set of input symbols,
• δ : Q× Γ −→ Q× Γ× {le f t, right, none} a transition function,
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state of the DTM,
• B ∈ Γ \ Σ the blank symbol, and
• F ⊆ Q a set of final states.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let ϕ be a sentence in first-order logic, then we can construct a
corresponding ψ ∈ LTLFO s.t. ϕ has a finite model iff ψ is satisfiable.
Proof. We construct the LTLFO formula ψ as follows. We first introduce a new unary
U-operator d whose arity is τ and that does not appear in ϕ. We then replace every
subformula in ϕ, which is of the form ∀x. θ, with ∀x : d. θ (resp. for ∃x. θ). Next, we
encode some restrictions on the interpretation of function and predicate symbols by
the following rules:
• For each constant symbol c in ϕ, we conjoin the obtained ψ with d(c).
• For each function symbol f in ϕ of arity n, we conjoin the obtained ψ with
∀x1 : d. . . . ∀xn : d. d( f (x1, . . . , xn)).
• For each predicate symbol p in ϕ of arity n, we conjoin the obtained ψ with
∀(x1, . . . , xn) : p. d(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ d(xn).
• We conjoin ∃x : d. d(x) to the obtained ψ to ensure that the domain is not
empty.
Finally, we fix the arities of symbols in ψ appropriately to one of the following τ,
τ× . . .× τ, τ× . . .× τ −→ τ. Obviously, the formula ψ, constructed by the procedure
above, is a syntactically correct LTLFO formula.
(⇐:) Now, if ψ is satisfiable by some (A′, σ), where A′ = (|A′|, I′) and σ ∈
(A′)- Ev, it is easy to construct a finite model A = (|A|, I) s.t. A |= ϕ holds in the
classical sense of first-order logic: set |A| = dI′ , cI = cI′ , f I = f I′ |dI′×...×dI′ , pI = pI
′
,
respectively. By an inductive argument one can show that the LTLFO semantics is
preserved.
(⇒:) The other direction, if ϕ is finitely satisfiable, is trivial: set |A′| = τ I′ = |A|,
cI
′
= cI , f I
′
= f I , respectively, and σ = {(p, e) | e ∈ pI} ∪ {(d, e) | e ∈ |A|}.
Lemma A.1.1. Let M be a deterministic Turing machine (DTM), then we can construct a
ϕM ∈ LTLFO s.t. M halts on the empty input iff ϕM is satisfiable.
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Proof. Let us first state some important notes on the type of DTM we use (see
Def. A.1.3): It has an infinite tape (to the left and right direction) consisting of in-
finite many cells, where each cell is identifiable by a unique index i ∈ Z. Each cell
can contain only a single symbol from the set of tape symbols. In the beginning all
cells contain the blank symbol (meaning the tape is empty). The input to the ma-
chine is written to the tape starting at index 0 (but as we consider only the empty
input to the machine, initially the tape is empty). The machine has a head that is
always pointing to exactly one cell (in the beginning to cell 0). The “program” of
the machine is represented by finitely many states, and transitions between those.
The machine executes in steps: In one step it reads the symbol from the cell that the
head is currently pointing to, and according to this symbol and its current state, then
writes a new symbol (which might be the same that the cell contains already) to that
cell. Furthermore, it moves the head one cell to the left, right, or leaves it pointing to
the current cell, and is afterwards in a next, new state (which can be the same, as the
program is allowed to have loops).
When the machine reaches a final state, it self-loops in that state forever, does
not move its head and writes the same symbol to the tape every time. We say, the
machine halts if it reaches a final state.
We know that the following problem for this type of a Turing machine described
above is undecidable: “Given an instanceM of the machine, doesM halt?”
We now construct a formula
ϕM := ψinit ∧G(ψwell f ormed ∧ ψ< ∧ ψstep ∧ ¬ψ f inal),
which is based on a machine instanceM, and show that ϕM has a model iff M does
not halt. Before we discuss the meaning of the different subformulae of ϕM, let us
introduce the following U-operators tapes, head, stateq, <, and =, of which we make
use to describe a run of M: An event of the trace contains ground atom tapes(i) if
for cell i the tape contains the symbol s, head(i) if the head is at position i, and the
proposition stateq represents the current state of M being q. For readability we use
infix notations and write x = y and x < y, to denote predicates for equality and a
strict order relation, respectively. Let us now describe ψinit, ψwell f ormed, ψ<, ψstep and
ψ f inal in more detail:
• The formula
ψinit := head(0) ∧ stateq0 ∧
∧
s∈Γ\{B}
¬∃i : tapes. true
ensures that in the beginning the head is pointing to cell 0, the machine is in its
initial state q0 and the tape is empty. Note that events cannot and also do not
have to contain infinitely many ground atoms tapeB(i); that is, for every cell i.
This is implicitly the case if an event contains no other tape symbol for a cell.
• The formula ψwell f ormed ensures that each configuration of the DTM is well-
formed; that is, the head in exactly at one position, there is only one symbol
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written on each cell of the tape (and different tape symbols cannot be equal),
and the DTM is in exactly one state:
ψwell f ormed := (∀i : head. ∀j : head. i = j)∧(∀i : tapes. ∀j : tapes′ . i = j⇒ s = s′)∧( ∧
s,s′∈Γ,s 6=s′
¬(s = s′)
)
∧
¬
 ∨
p,q∈Q,p 6=q
(
statep ∧ stateq
)
Note that there can be indistinguishable twins representing the current head.
However, if an event contains for example head(0) and head(4), then 0 = 4
appears in the trace, and therefore tape symbols at position 0 and 4 must be
the same (i.e., are indistinguishable).
• We ensure a strict order relation of the indices of the tape the following way:
ψ< :=
(∧
s∈Γ
∀x : tapes. ¬(x < x)
)
∧( ∧
s,s′,s′′∈Γ
∀x : tapes. ∀y : tapes′ . ∀z : tapes′′ . (x < y ∧ y < z)⇒ (x < z)
)
∧( ∧
s,s′∈Γ
∀x : tapes. ∀y : tapes′ . (x = y)⊕ (x < y)⊕ (y < x)
)
• We define a successor relation, which is needed for ψstep, the following way:
ψsucc(x, y) := x < y ∧
∧
s∈Γ
(∀k : tapes. ¬(x < k ∧ k < y)) .
• The formula ψstep ensures that every step that the DTM takes is correct; that is,
ψstep =
∧
q∈Q,s∈Γ,(q′,s′,d)∈δ(q,s) ψstep(q, s, q′, s′, d). Note that this conjunction is finite
as Q, Γ and δ are finite. The ψstep(q, s, q′, s′, d)s, where d ∈ {none, le f t, right} are
defined as follows:
ψstep(q, s, q′, s′, none) :=stateq ∧ ∃i : tapes. head(i)⇒
X(stateq′ ∧ head(i) ∧ tapes′(i))
ψstep(q, s, q′, s′, right) :=stateq ∧ ∃i : tapes. head(i)⇒
X(stateq′ ∧ ∃j : tapes′ . (head(j) ∧ ψsucc(i, j)))
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ψstep(q, s, q′, s′, le f t) :=state(q) ∧ ∃i : tapes. head(i)⇒
X(stateq′ ∧ ∃j : tapes′ . (head(j) ∧ ψsucc(j, i)))
• We conjoin ψstep with the formula∧
s∈Γ
∀i : tapes. ¬head(i)⇒ Xtapes(i),
which expresses the fact that the tape can only change at the position where
the head is currently pointing to.
• The formula ψ f inal describes the machine entering a final state, i.e.,
ψ f inal :=
∨
q∈F
stateq
An instance M of a DTM does not halt iff ϕM is satisfiable; that is, we have
constructed ϕM in such a way that its models are infinite runs of a Turing machine
that never reach a final state. Since ϕM can be constructed effectively for every formal
description of an instance M, the undecidability of the halting problem for Turing
machines with empty input implies the undecidability of the satisfiability problem
of LTLFO.
Theorem 3.2.3. The word problem for LTLFO is PSpace-complete.
Proof. To evaluate a formula ϕ ∈ LTLFO over some linear Kripke structure, KFO, we
can basically use the inductive definition of the semantics of LTLFO: If used as a
function, starting in the initial state of KFO, s0, it evaluates ϕ in a depth-first manner
with the maximal depth bounded by |ϕ| (see a similar proof by [Bauer et al., 2009a,
Theorem 4]).
To show hardness, we reduce the QBF (see Def. A.1.1), which is known to be
PSpace-complete. The reduction of this problem proceeds as follows. We first con-
struct a formula ϕ ∈ LTLFO in prenex normal form,
ϕ = Q1x1 : d. Q2x2 : d. . . . Qnxn : d. E(px1(x1), px2(x2), . . . , pxn(xn)).
Then, using an U-operator pxi for every variable xi, we construct a singleton Kripke
structure, KFO, s.t. λ(s0) = (A, {(d, 0), (d, 1), (px1 , 1), (px2 , 1), . . . , (pxn , 1)}), where
|A| = {0, 1} and I defined accordingly. It can easily be seen that F evaluates to > iff
KFO is a model for ϕ. Moreover, this construction can be obtained in no more than a
polynomial number of steps wrt. the size of the input.
Theorem 3.2.4. The model checking problem for LTLFO is in ExpSpace.
Proof. For a given ϕ ∈ LTLFO and (A)-Kripke structure KFO defined as usual, where
A = (|A|, I), we construct a propositional Kripke structure K′ and ϕ′ ∈ LTL, s.t.
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L(KFO) ⊆ L(ϕ) iff L(K′) ⊆ L(ϕ′) holds. Assuming variable names in ϕ have been
adjusted so that each has a unique name, the construction of ϕ′ proceeds as follows.
Wlog. we can assume |A| to be a finite set {d0, . . . , dn}. We first set ϕ′ to ϕ
and extend the corresponding Γ by the constant symbols cd0 , . . . , cdn , s.t. c
I
di
= di,
respectively; that is, we add the respective interpretations of each cdi to I. This
step obviously does not require more than polynomial space. We then replace all
subformulae in ϕ′ of the form ν = Q x : p. ψ(x) exhaustively with the following
constructed ψ′:
• Set ψ′ = >.
• For each state s ∈ S do the following:
– Let T = {d | λ(s) = (A′, σ),A′ ∼ A and (p, d) ∈ σ}.
– If Q = ∀, then
ψ′ = ψ′ ∧ (s˜⇒ ∧
d∈T
ψ(x)[c / x]), where c is s.t. cI = d,
otherwise
ψ′ = ψ′ ∧ (s˜⇒ ∨
d∈T
ψ(x)[c / x]), where c is s.t. cI = d,
where s˜ is a fresh, unique predicate symbol meant to represent state s.
Then, for all subformulae in ϕ′ of the form s˜⇒ ψ we do the following:
• For each r(t) occurring in ψ, where r ∈ R and t are terms, let d = t I , and
replace r(t) by a fresh, unique predicate symbol rd.
It is easy to see that, indeed, ϕ′ is a syntactically correct standard LTL formula, where
all quantifiers have been eliminated. In terms of space complexity, note that in the
first loop, we replace each quantified formula by an expression at least |K| times
longer than the original quantified formula. In the worst case, the final formula’s
length will be exponential in the number of quantifiers.
We now define the propositional Kripke structure K′ = (S′, s′0,λ′,→′) as follows.
Let S′ = S, s′0 = s0, and →′=→. In what follows, let s be a state and λ(s) =
((|A|, I), σ). (Note, this is the labelling function of K.) The alphabet of K′ is given
by 2AP, where AP = {rd | r ∈ R and d ∈ |A|} ∪ {s˜ | s ∈ S}. Finally, we define the
labelling function of K′ as λ′(s) = {s˜} ∪ {rd | r ∈ R and rI(d) is true}. It is easy to
see that, indeed, K′ preserves all the runs possible through KFO.
One can show by an easy induction on the structure of ϕ′ that, indeed, L(K) ⊆
L(ϕ) iff L(K′) ⊆ L(ϕ′) holds.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let A be a first-order structure and ϕ ∈ LTLFO, then L(ϕ)A = {(A, w) |
A ∼ A, w ∈ Evω, and (A, w) |= ϕ}. Testing if L(ϕ)A 6= ∅ is generally undecidable.
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Proof. Let K = (x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk) be an instance of Post’s Correspondence Problem
over Σ = {0, 1}, where xi, yi ∈ Σ+, which is known to be undecidable in this form.
Let us now define a formula ϕK = ∃γ : z. pcp(γ), a structure A = (Σ+, I), s.t.
pcpI(u) ⇔ u = xi1 . . . xin = yi1 . . . yin , where u ∈ Σ+ and pcp is of corresponding
arity. Obviously, pcpI(u) can be computed in finite time for any given u. Let us now
show that L(ϕK)A 6= ∅ iff K has a solution.
(⇒:) Because L(ϕK)A 6= ∅, let’s assume there is a word u ∈ Σ+ st. (z, u) ∈ σ and
(A, σ) ∈ L(ϕK)A. By the choice of pcpI , there exists a sequence of indices, i1, . . . , in,
st. u = xi1 . . . xin = yi1 . . . yin , i.e., K has a solution.
(⇐:) Let’s assume K has a solution, i.e., there exists a word u ∈ Σ+ and a se-
quence of indices, i1, . . . , in, st. u = xi1 . . . xin = yi1 . . . yin . We now have to show
that L(ϕK)A 6= ∅. For this purpose, set σ = {(z, u)}, then (A, σ) ∈ L(ϕK)A and,
consequently, L(ϕK)A 6= ∅.
Theorem 3.2.5. The prefix problem for LTLFO is undecidable.
Proof. (1): By way of a similar reduction used in Theorem 3.2.1 already, i.e., for any
ϕ, A, and σ ∈ Ev we have that (A, σ) ∈ bad(Xϕ) iff L(ϕ)A = ∅. The ⇐-direction is
obvious. For the other direction:
(A, σ) ∈ bad(Xϕ)
⇒ for all A ∼ A and w ∈ Evω, we have that (AA, σw) 6|= Xϕ
⇒ for all A ∼ A and w ∈ Evω, we have that (A, w) 6|= ϕ
⇒ L(ϕ)A = ∅ (which is generally undecidable by Lemma 3.2.2).
A.2 Spawning automaton
This section contains the proof of Theorem 4.1.1, showing the correctness of the trans-
lation of an LTLFO formula to an SA, as well as the Lemma 4.1.1 on which the theorem
is based.
Lemma 4.1.1. Let ϕ ∈ LTLFO (not necessarily a sentence) and v be a valuation. For
each accepting run ρ in Aϕ,v over input (A, w), ψ ∈ cl(ϕ), and i ≥ 0, we have that
ψ ∈ ρ(i) iff (A, w, v, i) |= ψ.
Proof. We proceed by a nested induction on depth(ϕ) and the structure of ψ ∈ cl(ϕ).
For the base case let depth(ϕ) = 0: We fix ρ to be an accepting run inAϕ,v over (A, w),
and proceed by induction over those formulae ψ ∈ cl(ϕ) which are of depth zero (i.e.,
without quantifiers) since depth(ϕ) = 0. Therefore, this case basically resembles the
correctness argument of BAs for propositional LTL (cf. [Baier and Katoen, 2008, §5]).
For an arbitrary i ≥ 0, we have
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• ψ = r(t):
r(t) ∈ ρ(i) ⇔ t Ii ∈ rIi(by the definition of δ→),
where, as before, for any variable x in t, by xIi we mean v(x)
⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= r(t) (by the semantics of LTLFO)
• ψ = p(t): analogous to the above.
• ψ = ¬ψ′:
¬ψ′ ∈ ρ(i) ⇔ ψ′ 6∈ ρ(i) (by the completeness assumption of all q ∈ Q)
⇔ (A, w, v, i) 6|= ψ′ (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= ¬ψ′ (by the semantics of LTLFO)
• ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2:
ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ ρ(i) ⇔ {ψ1,ψ2} ⊆ ρ(i) (by the completeness assumption of all q ∈ Q)
⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= ψ′1 and (A, w, v, i) |= ψ2 (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 (by the semantics of LTLFO)
• ψ = Xψ′:
Xψ′ ∈ ρ(i) ⇔ ψ′ ∈ ρ(i + 1) (by the definition of δ→)
⇔ (A, w, v, i + 1) |= ψ′ (by induction hypothesis)
⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= Xψ′ (by the semantics of LTLFO)
• ψ = ψ1Uψ2: we first show the⇒-direction. For this, let us first show that there
is a j ≥ i, such that (A, w, v, j) |= ψ2 holds. For suppose not, then for all j ≥ i, we
have that (A, w, v, j) 6|= ψ2 and, consequently, by induction hypothesis ψ2 6∈ ρ(j).
By definition of δ→, since ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(i) and there is not a j s.t. ψ2 ∈ ρ(j), we
have that ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(j) for all j ≥ 0. On the other hand, ρ is accepting in Aϕ,
thus there exist infinitely many j ≥ i, s.t. ψ1Uψ2 6∈ ρ(j) or ψ2 ∈ ρ(j) by the
definition of the generalised Büchi acceptance condition F , which is a contra-
diction. Let us, in what follows, fix the smallest such j. We still need to show
that for all i ≤ k ≤ j, (A, w, v, k) |= ψ1 holds. As j is the smallest such j, where
ψ2 ∈ ρ(j) it follows that ψ2 6∈ ρ(k) for any such k. As ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(i), it follows by
definition of δ→ that ψ1 ∈ ρ(i) and ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(i + 1). We can then inductively
apply this argument to all i ≤ k < j, such that ψ1 ∈ ρ(k) and ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(k + 1)
hold. The statement then follows from the induction hypothesis.
Let us now focus on the⇐-direction, i.e., suppose (A, w, v, i) |= ψ1Uψ2 implies
that ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(i). By assumption, there is a j ≥ i, such that (A, w, v, j) |= ψ2
and for all i ≤ k < j, we have that (A, w, v, k) |= ψ1. Therefore, by induction
hypothesis, ψ2 ∈ ρ(j) and ψ1 ∈ ρ(k) for all such k. Then, by the completeness
assumption of all q ∈ Q, we also get ψ1Uψ2 ∈ pj, and if j = i, we are done.
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Otherwise with an inductive argument similar to the previous case on k = j− 1,
k = j− 2, . . . , k = i, we can infer that ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(k).
Let depth(ϕ) = n > 0, i.e., we suppose that our claim holds for all formulae with
quantifier depth less than n. We continue our proof by structural induction, where
the quantifier free cases are almost exactly as above. Therefore, we focus only on the
following case.
• ψ = ∀x : p. ψ′: for this case, as before with the U-operator, we will first show the
⇒-direction, i.e., for all i ≥ 0 we have ∀x : p. ψ′ ∈ ρ(i) implies (A, w, v, i) |= ∀x :
p. ψ′. By the semantics of LTLFO, the latter is equivalent to for all (p, d) ∈ wi,
(A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i) |= ψ′. If there is no (p, d) ∈ wi the statement is vacuously
true. Otherwise, there are some actions (p, d) ∈ wi and
δ↓(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)) = B ∧
∧
(p,d)∈wi
Aψ′,v∪{x 7→d},
where B is a Boolean combination of SAs corresponding to the remaining ele-
ments in ρ(i). As ρ is accepting inAϕ,v, there exists a Yi satisfying δ↓(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)),
s.t. all A ∈ Yi have an accepting run on input (Ai, wi). It follows that Yi con-
tains an automaton Aψ′,v∪{x 7→d} for each action (p, d) ∈ wi that has an accept-
ing run ρ′. As the respective levels of these automata is n− 1, we can use the
induction hypothesis and note that the following holds true for each of the
Aψ′,v∪{x 7→d} ∈ Yi:
for all: ν ∈ cl(ψ′) and l ≥ 0, ν ∈ ρ′(l) iff (A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i + l) |= ν,
We can now set ν = ψ′, respectively, and l = 0, from which it follows that
ψ′ ∈ ρ′(0) iff (A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i) |= ψ′, respectively. As by construction of
an SA the initial states of runs contain the formula which the SA represents,
we have ψ′ ∈ ρ′(0) and hence (A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i) |= ψ′, respectively. As this
holds for all Aψ′,v∪{x 7→d}, where (p, d) ∈ wi, it follows by semantics of LTLFO
that (A, w, v, i) |= ∀x : p. ψ′.
Let us now consider the ⇐-direction, i.e., (A, w, v, i) |= ∀x : p. ψ′ implies ∀x :
p. ψ′ ∈ ρ(i), which we show by contradiction. Suppose ∀x : p. ψ′ 6∈ ρ(i), which
implies by the completeness assumption of all q ∈ Q that ¬∀x : p. ψ′ ∈ ρ(i)
holds. If there is no (p, d) ∈ wi, then δ↓(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)) is equivalent to ⊥ and ρ
could not be accepting. Therefore there must be some (p, d) ∈ wi, s.t.
δ↓(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)) = B ∧
∨
(p,d)∈wi
A¬ψ′,v∪{x 7→d},
where B is a Boolean combination of SAs corresponding to the remaining el-
ements in ρ(i). Because ρ is accepting in Aϕ,v, there exists a Yi, such that
Yi |= δ↓(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)), and there is at least one SA, A′ = A¬ψ′,v∪{x 7→d} ∈ Yi,
with corresponding (p, d) ∈ wi, s.t. (Ai, wi) is accepted by A′ as input; that is,
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A′ has an accepting run, ρ′, on said input. As this automaton’s level is n− 1,
we can apply the induction hypothesis and obtain
for all: ν ∈ cl(¬ψ′) and l ≥ 0, ν ∈ ρ′(l) iff (A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i + l) |= ν.
We can now set ν = ¬ψ′ and l = 0, and since ν belongs to the initial states in
accepting runs, we derive (A, w, v∪ {x 7→ d}, i) |= ¬ψ′, which is a contradiction
to our initial hypothesis.
Theorem 4.1.1. The constructed SA is correct in the sense that for any sentence
ϕ ∈ LTLFO, we have that L(Aϕ) = L(ϕ).
Proof. ⊆: Follows from Lemma 4.1.1: let ρ be an accepting run over (A, w) in Aϕ. By
definition of an (accepting) run, ϕ ∈ ρ(0), and therefore (A, w) ∈ L(ϕ).
⊇: We show the more general statement: Given a (possibly not closed) formula
ϕ ∈ LTLFO and valuation v. It holds that {(A, w) | (A, w, v, 0) |= ϕ} ⊆ L(Aϕ,v). We
define for all i ≥ 0 the set ρ(i) = {ψ ∈ cl(ϕ) | (A, w, v, i) |= ψ} for some arbitrary
but fixed formula ϕ ∈ LTLFO and valuation v, and arbitrary but fixed (A, w), where
(A, w, v, 0) |= ϕ. Let us now show that ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . is a well-defined run in Aϕ,v
over (A, w): Firstly, from the construction of Q, it follows that for all i, ρ(i) ∈ Q.
Secondly, since ϕ ∈ cl(ϕ) and (A, w, v, 0) |= ϕ, ρ(0) always contains ϕ. Thirdly,
ρ(i + 1) ∈ δ→(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)) holds for all i. The latter is the case iff
• for all Xψ ∈ cl(ϕ): Xψ ∈ ρ(i) iff ψ ∈ ρ(i + 1), and
• for all ψ1Uψ2 ∈ cl(ϕ): ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(i) iff ψ2 ∈ ρ(i) or (ψ1 ∈ ρ(1) and ψ1Uψ2 ∈
ρ(i + 1)).
The first condition can be shown as follows:
Xψ ∈ ρ(i) ⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= Xψ (by definition of ρ(i))
⇔ (A, w, v, i + 1) |= ψ (by the semantics of LTLFO)
⇔ ψ ∈ ρ(i + 1) (by the definition of ρ(i + 1)).
The second can be shown as follows:
ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(i) ⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= ψ1Uψ2 (by definition of ρ(i))
⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= ψ2 ∨ (ψ1 ∧X(ψ1Uψ2))
⇔ (A, w, v, i) |= ψ2 or ((A, w, v, i) |= ψ1 and (A, w, v, i + 1) |= ψ1Uψ2)
⇔ ψ2 ∈ ρ(i) or (ψ1 ∈ ρ(1) and ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(i + 1)) (by definition of ρ).
It remains to show that ρ is also accepting in Aϕ,v. We proceed by induction on
depth(ϕ). In what follows, let depth(ϕ) = 0, i.e., we are showing local acceptance
only. By the definition of acceptance we must have that for all ψ1Uψ2 ∈ cl(ϕ), there
exist infinitely many i ≥ 0, s.t. ρ(i) ∈ Fψ1Uψ2 , where Fψ1Uψ2 ∈ F . For suppose not, i.e.,
there are only finitely many such i, then there is a k ≥ 0, s.t. for all j ≥ k we have
§A.3 Monitor construction 133
ρ(j) 6∈ Fψ1Uψ2 and therefore ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(j) and ψ2 6∈ ρ(j) by definition of Fψ1Uψ2 . In
particular, from ψ1Uψ2 ∈ ρ(k) we derive by construction of ρ(k) that there must be
some g ≥ k, s.t. (Ag, wg) ∈ L(ψ2) and thus ψ2 ∈ ρ(k) with g ≥ k. Contradiction.
Let us now assume the statement holds for all formulae with depth strictly less
than n and assume depth(ϕ) = n, where n > 0. We don’t show local acceptance of ρ
as it is virtually the same as in the base case, and instead go on to show that for all
i ≥ 0, there is a Yi, s.t. Yi |= δ↓(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)) and all A ∈ Yi are accepting (Ai, wi).
Let us define the following two sets:
Y∀i = {Aψ,v∪{x 7→d} | ∀x : p. ψ ∈ ρ(i) and (p, d) ∈ wi}
and
Y∃i = {A¬ψ,v∪{x 7→d} | ¬∀x : p. ψ ∈ ρ(i), (p, d) ∈ wi,
and (A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i) 6|= ψ}.
Set Yi = Y∀i ∪ Y∃i , which by construction satisfies δ↓(ρ(i), (Ai, wi)). We still need to
show that every automaton in this set accepts (Ai, wi). Now for Aν,v∪{x 7→d} ∈ Yi we
have either ν = ψ for some ∀x : p. ψ ∈ ρ(i) and (p, d) ∈ wi, or ν = ¬ψ for some
¬∀x : p. ψ ∈ ρ(i) and (p, d) ∈ wi s.t. (A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i) 6|= ψ holds. In either case
by definition of ρ(i) and semantics of LTLFO, it follows that (A, w, v ∪ {x 7→ d}, i) |=
ν. Since the level of Aν,v∪{x 7→d} is strictly less than n, we can apply the induction
hypothesis and construct an accepting run for (Ai, wi), where (A, w, v∪{x 7→ d}, i) |=
ν, in Aν,v∪{x 7→d}. The statement follows.
A.3 Monitor construction
This section contains the detailed proof of Theorem 4.2.1, which shows that the con-
structed monitor is impartial.
Theorem 4.2.1. Mϕ(A, u) = > ⇒ (A, u) ∈ good(ϕ) (resp. for ⊥ and bad(ϕ)).
Proof. We prove the more general statement Mϕ,v(A, u) = > ⇒ (A, u) ∈ good(ϕ, v),
where ϕ possibly has some free variables and v is a valuation, by a nested induction
over depth(ϕ).
• For the base case let depth(ϕ) = 0, where ϕ possibly has free variables, (A, u)
be an arbitrary but fixed prefix and v a valuation. Suppose Mϕ,v(A, u) returns
> after processing (A, u), but (A, u) 6∈ good(ϕ, v). By M3 and T10, the buffer
of T¬ϕ,v is empty, i.e., B¬ϕ,v = ∅. By T3 and because A¬ϕ,v has an accepting
run ρ over (A, u) with some suffix, B¬ϕ,v contains (ρ(|u|), [>]) after processing
(A, u). Furthermore, because δ↓ yields > for any input iff depth(¬ϕ) = 0, no
run in the buffer is ever removed in T7. Contradiction.
• Let depth(ϕ) > 0, (A, u) be an arbitrary but fixed prefix and v a valuation.
Under the same assumptions as above, we will reach a contradiction showing
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that after processing (A, u), there is a sequence of obligations (ρ(|u|), [obl0, . . . ,
obln]) in buffer B¬ϕ,v, which corresponds to an accepting run ρ in A¬ϕ,v over
(A, u) with some suffix (A′, w′). That is, Mϕ,v cannot return >, after B¬ϕ,v is
empty, and B¬ϕ,v containing the above mentioned sequence at the same time.
By T3, B¬ϕ,v contains a sequence (ρ(|u|), [obl0, . . . , obln]) that was incrementally
created processing (A, u) wrt. δ→, eventually with some obligations removed if
they were detected to be met by the input. We now show that this sequence is
never removed from the buffer in T7. Suppose the run has been removed, then
there was an oblj = δ↓(ρ(j), (Aj, uj)), that is ∧
∀ x:p.ψ∈ρ(j)
 ∧
(p,d)∈uj
Aψ,v′
 ∧
 ∧
¬∀ x:p.ψ∈ρ(j)
 ∨
(p,d)∈uj
A¬ψ,v′′
 ,
with v′ = v∪ {x 7→ d} and v′′ = v∪ {x 7→ d}, evaluated to ⊥ after l steps, with
0 ≤ j ≤ l < |u|. That is, at least one submonitor corresponding to an automaton
in the second conjunction has returned ⊥ (or all submonitors corresponding to
automata in a disjunction, for which the following argument would be similar).
Wlog. let ∀x : p.ψ ∈ ρ(j), (p, d) ∈ uj, and Mψ,v′(Aj, . . . ,Al , uj, . . . , ul) = ⊥,
i.e., Mψ,v′ is the submonitor corresponding to Aψ,v′ . As level(ψ) < level(ϕ),
from the induction hypothesis follows that (Aj, . . . ,Al , uj, . . . , ul) ∈ bad(ψ, v′),
i.e., (Aj, . . . ,AlA
′′, uj, . . . , ulw′′) 6|= ψ with evaluation v′ for any (A′′, w′′), and
therefore (Aj, . . . ,AlA
′′, uj, . . . , ulw′′) |= ¬∀x : p.ψ under valuation v. But as
ρ over (AA′, uw′) is an accepting run in A¬ϕ,v and ∀x : p.ψ ∈ ρ(j), it follows
that (AjA′, ujw′) |= ∀x : p.ψ. Now, we choose (A′′, w′′) to be (Al+1, . . . ,A|u|A′,
ul+1, . . . , u|u|w′). Contradiction.
As for our second statement above, it can be shown similar as before.
Appendix B
Proof of concept:
Additional experiment data
Figure B.1: Global market share of the Android OS (Source: http://www.statista.
com/statistics/266136/global-market-share-held-by-smartphone-operating-systems/).
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Figure B.2: New mobile malware collected by McAfee (Source: http://www.mcafee.
com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-aug-2015.pdf).
Figure B.3: Android architecture (Source: http://www.techotopia.com/index.php/
File:Android_architecture.png).
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B.1 Information stealing
Table B.1: Monitor results for the category information stealing of the AMGP
Cat. 1 (ϕ1−ϕ14)
1. [ϕ1]39
[ϕ2]
39
[ϕ11]
153
2. [[ϕ1]]458
[[ϕ2]]
458
[[ϕ3]]
458
[[ϕ4]]
458
[[ϕ5]]
458
[[ϕ12]]
115
ϕ14
2057
3.
4. [[ϕ2]]126
[[ϕ11]]
126
5.
6. [[ϕ1]]824
[[ϕ4]]
824
[[ϕ10]]
303
[[ϕ14]]
853
7. [[ϕ1]]81
[[ϕ2]]
81
8. ϕ141
9.
10. [ϕ1]810
[ϕ2]
810
[ϕ3]
810
[ϕ4]
810
[ϕ12]
810
[ϕ13]
810
11.
12. [[ϕ1]]300
[[ϕ2]]
300
13.
14.
15.
16. [[ϕ1]]332
[[ϕ3]]
332
[[ϕ4]]
332
17. [[ϕ1]]383
[[ϕ2]]
383
[[ϕ3]]
383
[[ϕ4]]
383
18. [ϕ1]276
19. [[ϕ1]]256
[[ϕ2]]
256
[[ϕ4]]
4189
[[ϕ12]]
304
20. [[ϕ4]]321
21.
22.
23. ϕ11176
24. [[ϕ1]]267
[[ϕ3]]
267
[[ϕ4]]
267
[[ϕ5]]
267
25. [[ϕ4]]437
[[ϕ11]]
193
[ϕ14]
595
26. [[ϕ1]]173
[[ϕ2]]
173
[[ϕ3]]
173
[[ϕ4]]
173
[[ϕ12]]
173
27. [[ϕ12]]1051
28. [ϕ6]618
[ϕ7]
350
[ϕ8]
350
[ϕ9]
350
[ϕ11]
350
29.
30. [ϕ3]352
[[ϕ11]]
329
31.
32. [[ϕ1]]558
[ϕ2]
558
[ϕ10]
679
33.
34. [[ϕ2]]378
35. [[ϕ1]]175
[[ϕ3]]
175
[[ϕ4]]
175
36. [[ϕ1]]219
′
37. [[ϕ4]]604
38. [[ϕ1]]58
39. [ϕ1]526
[ϕ2]
652
[ϕ14]
1030
40. [[ϕ1]]575
[ϕ7]
781
[ϕ8]
781
41. [[ϕ7]]236
42. ϕ1168
ϕ4
170
43. [[ϕ4]]242
44.
45. [[ϕ1]]392
[[ϕ7]]
492
[[ϕ8]]
492
46. [[ϕ1]]387
[[ϕ3]]
387
[[ϕ4]]
387
ϕ11
507
47. [[ϕ1]]618
[[ϕ2]]
618
[ϕ3]
618
[ϕ6]
618
[ϕ9]
1253
[ϕ10]
1253
[ϕ11]
618
48. [[ϕ1]]1045
49.
24 13 10 15 2 2 4 3 2 3 8 5 1 4
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B.2 False positives
Table B.2–B.3 show the results of MonitorMe for 61 benign apps from the Google Play
Store. The left column contains the apps’ package name under which those appear
on the test phone (Nexus 5 with version 5.0.1). Note that for Android version 5.0.1,
aborting of received SMS as well as sending SMS messages to premium numbers is
not possible anymore. Furthermore, there have not been observed any attempts to
execute on the command line. For those reasons we leave out Category 2 and 4 in
the tables.
Table B.2: False positives for 61 apps on the Nexus 5 running Android 5.0.1—Part 1.
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Table B.3: False positives for 61 apps on the Nexus 5 running Android 5.0.1—Part 2.
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B.3 Intercepted interface names
Table B.4–Table B.5 show in the left column the different interface names that have
been discovered by DroidTracer on a real phone (Nexus 5 with Android version
5.0.1). The right column indicates how often method calls occurred for each interface.
For example, for android.app.IActivityManager have been counted with 88,940
the most method calls. This is because the Activity Manager is continuously involved
in managing the life cycle of apps, i.e., it starts, stops or resumes them. The data was
collected during the false positive experiments; that is, the data is from monitoring
the 61 benign apps.1 Method names are not shown here, as these would be too many.
However, this tables provide an overview of the broad range of possible events that
can be picked from when using DroidTracer for analysis.
Table B.4: Complete list of observed interface names on Nexus 5—Part 1.
Interface Events
IMountService 1,164
android.accessibilityservice.IAccessibilityServiceConnection 223
android.accounts.IAccountManager 727
android.app.IActivityContainer 118
android.app.IActivityManager 88,940
android.app.IAlarmManager 1,974
android.app.IApplicationThread 60,211
android.app.INotificationManager 429
android.app.ISearchManager 8
android.app.IUiModeManager 117
android.app.admin.IDevicePolicyManager 14
android.app.backup.IBackupManager 8
android.bluetooth.IBluetooth 42
android.bluetooth.IBluetoothA2dp 1
android.bluetooth.IBluetoothHeadset 1
android.bluetooth.IBluetoothManager 17
android.content.IBulkCursor 8,632
android.content.IClipboard 2
android.content.IContentProvider 12,941
android.content.IContentService 10,483
android.content.ISyncContext 19
android.content.pm.IPackageManager 15,996
android.database.IContentObserver 87
android.drm.IDrm 42
1The complete SQLite database on which this aggregation is based, can be found under http://
kuester.multics.org/DroidTracer/malware/traces/.
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Table B.5: Complete list of observed interface names on Nexus 5—Part 2.
Interface Events
android.gui.DisplayEventConnection 38,724
android.gui.IProducerListener 156
android.gui.SensorEventConnection 1,151
android.gui.SensorServer 399
android.hardware.ICamera 50
android.hardware.ICameraService 48
android.hardware.display.IDisplayManager 11,369
android.hardware.input.IInputManager 248
android.location.ILocationManager 507
android.media.IAudioFlinger 478
android.media.IAudioPolicyService 34,837
android.media.IAudioService 68
android.media.IAudioTrack 456
android.media.IMediaCodecList 1,463
android.media.IMediaMetadataRetriever 2,092
android.media.IMediaPlayer 850
android.media.IMediaPlayerService 417
android.media.IMediaRouterService 35
android.media.session.ISession 273
android.media.session.ISessionManager 36
android.net.IConnectivityManager 14,195
android.net.INetworkStatsService 91
android.net.wifi.IWifiManager 1,042
android.nfc.INfcAdapter 7
android.os.IMessenger 113
android.os.IPowerManager 2,620
android.os.IServiceManager 43,057
android.os.IUserManager 344
android.os.IVibratorService 50
android.ui.IGraphicBufferAlloc 57
android.ui.ISurfaceComposer 165
android.utils.IMemory 115
android.utils.IMemoryHeap 5
android.view.IAssetAtlas 198
android.view.IWindowManager 17,710
android.view.IWindowSession 2,930
android.view.accessibility.IAccessibilityInteractionConnectionCallback 1
android.view.accessibility.IAccessibilityManager 20,611
android.webkit.IWebViewUpdateService 71
com.android.internal.app.IAppOpsService 744
com.android.internal.appwidget.IAppWidgetService 365
com.android.internal.os.IResultReceiver 3
com.android.internal.telecom.ITelecomService 34,722
142 Proof of concept: Additional experiment data
Table B.6: Complete list of observed interface names on Nexus 5—Part 3.
Interface Events
com.android.internal.telephony.IPhoneSubInfo 225
com.android.internal.telephony.ISub 2,861
com.android.internal.telephony.ITelephony 480
com.android.internal.telephony.ITelephonyRegistry 22
com.android.internal.textservice.ISpellCheckerSession 15
com.android.internal.textservice.ISpellCheckerSessionListener 11
com.android.internal.textservice.ITextServicesManager 264
com.android.internal.view.IInputContext 2,121
com.android.internal.view.IInputContextCallback 262
com.android.internal.view.IInputMethodManager 1,419
com.android.internal.view.IInputMethodSession 686
com.android.internal.view.IInputSessionCallback 86
com.android.vending.billing.IInAppBillingService 64
com.facebook.fbservice.observer.IBlueServiceObserver 2
com.facebook.fbservice.service.IBlueService 2
com.facebook.fbservice.service.ICompletionHandler 2
com.google.android.auth.IAuthManagerService 35
com.google.android.finsky.services.IMarketCatalogService 1
com.google.android.gms.ads.identifier.internal.IAdvertisingIdService 650
com.google.android.gms.ads.internal.gservice.IGservicesValueService 10
com.google.android.gms.ads.internal.request.IAdRequestService 23
com.google.android.gms.analytics.internal.IAnalyticsService 129
com.google.android.gms.appdatasearch.internal.IAppDataSearch 153
com.google.android.gms.clearcut.internal.IClearcutLoggerService 196
com.google.android.gms.common.internal.IGmsServiceBroker 373
com.google.android.gms.fitness.internal.IGoogleFitnessService 14
com.google.android.gms.http.IGoogleHttpService 466
com.google.android.gms.location.internal.IGoogleLocationManagerService 863
com.google.android.gms.location.reporting.internal.IReportingService 25
com.google.android.gms.maps.auth.IApiTokenService 2
com.google.android.gms.mdm.internal.INetworkQualityService 16
com.google.android.gms.people.internal.IPeopleService 17
com.google.android.music.net.IDownloadabilityChangeListener 1
com.google.android.music.net.INetworkChangeListener 5
com.google.android.music.net.INetworkMonitor 4
com.google.android.music.net.IStreamabilityChangeListener 1
com.google.android.music.playback.IMusicPlaybackService 87
com.google.android.music.preferences.IPreferenceChangeListener 3
com.google.android.music.preferences.IPreferenceService 5
com.google.android.music.store.IStoreService 798
com.google.android.now.INowAuthService 2
syscall 1,959
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